BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2101915
-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end is coming in GCC-14, and we are getting
ready to enable it globally.
There is currently an object (`hdr)` in `struct ima_max_digest_data`
that contains a flexible structure (`struct ima_digest_data`):
struct ima_max_digest_data {
struct ima_digest_data hdr;
u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
} __packed;
So, in order to avoid ending up with a flexible-array member in the
middle of a struct, we use the `__struct_group()` helper to separate
the flexible array from the rest of the members in the flexible
structure:
struct ima_digest_data {
__struct_group(ima_digest_data_hdr, hdr, __packed,
... the rest of the members
);
u8 digest[];
} __packed;
And similarly for `struct evm_ima_xattr_data`.
With the change described above, we can now declare an object of the
type of the tagged `struct ima_digest_data_hdr`, without embedding the
flexible array in the middle of another struct:
struct ima_max_digest_data {
struct ima_digest_data_hdr hdr;
u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
} __packed;
And similarly for `struct evm_digest` and `struct evm_xattr`.
We also use `container_of()` whenever we need to retrieve a pointer to
the flexible structure.
So, with these changes, fix the following warnings:
security/integrity/evm/evm.h:64:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/evm/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/evm/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/ima/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/ima/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/platform_certs/../integrity.h:40:35: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
security/integrity/platform_certs/../integrity.h:68:32: warning: structure containing a flexible array member is not at the end of another structure [-Wflex-array-member-not-at-end]
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/202
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38aa3f5ac6d2de6b471ecb6e1cd878957ae7e8de)
[koichiroden: prerequisite for the subsequent commit]
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2028253
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
(cherry picked from commit ec1eb9be88908dcb7e040a27c40f247b20ca5f21
https://git.launchpad.net/~apparmor-dev/ubuntu-kernel-next)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2028253
Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
security module to use for a particular rule.
This requires adding the LSM of interest as a parameter
to three of the audit hooks.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
To: audit@vger.kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit d177f98409d82dbb23763122fd1e4eb9897cf6ac
https://git.launchpad.net/~apparmor-dev/ubuntu-kernel-next)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
- Add a new IMA/EVM maintainer and reviewer
- Disable EVM on overlayfs
The EVM HMAC and the original file signatures contain filesystem
specific metadata (e.g. i_ino, i_generation and s_uuid), preventing
the security.evm xattr from directly being copied up to the overlay.
Further before calculating and writing out the overlay file's EVM
HMAC, EVM must first verify the existing backing file's
'security.evm' value.
For now until a solution is developed, disable EVM on overlayfs.
- One bug fix and two cleanups
* tag 'integrity-v6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
overlay: disable EVM
evm: add support to disable EVM on unsupported filesystems
evm: don't copy up 'security.evm' xattr
MAINTAINERS: Add Eric Snowberg as a reviewer to IMA
MAINTAINERS: Add Roberto Sassu as co-maintainer to IMA and EVM
KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep
ima: Remove EXPERIMENTAL from Kconfig
ima: Reword IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
"Quite a lot of kexec work this time around. Many singleton patches in
many places. The notable patch series are:
- nilfs2 folio conversion from Matthew Wilcox in 'nilfs2: Folio
conversions for file paths'.
- Additional nilfs2 folio conversion from Ryusuke Konishi in 'nilfs2:
Folio conversions for directory paths'.
- IA64 remnant removal in Heiko Carstens's 'Remove unused code after
IA-64 removal'.
- Arnd Bergmann has enabled the -Wmissing-prototypes warning
everywhere in 'Treewide: enable -Wmissing-prototypes'. This had
some followup fixes:
- Nathan Chancellor has cleaned up the hexagon build in the series
'hexagon: Fix up instances of -Wmissing-prototypes'.
- Nathan also addressed some s390 warnings in 's390: A couple of
fixes for -Wmissing-prototypes'.
- Arnd Bergmann addresses the same warnings for MIPS in his series
'mips: address -Wmissing-prototypes warnings'.
- Baoquan He has made kexec_file operate in a top-down-fitting manner
similar to kexec_load in the series 'kexec_file: Load kernel at top
of system RAM if required'
- Baoquan He has also added the self-explanatory 'kexec_file: print
out debugging message if required'.
- Some checkstack maintenance work from Tiezhu Yang in the series
'Modify some code about checkstack'.
- Douglas Anderson has disentangled the watchdog code's logging when
multiple reports are occurring simultaneously. The series is
'watchdog: Better handling of concurrent lockups'.
