UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor4.0.0 [88/90]: apparmor: add fine grained ipv4/ipv6 mediation

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2028253
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2056496

Add the ability to mediate inet access at a port and address level.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
(cherry picked from commit fefa3cec7db83b9a0dd1a339f7c8d76c0b820ad8
https://git.launchpad.net/~apparmor-dev/ubuntu-kernel-next)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Pisati <paolo.pisati@canonical.com>

security/apparmor/Makefile

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o task.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
               resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o \
-              policy_compat.o af_unix.o notify.o
+              policy_compat.o af_unix.o af_inet.o notify.o
 apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_KUNIT_TEST) += apparmor_policy_unpack_test.o

security/apparmor/af_inet.c

@@ -0,0 +1,854 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor inet fine grained mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2024 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <net/tcp_states.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/af_inet.h"
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/cred.h"
+
+
+
+static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_SK(struct aa_ruleset *rules,
+					  struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return RULE_MEDIATES_AF(rules, sk->sk_family);
+}
+
+
+enum addr_type {
+	ADDR_LOCAL = 0,
+	ADDR_LOCAL_PRIV	= 1,
+	ADDR_REMOTE = 2,
+};
+
+struct match_addr {
+	const char *addrp;
+	enum addr_type addrtype;
+	int len;
+	__be16 port;
+};
+
+struct stored_match_addr {
+	struct sockaddr addr;
+	int addrlen;
+	struct match_addr maddr;
+};
+
+static void set_ad_create(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
+			 int family, int type, int protocol)
+{
+	ad->common.u.net->family = family;
+	ad->net.type = type;
+	ad->net.protocol = protocol;
+}
+
+static int set_ad_addr(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
+		       u16 family, bool source, struct match_addr *maddr)
+{
+	ad->common.u.net->family = family;
+
+	if (source) {
+		ad->common.u.net->sport = maddr->port;
+		if (maddr->addrp) {
+			if (family == AF_INET)
+				//ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+				ad->common.u.net->v4info.saddr = *(__be32 *)maddr->addrp;
+			else
+				//ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+				ad->common.u.net->v6info.saddr = *(struct in6_addr *)maddr->addrp;
+		}
+	} else {
+		ad->common.u.net->dport = maddr->port;
+		if (maddr->addrp) {
+			if (family == AF_INET)
+				//ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+				ad->common.u.net->v4info.daddr = *(__be32 *)maddr->addrp;
+			else
+				//ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+				ad->common.u.net->v6info.daddr = *(struct in6_addr *)maddr->addrp;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* returns 0 on success
+* raw_port - if set raw_port (protocol) when SOCK_RAW */
+static int map_addr(struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen, u16 raw_port,
+		    enum addr_type addrtype, struct match_addr *maddr,
+		    struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+
+	AA_BUG(!maddr);
+
+	maddr->addrtype = addrtype;
+	if (!addr) {
+		maddr->addrp = NULL;
+		maddr->port = 0;
+		maddr->len = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * its possibly to have sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 and
+	 * addr->sa_family == AF_INET. sk_family is used for socket
+	 * mediation, sa_family for when we have address ...
+	 */
+	switch (addr->sa_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
+		if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		maddr->port = addr4->sin_port;
+		maddr->addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+		maddr->len = 4;
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
+		if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		maddr->port = addr6->sin6_port;
+		maddr->addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+		maddr->len = 16;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+	}
+	/* per ip spec, && sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW*/
+	if (raw_port && addrtype != ADDR_REMOTE)
+		maddr->port = raw_port;
+	if (ad)
+		set_ad_addr(ad, addr->sa_family, addrtype != ADDR_REMOTE, maddr);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* -ENOTCONN if not connected */
+static int map_sock_addr(struct socket *sock, enum addr_type addrtype,
+			 struct stored_match_addr *maddr,
+			 struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	/* do we need early bailout for !family ... */
+	maddr->addrlen = sock->ops->getname(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &maddr->addr, addrtype != ADDR_REMOTE ? 0 : 1);
+	if (maddr->addrlen == -ENOTCONN) {
+		maddr->addrlen = 0;
+		return map_addr(NULL, 0, 0, addrtype, &maddr->maddr, ad);
+	} else if (maddr->addrlen < 0)
+		return maddr->addrlen;
+	return map_addr(&maddr->addr, maddr->addrlen, 0, addrtype,
+			&maddr->maddr, ad);
