UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor4.0.0 [01/90]: LSM stacking v39: integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2028253 Create real functions for the ima_filter_rule interfaces. These replace #defines that obscure the reuse of audit interfaces. The new functions are put in security.c because they use security module registered hooks that we don't want exported. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org (cherry picked from commit ceac4ac3a986cd84c6b83ff962fbc4206e42bd99 https://git.launchpad.net/~apparmor-dev/ubuntu-kernel-next) Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>
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Paolo Pisati
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@@ -2023,6 +2023,30 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
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#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
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#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
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#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
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int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
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int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
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void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
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#else
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static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
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void **lsmrule)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
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void *lsmrule)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
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{ }
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#endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
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extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
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@@ -420,32 +420,6 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
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/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
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#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
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#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
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#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
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#else
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static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
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void **lsmrule)
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{
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
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{
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}
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static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
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void *lsmrule)
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{
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
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#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
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#else
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@@ -5404,6 +5404,27 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
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/*
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* The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
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* the audit subsystem.
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*/
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int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
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{
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return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
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}
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void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
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{
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call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
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}
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int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
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{
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return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
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#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
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/**
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* security_bpf() - Check if the bpf syscall operation is allowed
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