BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2111953
[ Upstream commit 8dd458cbc5be9ce4427ffce7a9dcdbff4dfc4ac9 ]
During the boot process self-tests are postponed so that all
algorithms are registered when the test starts. In the event
that algorithms are still being registered during these tests,
which can occur either because the algorithm is registered at
late_initcall, or because a self-test itself triggers the creation
of an instance, some self-tests may never start at all.
Fix this by setting the flag at the start of crypto_start_tests.
Note that this race is theoretical and has never been observed
in practice.
Fixes: adad556efc ("crypto: api - Fix built-in testing dependency failures")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert.xu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <manuel.diewald@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mehmet Basaran <mehmet.basaran@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2102118
[ Upstream commit 3b0565c703503f832d6cd7ba805aafa3b330cb9d ]
When extracting a signature component r or s from an ASN.1-encoded
integer, ecdsa_get_signature_rs() subtracts the expected length
"bufsize" from the ASN.1 length "vlen" (both of unsigned type size_t)
and stores the result in "diff" (of signed type ssize_t).
This results in a signed integer overflow if vlen > SSIZE_MAX + bufsize.
The kernel is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow, which implies -fwrapv,
meaning signed integer overflow is not undefined behavior. And the
function does check for overflow:
if (-diff >= bufsize)
return -EINVAL;
So the code is fine in principle but not very obvious. In the future it
might trigger a false-positive with CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP=y.
Avoid by comparing the two unsigned variables directly and erroring out
if "vlen" is too large.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2102118
[ Upstream commit 546ce0bdc91afd9f5c4c67d9fc4733e0fc7086d1 ]
Since ecc_digits_from_bytes will provide zeros when an insufficient number
of bytes are passed in the input byte array, use it to convert the r and s
components of the signature to digits directly from the input byte
array. This avoids going through an intermediate byte array that has the
first few bytes filled with zeros.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: 3b0565c70350 ("crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decoding")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit ec64889179410e67d1b2aa7b047cafaa2d0c3f43 linux-6.6.y)
[koichiroden: from v6.6.70, as a dependency for "crypto: ecdsa - Avoid
signed integer overflow on signature decoding"]
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2102118
[ Upstream commit 703ca5cda1ea04735e48882a7cccff97d57656c3 ]
In cases where 'keylen' was referring to the size of the buffer used by
a curve's digits, it does not reflect the purpose of the variable anymore
once NIST P521 is used. What it refers to then is the size of the buffer,
which may be a few bytes larger than the size a coordinate of a key.
Therefore, rename keylen to bufsize where appropriate.
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: 3b0565c70350 ("crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decoding")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1afc7acbedb8dcae865d5b650c4a12aa4a48bd07 linux-6.6.y)
[koichiroden: from v6.6.70, as a dependency for "crypto: ecdsa - Avoid
signed integer overflow on signature decoding"]
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2102118
[ Upstream commit c6ab5c915da460c0397960af3c308386c3f3247b ]
Prevent ecc_digits_from_bytes from reading too many bytes from the input
byte array in case an insufficient number of bytes is provided to fill the
output digit array of ndigits. Therefore, initialize the most significant
digits with 0 to avoid trying to read too many bytes later on. Convert the
function into a regular function since it is getting too big for an inline
function.
If too many bytes are provided on the input byte array the extra bytes
are ignored since the input variable 'ndigits' limits the number of digits
that will be filled.
Fixes: d67c96fb97b5 ("crypto: ecdsa - Convert byte arrays with key coordinates to digits")
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55779f26eab9af12474a447001bd17070f055712 linux-6.6.y)
[koichiroden: follow-up fix from v6.6.70]
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2102118
[ Upstream commit d67c96fb97b5811e15c881d5cb72e293faa5f8e1 ]
For NIST P192/256/384 the public key's x and y parameters could be copied
directly from a given array since both parameters filled 'ndigits' of
digits (a 'digit' is a u64). For support of NIST P521 the key parameters
need to have leading zeros prepended to the most significant digit since
only 2 bytes of the most significant digit are provided.
Therefore, implement ecc_digits_from_bytes to convert a byte array into an
array of digits and use this function in ecdsa_set_pub_key where an input
byte array needs to be converted into digits.
Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Tested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: 3b0565c70350 ("crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decoding")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit e7fcd5d696c4d020b4218f5015631596ab382475 linux-6.6.y)
[koichiroden: from v6.6.70, as a dependency for "crypto: ecdsa - Avoid
signed integer overflow on signature decoding"]
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2101915
[ Upstream commit 662f2f13e66d3883b9238b0b96b17886179e60e2 ]
Since commit 8f4f68e788 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for
PADATA_RESET"), the pcrypt encryption and decryption operations return
-EAGAIN when the CPU goes online or offline. In alg_test(), a WARN is
generated when pcrypt_aead_decrypt() or pcrypt_aead_encrypt() returns
-EAGAIN, the unnecessary panic will occur when panic_on_warn set 1.
Fix this issue by calling crypto layer directly without parallelization
in that case.
Fixes: 8f4f68e788 ("crypto: pcrypt - Fix hungtask for PADATA_RESET")
Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
CVE-2024-56690
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2100894
[ Upstream commit b81e286ba154a4e0f01a94d99179a97f4ba3e396 ]
As algorithm testing is carried out without holding the main crypto
lock, it is always possible for the algorithm to go away during the
test.
So before crypto_alg_tested updates the status of the tested alg,
it checks whether it's still on the list of all algorithms. This
is inaccurate because it may be off the main list but still on the
list of algorithms to be removed.
Updating the algorithm status is safe per se as the larval still
holds a reference to it. However, killing spawns of other algorithms
that are of lower priority is clearly a deficiency as it adds
unnecessary churn.
Fix the test by checking whether the algorithm is dead.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <manuel.diewald@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2089884
[ Upstream commit 3c44d31cb34ce4eb8311a2e73634d57702948230 ]
Algorithm registration is usually carried out during module init,
where as little work as possible should be carried out. The SIMD
code violated this rule by allocating a tfm, this then triggers a
full test of the algorithm which may dead-lock in certain cases.
SIMD is only allocating the tfm to get at the alg object, which is
in fact already available as it is what we are registering. Use
that directly and remove the crypto_alloc_tfm call.
Also remove some obsolete and unused SIMD API.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu <roxana.nicolescu@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2089340
commit 70fd1966c93bf3bfe3fe6d753eb3d83a76597eef upstream.
In find_asymmetric_key(), if all NULLs are passed in the id_{0,1,2}
arguments, the kernel will first emit WARN but then have an oops
because id_2 gets dereferenced anyway.
Add the missing id_2 check and move WARN_ON() to the final else branch
to avoid duplicate NULL checks.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static
analysis tool.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.17+
Fixes: 7d30198ee2 ("keys: X.509 public key issuer lookup without AKID")
Suggested-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Portia Stephens <portia.stephens@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2089340
[ Upstream commit ab9a244c396aae4aaa34b2399b82fc15ec2df8c1 ]
Commit c055e3eae0 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking")
switched from using jiffies to ktime-based performance benchmarking.
This works nicely on machines which have a fine-grained ktime()
clocksource as e.g. x86 machines with TSC.
But other machines, e.g. my 4-way HP PARISC server, don't have such
fine-grained clocksources, which is why it seems that 800 xor loops
take zero seconds, which then shows up in the logs as:
xor: measuring software checksum speed
8regs : -1018167296 MB/sec
8regs_prefetch : -1018167296 MB/sec
32regs : -1018167296 MB/sec
32regs_prefetch : -1018167296 MB/sec
Fix this with some small modifications to the existing code to improve
the algorithm to always produce correct results without introducing
major delays for architectures with a fine-grained ktime()
clocksource:
a) Delay start of the timing until ktime() just advanced. On machines
with a fast ktime() this should be just one additional ktime() call.
b) Count the number of loops. Run at minimum 800 loops and finish
earliest when the ktime() counter has progressed.
With that the throughput can now be calculated more accurately under all
conditions.
Fixes: c055e3eae0 ("crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking")
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Tested-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
v2:
- clean up coding style (noticed & suggested by Herbert Xu)
- rephrased & fixed typo in commit message
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Portia Stephens <portia.stephens@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2076435
[ Upstream commit 73e5984e540a76a2ee1868b91590c922da8c24c9 ]
private_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the
caller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key.
However, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly
generated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that
scenario, some key material from the previous key would not be
overwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire
private_key array first.
Note that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function:
previously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would
remain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is
consistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid
fails.
Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Portia Stephens <portia.stephens@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu <roxana.nicolescu@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2073788
commit eb5739a1efbc9ff216271aeea0ebe1c92e5383e5 upstream.
Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for
RSA-related and other algorithms.
The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names
"crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these
aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance,
when using the `add_key` function, the hash algorithm is typically
loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not.