+}
+
+/* TODO: combine with connect map addr */
+/* TODO: raw_port */
+static int bind_map_addr(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen,
+			 struct match_addr *maddr,
+			 struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+	u16 family;
+
+	AA_BUG(!addr);
+	AA_BUG(!maddr);
+
+	if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	maddr->addrtype = ADDR_LOCAL;
+	/*
+	 * its possibly to have sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 and
+	 * addr->sa_family == AF_INET. sk_family is used for socket
+	 * mediation, sa_family for when we have address ...
+	 */
+	family = addr->sa_family;
+	switch (addr->sa_family) {
+	case AF_UNSPEC:
+		if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
+			/* Length check from inet6_bind_sk() */
+			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			/* Family check from __inet6_bind() */
+			return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+		}
+		/* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
+		 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
+		 */
+		if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
+			return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+		family = AF_INET;
+		fallthrough;
+	case AF_INET:
+		addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
+		if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		maddr->port = addr4->sin_port;
+		maddr->addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+		maddr->len = 4;
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
+		if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		maddr->port = addr6->sin6_port;
+		maddr->addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+		maddr->len = 16;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+	}
+
+	if (ad)
+		set_ad_addr(ad, family, true, maddr);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* only continue match if
+ *   insufficient current perms at current state
+ *   indicates there are more perms in later state
+ * Returns: perms struct if early match
+ */
+static struct aa_perms *early_match(struct aa_policydb *policy,
+				    aa_state_t state, u32 request)
+{
+	struct aa_perms *p;
+
+	p = aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
+	if (((p->allow & request) != request) && (p->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH))
+		return NULL;
+	return p;
+}
+
+static int do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, aa_state_t state, u32 request,
+		    struct aa_perms *p, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_perms perms;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+
+	if (state || !p)
+		p = aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+	perms = *p;
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
+			      audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+static aa_state_t match_addr(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
+			     struct match_addr *maddr)
+{
+	char l = (char) maddr->addrtype;
+
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, &l, 1);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, (char *)&maddr->port, 2);
+	if (maddr->len == 0 && !maddr->addrp) {
+		l = 0;
+	} else if (maddr->len == 4) {
+		l = 1;
+	} else if (maddr->len == 16) {
+		l = 2;
+	} else {
+		AA_BUG("address length unsupported");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, &l, 1);
+	if (maddr->addrp)
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, maddr->addrp, maddr->len);
+	/* null transition between addr and label */
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+
+static aa_state_t match_addr_info(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
+				  struct match_addr *maddr,
+				  const char **info)
+{
+	state = match_addr(dfa, state, maddr);
+	if (!state) {
+		*info = maddr->addrtype == ADDR_REMOTE ?
+			"failed remote addr match" :
+			"failed local addr match";
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+static aa_state_t match_addr_label(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
+				   u32 request, struct match_addr *maddr,
+				   struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
+{
+	state = match_addr_info(policy->dfa, state, maddr, info);
+	*p = early_match(policy, state, request);
+	if (!*p) {
+		/* TODO: actual label match: */
+		if (!state) {
+			*info = maddr->addrtype == ADDR_REMOTE ?
+				"failed remote label match" :
+				"failed local label match";
+		}
+
+		/* null transition after label match */
+		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(policy->dfa, state);
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+
+/* passing in state returned by PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF */
+static aa_state_t match_to_prot(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
+				u32 request, int type, int protocol,
+				struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
+{
+	__be16 buffer;
+	buffer = cpu_to_be16((u16)type);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, 2);
+	if (!state)
+		*info = "failed type match";
+	*p = early_match(policy, state, request);
+	if (!*p) {
+		buffer = cpu_to_be16((u16)protocol);
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