- Yuntao Wang has contributed some maintenance work on the crash code
in 'crash: Some cleanups and fixes'"
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2024-01-09-10-33' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (157 commits)
crash_core: fix and simplify the logic of crash_exclude_mem_range()
x86/crash: use SZ_1M macro instead of hardcoded value
x86/crash: remove the unused image parameter from prepare_elf_headers()
kdump: remove redundant DEFAULT_CRASH_KERNEL_LOW_SIZE
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh: strip unexpected CR from lines
watchdog: if panicking and we dumped everything, don't re-enable dumping
watchdog/hardlockup: use printk_cpu_sync_get_irqsave() to serialize reporting
watchdog/softlockup: use printk_cpu_sync_get_irqsave() to serialize reporting
watchdog/hardlockup: adopt softlockup logic avoiding double-dumps
kexec_core: fix the assignment to kimage->control_page
x86/kexec: fix incorrect end address passed to kernel_ident_mapping_init()
lib/trace_readwrite.c:: replace asm-generic/io with linux/io
nilfs2: cpfile: fix some kernel-doc warnings
stacktrace: fix kernel-doc typo
scripts/checkstack.pl: fix no space expression between sp and offset
x86/kexec: fix incorrect argument passed to kexec_dprintk()
x86/kexec: use pr_err() instead of kexec_dprintk() when an error occurs
nilfs2: add missing set_freezable() for freezable kthread
kernel: relay: remove relay_file_splice_read dead code, doesn't work
docs: submit-checklist: remove all of "make namespacecheck"
...
When the machine keyring is enabled, it may be used as a trust source
for the .ima keyring. Add a reference to this in
IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Four integrity changes: two IMA-overlay updates, an integrity Kconfig
cleanup, and a secondary keyring update"
* tag 'integrity-v6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: detect changes to the backing overlay file
certs: Only allow certs signed by keys on the builtin keyring
integrity: fix indentation of config attributes
ima: annotate iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positive warnings
Commit 18b44bc5a6 ("ovl: Always reevaluate the file signature for
IMA") forced signature re-evaulation on every file access.
Instead of always re-evaluating the file's integrity, detect a change
to the backing file, by comparing the cached file metadata with the
backing file's metadata. Verifying just the i_version has not changed
is insufficient. In addition save and compare the i_ino and s_dev
as well.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Raul E Rangel <rrangel@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull hardening updates from Kees Cook:
"One of the more voluminous set of changes is for adding the new
__counted_by annotation[1] to gain run-time bounds checking of
dynamically sized arrays with UBSan.
- Add LKDTM test for stuck CPUs (Mark Rutland)
- Improve LKDTM selftest behavior under UBSan (Ricardo Cañuelo)
- Refactor more 1-element arrays into flexible arrays (Gustavo A. R.
Silva)
- Analyze and replace strlcpy and strncpy uses (Justin Stitt, Azeem
Shaikh)
- Convert group_info.usage to refcount_t (Elena Reshetova)
- Add __counted_by annotations (Kees Cook, Gustavo A. R. Silva)
- Add Kconfig fragment for basic hardening options (Kees Cook, Lukas
Bulwahn)
- Fix randstruct GCC plugin performance mode to stay in groups (Kees
Cook)
- Fix strtomem() compile-time check for small sources (Kees Cook)"
* tag 'hardening-v6.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (56 commits)
hwmon: (acpi_power_meter) replace open-coded kmemdup_nul
reset: Annotate struct reset_control_array with __counted_by
kexec: Annotate struct crash_mem with __counted_by
virtio_console: Annotate struct port_buffer with __counted_by
ima: Add __counted_by for struct modsig and use struct_size()
MAINTAINERS: Include stackleak paths in hardening entry
string: Adjust strtomem() logic to allow for smaller sources
hardening: x86: drop reference to removed config AMD_IOMMU_V2
randstruct: Fix gcc-plugin performance mode to stay in group
mailbox: zynqmp: Annotate struct zynqmp_ipi_pdata with __counted_by
drivers: thermal: tsens: Annotate struct tsens_priv with __counted_by
irqchip/imx-intmux: Annotate struct intmux_data with __counted_by
KVM: Annotate struct kvm_irq_routing_table with __counted_by
virt: acrn: Annotate struct vm_memory_region_batch with __counted_by
hwmon: Annotate struct gsc_hwmon_platform_data with __counted_by
sparc: Annotate struct cpuinfo_tree with __counted_by
isdn: kcapi: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy_pad
isdn: replace deprecated strncpy with strscpy
NFS/flexfiles: Annotate struct nfs4_ff_layout_segment with __counted_by
nfs41: Annotate struct nfs4_file_layout_dsaddr with __counted_by
...