Steps to test:
1. Cert is generated usings ima-evm-utils test suite with
`gen-keys.sh`, example cert is provided below:
$ base64 -d >test-gost2012_512-A.cer <<EOF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=
EOF
2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module &
3. Trigger add_key call for the cert:
# keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u <test-gost2012_512-A.cer
939910969
# lsmod | head -3
Module Size Used by
ecrdsa_generic 16384 0
streebog_generic 28672 0
Repored-by: Paul Wolneykien <manowar@altlinux.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Portia Stephens <portia.stephens@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu <roxana.nicolescu@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2073788
commit 48e4fd6d54f54d0ceab5a952d73e47a9454a6ccb upstream.
Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for
RSA-related and other algorithms.
The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names
"crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these
aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance,
when using the `add_key` function, the hash algorithm is typically
loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not.
Steps to test:
1. Create certificate
openssl req -x509 -sha256 -newkey ec \
-pkeyopt "ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1" -keyout key.pem -days 365 \
-subj '/CN=test' -nodes -outform der -out nist-p384.der
2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module &
3. Trigger add_key call for the cert:
# keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u < nist-p384.der
641069229
# lsmod | head -2
Module Size Used by
ecdsa_generic 16384 0
Fixes: c12d448ba9 ("crypto: ecdsa - Register NIST P384 and extend test suite")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Portia Stephens <portia.stephens@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Roxana Nicolescu <roxana.nicolescu@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2071621
commit dcaa86b904ea3761e62c849957dd0904e126bf4a upstream.
Make ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE select CRYPTO_SIG to avoid build
errors like the following, which were possible with
CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y && CONFIG_CRYPTO_SIG=n:
ld: vmlinux.o: in function `public_key_verify_signature':
(.text+0x306280): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_sig'
ld: (.text+0x306300): undefined reference to `crypto_sig_set_pubkey'
ld: (.text+0x306324): undefined reference to `crypto_sig_verify'
ld: (.text+0x30636c): undefined reference to `crypto_sig_set_privkey'
Fixes: 63ba4d6759 ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto interface without scatterlists")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Manuel Diewald <manuel.diewald@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2060531
commit 203a6763ab699da0568fd2b76303d03bb121abd4 upstream.
This reverts commit 16ab7cb582 because it
broke iwd. iwd uses the KEYCTL_PKEY_* UAPIs via its dependency libell,
and apparently it is relying on SHA-1 signature support. These UAPIs
are fairly obscure, and their documentation does not mention which
algorithms they support. iwd really should be using a properly
supported userspace crypto library instead. Regardless, since something
broke we have to revert the change.
It may be possible that some parts of this commit can be reinstated
without breaking iwd (e.g. probably the removal of MODULE_SIG_SHA1), but
for now this just does a full revert to get things working again.
Reported-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CZSHRUIJ4RKL.34T4EASV5DNJM@matfyz.cz
Cc: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Karel Balej <balejk@matfyz.cz>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2049082
Ensure that kernels built with CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS=y default to fips
mode. Such that testing FIPS kernels in FIPS mode requires no
additional bootloader configuration. This will ease testing,
deployment, downgrades/upgrades, certification.
Tested by building unstable kernel with a minimal FIPS configuration
enabled, and observing that default boot goes into fips mode, as well
as when fips=1 passed on the cmdline. Also verified that fips=0 turns
off fips mode correctly.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Andrei Gherzan <andrei.gherzan@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
After the update to gcc 10 we started to experience the following build
errors on ARM:
crypto/aegis128-neon-inner.c: In function 'crypto_aegis128_init_neon':
crypto/aegis128-neon-inner.c:151:3: error: incompatible types when initializing type 'unsigned char' using type 'uint8x16_t'
151 | k ^ vld1q_u8(const0),
| ^
crypto/aegis128-neon-inner.c:152:3: error: incompatible types when initializing type 'unsigned char' using type 'uint8x16_t'
152 | k ^ vld1q_u8(const1),
| ^
This seems to be a gcc bug:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=96377
The workaround (suggested in the bug report) is to enforce a cast to
uint8x16_t.
Apply the workaround so that we can re-enable the driver disabled by
7c950e057db6 ("UBUNTU: [Config] disable CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEGIS128_SIMD").
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
The lskcipher glue code for skcipher needs to copy the IV every
time rather than only on the first and last request. Otherwise
those algorithms that use IV to perform chaining may break, e.g.,
CBC.
This is because crypto_skcipher_import/export do not include the
IV as part of the saved state.