+					 2);
+		if (!state)
+			*info = "failed protocol match";
+	}
+	return state;
+}
+
+static aa_state_t match_to_sk(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
+			      u32 request, struct sock *sk,
+			      struct match_addr *maddr,
+			      struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
+{
+	*p = NULL;
+	state = match_to_prot(policy, state, request, sk->sk_type,
+			      sk->sk_protocol, p, info);
+	if (*p || !state)
+		return state;
+	return match_addr_label(policy, state, request, maddr, p, info);
+}
+
+enum cmd_type {
+	CMD_ADDR = 1,
+	CMD_LISTEN = 2,
+	CMD_OPT = 4,
+};
+
+static inline aa_state_t match_to_cmd(struct aa_policydb *policy,
+				      aa_state_t state, u32 request,
+				      struct sock *sk, enum cmd_type cmd,
+				      struct match_addr *maddr,
+				      struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
+{
+	state = match_to_sk(policy, state, request, sk, maddr, p, info);
+	if (!*p && state) {
+		char c = (char) cmd;
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(policy->dfa, state, &c, 1);
+		if (!state)
+			*info = "failed cmd selection match";
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/*
+static int match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *peer,
+			      aa_state_t state, u32 request,
+			      struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!peer);
+
+	ad->peer = &peer->label;
+
+	if (state) {
+		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state,
+				     peer->base.hname);
+		if (!state)
+			ad->info = "failed peer label match";
+	}
+	return do_perms(profile, state, request, ad);
+}
+*/
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+
+static inline int profile_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
+				    struct sock *sk, struct match_addr *maddr,
+				    struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules),
+						    list);
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_AF(rules, sk->sk_family);
+	if (state) {
+		state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, request, sk,
+				    maddr, &p, &ad->info);
+		return do_perms(profile, state, request, p, ad);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk);
+}
+
+/* no kernel_t bailout */
+static int profile_create_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, int family,
+			       int type, int protocol,
+			       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_AF(rules, family);
+	if (state) {
+		state = match_to_prot(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+				      type, protocol, &p, &ad->info);
+		return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_CREATE, p, ad);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type);
+}
+
+
+/* sendmsg/rcvmsg/connect */
+static int profile_remote_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
+			       u32 request, struct match_addr *raddr,
+			       struct match_addr *laddr,
+			       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(!raddr);
+	AA_BUG(!laddr);
+	AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
+	       "family=%d", sk->sk_family);
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
+	if (!state)
+		return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk);
+
+	/* TODO: deal with sa_family vs. sk_family */
+	state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, request, sk, CMD_ADDR,
+			     raddr, &p, &ad->info);
+	if (state && !p)
+		/* check if perm is restricted to a pairing */
+		state = match_addr_label(rules->policy, state, request,
+					 laddr, &p, &ad->info);
+	return do_perms(profile, state, request, p, ad);
+}
+
+static int profile_bind_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
+			     struct match_addr *maddr,
+			     struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+	unsigned short sport;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(!maddr);
+	AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
+	       "family=%d", sk->sk_family);
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
+	if (!state)
+		return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_BIND, sk);
+
+	/*
+	 * its possibly to have sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 and
+	 * addr->sa_family == AF_INET
+	 */
+	sport = ntohs(maddr->port);
+	if (sport) {
+		if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), sport)) {
+			/* cap NET_BIND_SERVICE will get raised */
+			maddr->addrtype = ADDR_LOCAL_PRIV;
+		}
+	}
+	state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_BIND, sk,
+			    maddr, &p, &ad->info);
+	return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_BIND, p, ad);
+}
+
+static int profile_listen_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
+			       struct match_addr *maddr, int backlog,
+			       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(!maddr);
+	AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
+	       "family=%d", sk->sk_family);
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
+	if (state) {
+		__be16 b = htons(backlog);
+
+		state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sk,
+				     CMD_LISTEN, maddr, &p, &ad->info);
+		if (state && !p) {
