UBUNTU: SAUCE: security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open
https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/11/587 The GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN feature extracted from grsecurity. Adds the option to disable perf_event_open() entirely for unprivileged users. This standalone version doesn't include making the variable read-only (or renaming it). When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that makes this value the default. This is based on a similar feature in grsecurity (CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN). This version doesn't include making the variable read-only. It also allows enabling further restriction at run-time regardless of whether the default is changed. Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com> [ saf: resolve conflicts with v5.8-rc1 ] Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> [ arighi: resolve conflicts with v6.2-rc2 ] Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Paolo Pisati
parent
4db0d77540
commit
e88769f04a
@@ -1612,6 +1612,12 @@ int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
|
||||
#define PERF_SECURITY_CPU 1
|
||||
#define PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL 2
|
||||
#define PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT 3
|
||||
#define PERF_SECURITY_MAX 4
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid >= PERF_SECURITY_MAX;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -415,8 +415,13 @@ static struct kmem_cache *perf_event_cache;
|
||||
* 0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
|
||||
* 1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
|
||||
* 2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
|
||||
* 4 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
|
||||
int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = PERF_SECURITY_MAX;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
|
||||
int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
|
||||
@@ -12440,6 +12445,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
|
||||
if (flags & ~PERF_FLAG_ALL)
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
||||
return -EACCES;
|
||||
|
||||
err = perf_copy_attr(attr_uptr, &attr);
|
||||
if (err)
|
||||
return err;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +19,15 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
|
||||
|
||||
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
|
||||
|
||||
config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
|
||||
bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
|
||||
depends on PERF_EVENTS
|
||||
help
|
||||
If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
|
||||
will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
|
||||
perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
|
||||
changed.
|
||||
|
||||
config SECURITY
|
||||
bool "Enable different security models"
|
||||
depends on SYSFS
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user