UBUNTU: SAUCE: security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open

https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/11/587

The GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN feature extracted from grsecurity.  Adds the
option to disable perf_event_open() entirely for unprivileged users.
This standalone version doesn't include making the variable read-only
(or renaming it).

When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all
access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that
makes this value the default.

This is based on a similar feature in grsecurity
(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN).  This version doesn't include making
the variable read-only.  It also allows enabling further restriction
at run-time regardless of whether the default is changed.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
[ saf: resolve conflicts with v5.8-rc1 ]
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
[ arighi: resolve conflicts with v6.2-rc2 ]
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ben Hutchings
2016-08-16 10:27:00 -06:00
committed by Paolo Pisati
parent 4db0d77540
commit e88769f04a
3 changed files with 23 additions and 0 deletions
+6
View File
@@ -1612,6 +1612,12 @@ int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
#define PERF_SECURITY_CPU 1
#define PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL 2
#define PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT 3
#define PERF_SECURITY_MAX 4
static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void)
{
return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >= PERF_SECURITY_MAX;
}
static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
{
+8
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@@ -415,8 +415,13 @@ static struct kmem_cache *perf_event_cache;
* 0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
* 1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
* 2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
* 4 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = PERF_SECURITY_MAX;
#else
int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
#endif
/* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
@@ -12440,6 +12445,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL)
return -EINVAL;
if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr);
if (err)
return err;
+9
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@@ -19,6 +19,15 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
depends on PERF_EVENTS
help
If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
changed.
config SECURITY
bool "Enable different security models"
depends on SYSFS