+			state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state,
+						 (char *) &b, 2);
+			if (!state)
+				ad->info = "failed listen backlog match";
+		}
+		return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_LISTEN, p, ad);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sk);
+}
+
+static inline int profile_accept_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				      struct sock *sk, struct match_addr *maddr,
+				      struct sock *newsk,
+				      struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	/* AA_BUG(!newsk);  newsk can be null here, since not using atm ... */
+	AA_BUG(!maddr);
+	AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
+	       "family=%d", sk->sk_family);
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
+	if (state) {
+		state = match_to_sk(rules->policy, state, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sk,
+				    maddr, &p, &ad->info);
+		return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, p, ad);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sk);
+}
+
+/* getopt/setopt */
+static int profile_opt_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request,
+			    struct sock *sk, struct match_addr *maddr,
+			    int level, int optname,
+			    struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
+	aa_state_t state;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!sk);
+	AA_BUG(!maddr);
+	AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
+	       "family=%d", sk->sk_family);
+
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_SK(rules, sk);
+	if (state) {
+		__be16 l = htons(l);
+		__be16 n = htons(optname);
+
+		state = match_to_cmd(rules->policy, state, request, sk,
+				     CMD_OPT, maddr, &p, &ad->info);
+		if (state && !p) {
+			state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state,
+						 (char *) &l, 2);
+			state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state,
+						 (char *) &n, 2);
+			if (!state)
+				ad->info = "failed sockopt match";
+		}
+		return do_perms(profile, state, request, p, ad);
+	}
+
+	return aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, ad, request, sk);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+// TODO: cleanup init to use recursion, so we can have N init fns, in 1 macro
+// TODO: lift DEFINE_AUDIT out of macro into init fn???
+
+/* no kernel_t bailout */
+#define label_sk_has_perm2(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXX, YYYY, CALLBACKFN) \
+({								\
+	int __EERROR = 0;					\
+	if (label_mediates(LABEL, AA_CLASS_NET)) {		\
+		struct aa_profile *PROFILE;			\
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(AAD, OP, SOCKSK);		\
+		(AAD).subj_cred = (CRED);			\
+		__EERROR = (XXXX);				\
+		if (__EERROR == 0) {				\
+			__EERROR = (YYYY);			\
+			if (__EERROR == 0) {			\
+				__EERROR = fn_for_each(label, PROFILE,	\
+						       (CALLBACKFN));	\
+			}						\
+		}							\
+	}							\
+	__EERROR;						\
+})
+
+/* no kernel_t bailout */
+#define label_sk_has_perm(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, CALLBACKFN) \
+	label_sk_has_perm2(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, \
+			   0, 0, CALLBACKFN)
+
+/* no kernel_t bailout */
+#define label_sk_has_perm1(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXX, CALLBACKFN) \
+	label_sk_has_perm2(CRED, LABEL, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, \
+			   XXXX, 0, CALLBACKFN)
+
+
+/* Early bailout for kernel_t - 2 init args before callback */
+#define sk_has_perm2(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXXY, YYYYX, CALLBACKFN) \
+({									\
+	struct aa_label *label;						\
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx= aa_sock(SOCKSK);				\
+	int __ERROR = 0;						\
+	if (ctx->label != kernel_t) {					\
+									\
+		label = begin_current_label_crit_section();		\
+                __ERROR = label_sk_has_perm2(current_cred(), label, SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXXY, YYYYX, CALLBACKFN); \
+		end_current_label_crit_section(label);			\
+	}								\
+	__ERROR;							\
+})
+
+/* Early bailout for kernel_t - no init args before callback */
+#define sk_has_perm(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, CALLBACKFN)	\
+	sk_has_perm2(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, 0, 0, CALLBACKFN)
+
+
+/* Early bailout for kernel_t - 1 init arg before callback */
+#define sk_has_perm1(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXXY, CALLBACKFN) \
+	sk_has_perm2(SOCKSK, OP, REQUEST, PROFILE, AAD, XXXXY, 0, CALLBACKFN)
+
+
+
+/* no kernel_t early bailout */
+/* NOTE: already lifted label_mediates into lsm.c */
+int aa_inet_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
+			int protocol)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	int error = 0;
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, OP_CREATE, NULL, family, type, protocol);
+
+	ad.subj_cred = current_cred();
+	set_ad_create(&ad, family, type, protocol);
+	error = fn_for_each(label, profile,
+			    profile_create_perm(profile, family, type,
+						protocol, &ad));
+
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_inet_bind_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+		      int addrlen)
+{
+	struct match_addr maddr;