Prepare for the coming implementation by GCC and Clang of the __counted_by
attribute. Flexible array members annotated with __counted_by can have
their accesses bounds-checked at run-time via CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS (for
array indexing) and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE (for strcpy/memcpy-family
functions).
Also, relocate `hdr->raw_pkcs7_len = sig_len;` so that the __counted_by
annotation has effect, and flex-array member `raw_pkcs7` can be properly
bounds-checked at run-time.
While there, use struct_size() helper, instead of the open-coded
version, to calculate the size for the allocation of the whole
flexible structure, including of course, the flexible-array member.
This code was found with the help of Coccinelle, and audited and
fixed manually.
Signed-off-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZSRaDcJNARUUWUwS@work
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Changing the direct dependencies of IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING and
IMA_LOAD_X509 caused them to no longer depend on IMA, but a
a configuration without IMA results in link failures:
arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: security/integrity/iint.o: in function `integrity_load_keys':
iint.c:(.init.text+0xd8): undefined reference to `ima_load_x509'
aarch64-linux-ld: security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.o: in function `asymmetric_verify':
digsig_asymmetric.c:(.text+0x104): undefined reference to `ima_blacklist_keyring'
Adding explicit dependencies on IMA would fix this, but a more reliable
way to do this is to enclose the entire Kconfig file in an 'if IMA' block.
This also allows removing the existing direct dependencies.
Fixes: be210c6d35 ("ima: Finish deprecation of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The removal of IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING made IMA_LOAD_X509
and IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING unavailable because the latter
two depend on the former. Since IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING was
deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING use it
as a dependency for the two Kconfigs affected by the
deprecation.
Fixes: 5087fd9e80 ("ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig")
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tymoshenko <ovt@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
- With commit 099f26f22f ("integrity: machine keyring CA
configuration") certificates may be loaded onto the IMA keyring,
directly or indirectly signed by keys on either the "builtin" or the
"machine" keyrings.
With the ability for the system/machine owner to sign the IMA policy
itself without needing to recompile the kernel, update the IMA
architecture specific policy rules to require the IMA policy itself
be signed.
[ As commit 099f26f22f was upstreamed in linux-6.4, updating the
IMA architecture specific policy now to require signed IMA policies
may break userspace expectations. ]
- IMA only checked the file data hash was not on the system blacklist
keyring for files with an appended signature (e.g. kernel modules,
Power kernel image).
Check all file data hashes regardless of how it was signed
- Code cleanup, and a kernel-doc update
* tag 'integrity-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
kexec_lock: Replace kexec_mutex() by kexec_lock() in two comments
ima: require signed IMA policy when UEFI secure boot is enabled
integrity: Always reference the blacklist keyring with appraisal
ima: Remove deprecated IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING Kconfig
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
- Restrict linking of keys to .ima and .evm keyrings based on
digitalSignature attribute in the certificate
- PowerVM: load machine owner keys into the .machine [1] keyring
- PowerVM: load module signing keys into the secondary trusted keyring
(keys blessed by the vendor)
- tpm_tis_spi: half-duplex transfer mode
- tpm_tis: retry corrupted transfers
- Apply revocation list (.mokx) to an all system keyrings (e.g.
.machine keyring)
Link: https://blogs.oracle.com/linux/post/the-machine-keyring [1]
* tag 'tpmdd-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
certs: Reference revocation list for all keyrings
tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer: Use module_platform_driver macro to simplify the code
tpm: remove redundant variable len
tpm_tis: Resend command to recover from data transfer errors
tpm_tis: Use responseRetry to recover from data transfer errors
tpm_tis: Move CRC check to generic send routine
tpm_tis_spi: Add hardware wait polling
KEYS: Replace all non-returning strlcpy with strscpy
integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys
integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement
integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled
integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c
integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform
integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring
integrity: Enforce digitalSignature usage in the ima and evm keyrings
KEYS: DigitalSignature link restriction
tpm_tis: Revert "tpm_tis: Disable interrupts on ThinkPad T490s"
kexec_mutex is replaced by an atomic variable
in 05c6257433 (panic, kexec: make __crash_kexec() NMI safe).
But there are still two comments that referenced kexec_mutex,
replace them by kexec_lock.