Reported-by: syzbot+b90b904ef6bdfdafec1d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 662ea18d08 ("crypto: skcipher - Make use of internal state")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch registers the deflate-iaa deflate compression algorithm and
hooks it up to the IAA hardware using the 'fixed' compression mode
introduced in the previous patch.
Because the IAA hardware has a 4k history-window limitation, only
buffers <= 4k, or that have been compressed using a <= 4k history
window, are technically compliant with the deflate spec, which allows
for a window of up to 32k. Because of this limitation, the IAA fixed
mode deflate algorithm is given its own algorithm name, 'deflate-iaa'.
With this change, the deflate-iaa crypto algorithm is registered and
operational, and compression and decompression operations are fully
enabled following the successful binding of the first IAA workqueue
to the iaa_crypto sub-driver.
when there are no IAA workqueues bound to the driver, the IAA crypto
algorithm can be unregistered by removing the module.
A new iaa_crypto 'verify_compress' driver attribute is also added,
allowing the user to toggle compression verification. If set, each
compress will be internally decompressed and the contents verified,
returning error codes if unsuccessful. This can be toggled with 0/1:
echo 0 > /sys/bus/dsa/drivers/crypto/verify_compress
The default setting is '1' - verify all compresses.
The verify_compress value setting at the time the algorithm is
registered is captured in the algorithm's crypto_ctx and used for all
compresses when using the algorithm.
[ Based on work originally by George Powley, Jing Lin and Kyung Min
Park ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Unlike algif_aead which is always issued in one go (thus limiting
the maximum size of the request), algif_skcipher has always allowed
unlimited input data by cutting them up as necessary and feeding
the fragments to the underlying algorithm one at a time.
However, because of deficiencies in the API, this has been broken
for most stream ciphers such as arc4 or chacha. This is because
they have an internal state in addition to the IV that must be
preserved in order to continue processing.
Fix this by using the new skcipher state API.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The arc4 algorithm has always had internal state. It's been buggy
from day one in that the state has been stored in the shared tfm
object. That means two users sharing the same tfm will end up
affecting each other's output, or worse, they may end up with the
same output.
Fix this by declaring an internal state and storing the state there
instead of within the tfm context.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This patch adds code to the skcipher/lskcipher API to make use
of the internal state if present. In particular, the skcipher
lskcipher wrapper will allocate a buffer for the IV/state and
feed that to the underlying lskcipher algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Unlike chaining modes such as CBC, stream ciphers other than CTR
usually hold an internal state that must be preserved if the
operation is to be done piecemeal. This has not been represented
in the API, resulting in the inability to split up stream cipher
operations.
This patch adds the basic representation of an internal state to
skcipher and lskcipher. In the interest of backwards compatibility,
the default has been set such that existing users are assumed to
be operating in one go as opposed to piecemeal.
With the new API, each lskcipher/skcipher algorithm has a new
attribute called statesize. For skcipher, this is the size of
the buffer that can be exported or imported similar to ahash.
For lskcipher, instead of providing a buffer of ivsize, the user
now has to provide a buffer of ivsize + statesize.
Each skcipher operation is assumed to be final as they are now,
but this may be overridden with a request flag. When the override
occurs, the user may then export the partial state and reimport
it later.
For lskcipher operations this is reversed. All operations are
not final and the state will be exported unless the FINAL bit is
set. However, the CONT bit still has to be set for the state
to be used.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Having multiple in-flight AIO requests results in unpredictable
output because they all share the same IV. Fix this by only allowing
one request at a time.
Fixes: 83094e5e9e ("crypto: af_alg - add async support to algif_aead")
Fixes: a596999b7d ("crypto: algif - change algif_skcipher to be asynchronous")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
SP800-90C 3rd draft states that SHA-1 will be removed from all
specifications, including drbg by end of 2030. Given kernels built
today will be operating past that date, start complying with upcoming
requirements.
No functional change, as SHA-256 / SHA-512 based DRBG have always been
the preferred ones.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Update code comment, self test & healthcheck to use HMAC SHA512,
instead of HMAC SHA256. These changes are in dead-code, or FIPS
enabled code-paths only and have not effect on usual kernel builds.
On systems booting in FIPS mode that has the effect of switch sanity
selftest to HMAC sha512 based (which has been the default DRBG).