+
+	return sk_has_perm1(sock->sk, OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, profile, ad,
+			    bind_map_addr(sock->sk, addr, addrlen, &maddr,
+					  &ad),
+			    profile_bind_perm(profile, sock->sk, &maddr, &ad));
+}
+
+
+int aa_inet_connect_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+			 int addrlen)
+{
+	struct stored_match_addr laddr;
+	struct match_addr raddr;
+
+	/* disconnect socket */
+	if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
+		return 0;
+	if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* do we need early bailout for !family ... */
+	return sk_has_perm2(sock->sk, OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, profile, ad,
+			    map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &laddr, &ad),
+			    map_addr(addr, addrlen, 0, ADDR_REMOTE, &raddr,
+				     &ad),
+			    profile_remote_perm(profile, sock->sk,
+						AA_MAY_CONNECT, &raddr,
+						&laddr.maddr, &ad));
+}
+
+int aa_inet_listen_perm(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	struct stored_match_addr maddr;
+
+	/* do we need early bailout for !family ... */
+	return sk_has_perm1(sock->sk, OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, profile, ad,
+			    map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &maddr, &ad),
+			    profile_listen_perm(profile, sock->sk, &maddr.maddr,
+						backlog, &ad));
+}
+
+/* ability of sock to connect, not peer address binding */
+int aa_inet_accept_perm(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	struct stored_match_addr maddr;
+	int error;
+
+	error = sk_has_perm1(sock->sk, OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, profile, ad,
+			     map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &maddr, &ad),
+			     profile_accept_perm(profile, sock->sk,
+						 &maddr.maddr,
+						 newsock->sk, &ad));
+
+	/* selinux updates inode - need to investigate this more */
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* sendmsg, recvmsg. */
+int aa_inet_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+		     struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+	struct stored_match_addr laddr;
+	struct match_addr raddr;
+
+	/* do we need early bailout for !family ... */
+	return sk_has_perm2(sock->sk, op, request, profile, ad,
+			    map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &laddr, &ad),
+			    map_addr(msg->msg_name, msg->msg_namelen, 0,
+				     ADDR_REMOTE, &raddr, &ad),
+			    profile_remote_perm(profile, sock->sk, request,
+						&raddr, &laddr.maddr, &ad));
+}
+
+/* getopt, setopt */
+int aa_inet_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+		     int level, int optname)
+{
+	struct stored_match_addr maddr;
+
+	return sk_has_perm1(sock->sk, op, request, profile, ad,
+			    map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &maddr, &ad),
+			    profile_opt_perm(profile, request, sock->sk,
+					    &maddr.maddr, level, optname, &ad));
+}
+
+static int inet_label_sock_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct aa_label *label,
+				const char *op, u32 request,
+				struct socket *sock)
+{
+	struct stored_match_addr maddr;
+
+	return label_sk_has_perm1(cred, label, sock->sk, op, request, profile,
+				  ad,
+			map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &maddr, &ad),
+			profile_sk_perm(profile, request, sock->sk,
+					&maddr.maddr, &ad));
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr/getsockname/peername */
+int aa_inet_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
+{
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx= aa_sock(sock->sk);
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	int error;
+
+	if (ctx->label == kernel_t)
+		return 0;
+
+	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	error = inet_label_sock_perm(current_cred(), label, op, request, sock);
+	end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+int aa_inet_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
+		      const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
+{
+	u32 sk_req = request & ~NET_PEER_MASK;
+	struct stored_match_addr laddr;
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	AA_BUG(!sock);
+	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+	AA_BUG(sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6,
+	       "family=%d", sk->sk_family);
+
+	/* access to the local sock */
+	error = label_sk_has_perm1(subj_cred, label, sock->sk, op, request,
+				   profile, ad,
+			map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_LOCAL, &laddr, &ad),
+			profile_sk_perm(profile, sk_req, sock->sk, &laddr.maddr,
+					&ad));
+
+	if (!error) {
+		struct stored_match_addr laddr, raddr;
+
+		/* TODO: have ad here: instead of in CB so we do have to redo */
+		error = map_sock_addr(sock, ADDR_REMOTE, &raddr, NULL);
+		if (!error && raddr.maddr.addrp) {
+			error = label_sk_has_perm1(subj_cred, label, sock->sk,
+						   op, request, profile, ad,
+					set_ad_addr(&ad, raddr.addr.sa_family,
+						    false, &raddr.maddr),
+					profile_remote_perm(profile, sock->sk,
+							    request,
+							    &raddr.maddr,
+							    &laddr.maddr, &ad));
+		}
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}