Signed-off-by: Wenyu Liu <liuwenyu7@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
With commit 099f26f22f ("integrity: machine keyring CA
configuration"), users are able to add custom IMA CA keys via
MOK. This allows users to sign their own IMA polices without
recompiling the kernel. For the sake of security, mandate signed IMA
policy when UEFI secure boot is enabled.
Note this change may affect existing users/tests i.e users won't be able
to load an unsigned IMA policy when the IMA architecture specific policy
is configured and UEFI secure boot is enabled.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Commit 273df864cf ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with
modsig") introduced an appraise_flag option for referencing the blacklist
keyring. Any matching binary found on this keyring fails signature
validation. This flag only works with module appended signatures.
An important part of a PKI infrastructure is to have the ability to do
revocation at a later time should a vulnerability be found. Expand the
revocation flag usage to all appraisal functions. The flag is now
enabled by default. Setting the flag with an IMA policy has been
deprecated. Without a revocation capability like this in place, only
authenticity can be maintained. With this change, integrity can now be
achieved with digital signature based IMA appraisal.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
"An i_version change, one bug fix, and three kernel doc fixes:
- instead of IMA detecting file change by directly accesssing
i_version, it now calls vfs_getattr_nosec().
- fix a race condition when inserting a new node in the iint rb-tree"
* tag 'integrity-v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Fix build warnings
evm: Fix build warnings
evm: Complete description of evm_inode_setattr()
integrity: Fix possible multiple allocation in integrity_inode_get()
IMA: use vfs_getattr_nosec to get the i_version
Address several issues with the calling convention and documentation of
fsverity_get_digest():
- Make it provide the hash algorithm as either a FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_*
value or HASH_ALGO_* value, at the caller's choice, rather than only a
HASH_ALGO_* value as it did before. This allows callers to work with
the fsverity native algorithm numbers if they want to. HASH_ALGO_* is
what IMA uses, but other users (e.g. overlayfs) should use
FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_* to match fsverity-utils and the fsverity UAPI.
- Make it return the digest size so that it doesn't need to be looked up
separately. Use the return value for this, since 0 works nicely for
the "file doesn't have fsverity enabled" case. This also makes it
clear that no other errors are possible.
- Rename the 'digest' parameter to 'raw_digest' and clearly document
that it is only useful in combination with the algorithm ID. This
hopefully clears up a point of confusion.
- Export it to modules, since overlayfs will need it for checking the
fsverity digests of lowerdata files
(https://lore.kernel.org/r/dd294a44e8f401e6b5140029d8355f88748cd8fd.1686565330.git.alexl@redhat.com).
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> # for the IMA piece
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230612190047.59755-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
IMA currently accesses the i_version out of the inode directly when it
does a measurement. This is fine for most simple filesystems, but can be
problematic with more complex setups (e.g. overlayfs).
Make IMA instead call vfs_getattr_nosec to get this info. This allows
the filesystem to determine whether and how to report the i_version, and
should allow IMA to work properly with a broader class of filesystems in
the future.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull integrity update from Mimi Zohar:
"Just one one bug fix. Other integrity changes are being upstreamed via
the tpm and lsm trees"
* tag 'integrity-v6.4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
IMA: allow/fix UML builds
UML supports HAS_IOMEM since 0bbadafdc4 (um: allow disabling
NO_IOMEM).
Current IMA build on UML fails on allmodconfig (with TCG_TPM=m):
ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.o: in function `ima_add_template_entry':
ima_queue.c:(.text+0x2d9): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_extend'
ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_init.o: in function `ima_init':
ima_init.c:(.init.text+0x43f): undefined reference to `tpm_default_chip'
ld: security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.o: in function `ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm':
ima_crypto.c:(.text+0x1044): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_read'
ld: ima_crypto.c:(.text+0x10d8): undefined reference to `tpm_pcr_read'
Modify the IMA Kconfig entry so that it selects TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
is set, regardless of the UML Kconfig setting.
This updates TCG_TPM from =m to =y and fixes the linker errors.
Fixes: f4a0391dfa ("ima: fix Kconfig dependencies")
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.14+
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull integrity update from Mimi Zohar:
"One doc and one code cleanup, and two bug fixes"
* tag 'integrity-v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook
ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook
evm: call dump_security_xattr() in all cases to remove code duplication
ima: fix ima_delete_rules() kernel-doc warning
ima: return IMA digest value only when IMA_COLLECTED flag is set
ima: fix error handling logic when file measurement failed
Commit 98de59bfe4 ("take calculation of final prot in
security_mmap_file() into a helper") caused ima_file_mmap() to receive the
protections requested by the application and not those applied by the
kernel.