This patch updates code from 9b7b94683a ("crypto: DRBG - switch to
HMAC SHA512 DRBG as default DRBG"), but is not interesting to
cherry-pick for stable updates, because it doesn't affect regular
builds, nor has any tangible effect on FIPS certifcation.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When originally drbg was introduced FIPS self-checks for all types but
CTR were using the most preferred parameters for each type of
DRBG. Update CTR self-check to use aes256.
This patch updates code from 541af946fe ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A
Deterministic Random Bit Generator"), but is not interesting to
cherry-pick for stable updates, because it doesn't affect regular
builds, nor has any tangible effect on FIPS certifcation.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
drbg supports multiple types of drbg, and multiple parameters of
each. Health check sanity only checks one drbg of a single type. One
can enable all three types of drbg. And instead of checking the most
preferred algorithm (last one wins), it is currently checking first
one instead.
Update ifdef to ensure that healthcheck prefers HMAC, over HASH, over
CTR, last one wins, like all other code and functions.
This patch updates code from 541af946fe ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A
Deterministic Random Bit Generator"), but is not interesting to
cherry-pick for stable updates, because it doesn't affect regular
builds, nor has any tangible effect on FIPS certifcation.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Static checkers insist that the mpi_alloc() allocation can fail so add
a check to prevent a NULL dereference. Small allocations like this
can't actually fail in current kernels, but adding a check is very
simple and makes the static checkers happy.
Fixes: 6637e11e4a ("crypto: rsa - allow only odd e and restrict value in FIPS mode")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
EINPROGRESS and EBUSY have special meaning for async operations.
However, shash is always synchronous, so these statuses have no special
meaning for shash and don't need to be excluded when handling errors.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes a regression in ahash and hides the Kconfig sub-options for
the jitter RNG"
* tag 'v6.7-p2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: ahash - Set using_shash for cloned ahash wrapper over shash
crypto: jitterentropy - Hide esoteric Kconfig options under FIPS and EXPERT
As JITTERENTROPY is selected by default if you enable the CRYPTO
API, any Kconfig options added there will show up for every single
user. Hide the esoteric options under EXPERT as well as FIPS so
that only distro makers will see them.
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add virtual-address based lskcipher interface
- Optimise ahash/shash performance in light of costly indirect calls
- Remove ahash alignmask attribute
Algorithms:
- Improve AES/XTS performance of 6-way unrolling for ppc
- Remove some uses of obsolete algorithms (md4, md5, sha1)
- Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support in pkcs1pad
- Add fast path for single-page messages in adiantum
- Remove zlib-deflate
Drivers:
- Add support for S4 in meson RNG driver
- Add STM32MP13x support in stm32
- Add hwrng interface support in qcom-rng
- Add support for deflate algorithm in hisilicon/zip"
* tag 'v6.7-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (283 commits)
crypto: adiantum - flush destination page before unmapping
crypto: testmgr - move pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-*) to correct place
Documentation/module-signing.txt: bring up to date
module: enable automatic module signing with FIPS 202 SHA-3
crypto: asymmetric_keys - allow FIPS 202 SHA-3 signatures
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support
crypto: FIPS 202 SHA-3 register in hash info for IMA
x509: Add OIDs for FIPS 202 SHA-3 hash and signatures
crypto: ahash - optimize performance when wrapping shash
crypto: ahash - check for shash type instead of not ahash type
crypto: hash - move "ahash wrapping shash" functions to ahash.c
crypto: talitos - stop using crypto_ahash::init
crypto: chelsio - stop using crypto_ahash::init
crypto: ahash - improve file comment
crypto: ahash - remove struct ahash_request_priv
crypto: ahash - remove crypto_ahash_alignmask
crypto: gcm - stop using alignmask of ahash
crypto: chacha20poly1305 - stop using alignmask of ahash
crypto: ccm - stop using alignmask of ahash
net: ipv6: stop checking crypto_ahash_alignmask
...
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Four integrity changes: two IMA-overlay updates, an integrity Kconfig
cleanup, and a secondary keyring update"
* tag 'integrity-v6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: detect changes to the backing overlay file
certs: Only allow certs signed by keys on the builtin keyring
integrity: fix indentation of config attributes
ima: annotate iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positive warnings
Akhil R
Herbert Xu
Lukas Wunner
Stefan Berger
Yi Yang
Roman Smirnov
Helge Deller
Hailey Mothershead
Joachim Vandersmissen
Vitaly Chikunov
Eric Biggers
Randy Dunlap
Dimitri John Ledkov
Andrea Righi
Tim Gardner
Chengming Zhou
Tom Zanussi
Dan Carpenter
Linus Torvalds
Dmitry Safonov