security/apparmor/af_unix.c

@@ -243,8 +243,8 @@ static int profile_create_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, int family,
 
 	state = RULE_MEDIATES_AF(rules, AF_UNIX);
 	if (state) {
-		state = match_to_prot(rules->policy->dfa, state, type, protocol,
+		state = match_to_prot(rules->policy->dfa, state, type,
-				      &ad.info);
+				      protocol, &ad.info);
 		return do_perms(profile, rules, state, AA_MAY_CREATE, &ad);
 	}
 

security/apparmor/include/af_inet.h

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor af_unix fine grained mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2024 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+#ifndef __AA_AF_INET_H
+
+#include "label.h"
+
+int aa_inet_peer_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		      struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk,
+		      struct aa_label *peer_label);
+int aa_inet_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+			  struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+			  struct sock *sk);
+int aa_inet_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock);
+int aa_inet_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
+			int protocol);
+int aa_inet_bind_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+		      int addrlen);
+int aa_inet_connect_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+			 int addrlen);
+int aa_inet_listen_perm(struct socket *sock, int backlog);
+int aa_inet_accept_perm(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+int aa_inet_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+		     struct msghdr *msg, int size);
+int aa_inet_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, int level,
+		     int optname);
+int aa_inet_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
+		      struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct socket *sock);
+
+#endif /* __AA_AF_INET_H */

security/apparmor/include/net.h

@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
 	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type,	\
 			 (SK)->sk_protocol)
 
+
+
 /* struct aa_net - network confinement data
  * @allow: basic network families permissions
  * @audit: which network permissions to force audit
@@ -93,9 +95,13 @@ struct aa_net_compat {
 ({						\
 	int __e;				\
 	switch ((FAMILY)) {			\
-	case AF_UNIX:				\
+	case PF_UNIX:				\
 		__e = aa_unix_ ## FN;		\
 		break;				\
+	case PF_INET:				\
+	case PF_INET6:				\
+		__e = aa_inet_ ## FN;		\
+		break;				\
 	default:				\
 		__e = DEF_FN;			\
 	}					\

security/apparmor/lsm.c

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
 
 #include "include/af_unix.h"
+#include "include/af_inet.h"
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
@@ -1408,8 +1409,11 @@ static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 
 	AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
 
+	if (kern)
+		return 0;
+
 	label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	if (!kern && label_mediates(label, AA_CLASS_NET))
+	if (label_mediates(label, AA_CLASS_NET))
 		error = af_select(family,
 				  create_perm(label, family, type, protocol),
 				  aa_af_perm(current_cred(), label,

security/apparmor/net.c

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "include/af_unix.h"
+#include "include/af_inet.h"
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/cred.h"
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@
 
 struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("af_inet",	1),
 	{ }
 };
 
@@ -126,12 +128,12 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", ad->net.protocol);
 
 	if (ad->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
-		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested=");
 		aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->request, NULL, 0,
 				   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
 
 		if (ad->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
+			audit_log_format(ab, " denied=");
 			aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, ad->denied, NULL, 0,
 					   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
 		}
@@ -183,7 +185,8 @@ int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
 					 (char *) &buffer, 4);
 		perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
 	} else if (profile->net_compat) {
-		/* 2.x socket mediation compat */
+
+	  /* 2.x socket mediation compat */
 		perms.allow = (profile->net_compat->allow[family] & (1 << type)) ?
 			ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
 		perms.audit = (profile->net_compat->audit[family] & (1 << type)) ?

security/apparmor/policy_compat.c

@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ static void compute_fperms_allow(struct aa_perms *perms, struct aa_dfa *dfa,
 		perms->allow |= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
 	if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x40000000)
 		perms->allow |= AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
+	if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x10000000)
+		perms->allow |= AA_CONT_MATCH;
 }
 
 static struct aa_perms compute_fperms_user(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
@@ -216,6 +218,8 @@ static struct aa_perms compute_perms_entry(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
 	perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
 	perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
 	perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
+	if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x10000000)
+		perms.allow |= AA_CONT_MATCH;
 
 	/*
 	 * This mapping is convulated due to history.