After restoring the original MMAP_CHECK behavior, existing attestation
servers might be broken due to not being ready to handle new entries
(previously missing) in the IMA measurement list.
Restore the original correct MMAP_CHECK behavior, instead of keeping the
current buggy one and introducing a new hook with the correct behavior.
Otherwise, there would have been the risk of IMA users not noticing the
problem at all, as they would actively have to update the IMA policy, to
switch to the correct behavior.
Also, introduce the new MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook to keep the current
behavior, so that IMA users could easily fix a broken attestation server,
although this approach is discouraged due to potentially missing
measurements.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Commit 98de59bfe4 ("take calculation of final prot in
security_mmap_file() into a helper") moved the code to update prot, to be
the actual protections applied to the kernel, to a new helper called
mmap_prot().
However, while without the helper ima_file_mmap() was getting the updated
prot, with the helper ima_file_mmap() gets the original prot, which
contains the protections requested by the application.
A possible consequence of this change is that, if an application calls
mmap() with only PROT_READ, and the kernel applies PROT_EXEC in addition,
that application would have access to executable memory without having this
event recorded in the IMA measurement list. This situation would occur for
example if the application, before mmap(), calls the personality() system
call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC as the first argument.
Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with those of the mmap_file LSM hook, so
that IMA can receive both the requested prot and the final prot. Since the
requested protections are stored in a new variable, and the final
protections are stored in the existing variable, this effectively restores
the original behavior of the MMAP_CHECK hook.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 98de59bfe4 ("take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Remove legacy file_mnt_user_ns() and mnt_user_ns().
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Use correct kernel-doc syntax in the function description to
prevent a kernel-doc warning:
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:1964: warning: expecting prototype for ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in(). Prototype was for ima_delete_rules() instead
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The IMA_COLLECTED flag indicates whether the IMA subsystem has
successfully collected a measurement for a given file object. Ensure
that we return the respective digest value stored within the iint
entry only when this flag has been set.
Failing to check for the presence of this flag exposes consumers of
this IMA API to receive potentially undesired IMA digest values when
an erroneous condition has been experienced in some of the lower level
IMA API code.
Signed-off-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Restore the error handling logic so that when file measurement fails,
the respective iint entry is not left with the digest data being
populated with zeroes.
Fixes: 54f03916fb ("ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.19
Signed-off-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Pull vfsuid cleanup from Christian Brauner:
"This moves the ima specific vfs{g,u}id_t comparison helpers out of the
header and into the one file in ima where they are used.
We shouldn't incentivize people to use them by placing them into the
header. As discussed and suggested by Linus in [1] let's just define
them locally in the one file in ima where they are used"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wj4BpEwUd=OkTv1F9uykvSrsBNZJVHMp+p_+e2kiV71_A@mail.gmail.com [1]
* tag 'fs.vfsuid.ima.v6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping:
mnt_idmapping: move ima-only helpers to ima
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Aside from the one cleanup, the other changes are bug fixes:
Cleanup:
- Include missing iMac Pro 2017 in list of Macs with T2 security chip
Bug fixes:
- Improper instantiation of "encrypted" keys with user provided data
- Not handling delay in updating LSM label based IMA policy rules
(-ESTALE)
- IMA and integrity memory leaks on error paths
- CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 hash algorithm renamed"
* tag 'integrity-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Fix hash dependency to correct algorithm
ima: Fix misuse of dereference of pointer in template_desc_init_fields()
integrity: Fix memory leakage in keyring allocation error path
ima: Fix memory leak in __ima_inode_hash()
ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()
ima: Simplify ima_lsm_copy_rule
ima: Fix a potential NULL pointer access in ima_restore_measurement_list
efi: Add iMac Pro 2017 to uefi skip cert quirk
KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data
Gustavo A. R. Silva
Samasth Norway Ananda
GUO Zihua
Stefan Berger
Casey Schaufler
Tim Gardner
Linus Torvalds
Kirill A. Shutemov
Baoquan He
Eric Snowberg
Mimi Zohar
Arnd Bergmann
Oleksandr Tymoshenko
Kees Cook
Wenyu Liu
Coiby Xu
Nayna Jain
Eric Biggers
Roberto Sassu
Jeff Layton
Randy Dunlap
Christian Brauner
Matt Bobrowski