Files
ack-tegra/crypto/fips140-module.c
Ard Biesheuvel 4084529fba ANDROID: fips140: add kernel crypto module
To meet FIPS 140 requirements, add support for building a kernel module
"fips140.ko" that contains various cryptographic algorithms built from
existing kernel source files.  At load time, the module checks its own
integrity and self-tests its algorithms, then registers the algorithms
with the crypto API to supersede the original algorithms provided by the
kernel itself.

[ebiggers: this commit originated from "ANDROID: crypto: fips140 -
 perform load time integrity check", but I've folded many later commits
 into it to make forward porting easier.  See below]

Original commits:
  android12-5.10:
    6be141eb36fe ("ANDROID: crypto: fips140 - perform load time integrity check")
    868be244bbed ("ANDROID: inject correct HMAC digest into fips140.ko at build time")
    091338cb398e ("ANDROID: fips140: add missing static keyword to fips140_init()")
    c799c6644b52 ("ANDROID: fips140: adjust some log messages")
    92de53472e68 ("ANDROID: fips140: log already-live algorithms")
    0af06624eadc ("ANDROID: fips140: check for errors from initcalls")
    634445a640a4 ("ANDROID: fips140: fix deadlock in unregister_existing_fips140_algos()")
    e886dd4c339e ("ANDROID: fips140: unregister existing DRBG algorithms")
    b7397e89db29 ("ANDROID: fips140: add power-up cryptographic self-tests")
    50661975be74 ("ANDROID: fips140: add/update module help text")
    b397a0387cb2 ("ANDROID: fips140: test all implementations")
    17ccefe14021 ("ANDROID: fips140: use full 16-byte IV")
    1be58af0776a ("ANDROID: fips140: remove non-prediction-resistant DRBG test")
    2b5843ae2d90 ("ANDROID: fips140: add AES-CBC-CTS")
    2ee56aad318c ("ANDROID: fips140: add AES-CMAC")
    960ebb2b565b ("ANDROID: fips140: add jitterentropy to fips140 module")
    e5b14396f9d2 ("ANDROID: fips140: take into account AES-GCM not being approvable")
    52b70d491bd4 ("ANDROID: fips140: use FIPS140_CFLAGS when compiling fips140-selftests.c")
    6b995f5a5403 ("ANDROID: fips140: preserve RELA sections without relying on the module loader")
    e45108ecff64 ("ANDROID: fips140: block crypto operations until tests complete")
    ecf9341134d1 ("ANDROID: fips140: remove in-place updating of live algorithms")
    482b0323cf29 ("ANDROID: fips140: zeroize temporary values from integrity check")
    64d769e53f20 ("ANDROID: fips140: add service indicators")
    8d7f609cdaa4 ("ANDROID: fips140: add name and version, and a function to retrieve them")
    6b7c37f6c449 ("ANDROID: fips140: use UTS_RELEASE as FIPS version")
    903e97a0ca6d ("ANDROID: fips140: refactor evaluation testing support")
    97fb2104fe22 ("ANDROID: fips140: add support for injecting integrity error")
    109f31ac23f5 ("ANDROID: fips140: add userspace interface for evaluation testing")
  android14-5.15:
    84572a0c7981 ("ANDROID: fips140: split dump-section+add-section into 2 ops")
    b0f8873811d4 ("ANDROID: kleaf: convert fips140 to kleaf")
    2535deae8069 ("ANDROID: GKI: Source GKI_BUILD_CONFIG_FRAGMENT after setting all variables")
    685a2ade28bb ("ANDROID: fips140: add crypto_memneq() back to the module")
    320dfca58a3d ("ANDROID: fips140: fix in-tree builds")
    d4966a820397 ("ANDROID: fips140: remove CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS140 option")
    6da26b8750f5 ("ANDROID: fips140: require 'm' to enable CRYPTO_FIPS140_MOD")
    bfcfcce3803b ("ANDROID: fips140: unapply ABS32 relocations generated by KCFI")
    63f46b45dda2 ("ANDROID: fips140: eliminate crypto-fips.a build step")
    ae4ca7a09bb6 ("ANDROID: fips140: allow building without LTO")
    e8b59bcd783b ("ANDROID: fips140: fix the error injection module parameters")
    9cef46f39ee9 ("ANDROID: remove LTO check from build.config.gki.aarch64.fips140")
    b1f8c250264b ("ANDROID: fips140 - add option for debugging the integrity check")
    7b301c70795e ("ANDROID: fips140 - fix integrity check by unapplying dynamic SCS")
  android14-6.1:
    3f5807c586a6 ("ANDROID: fips140: change linker script guard")
  android15-6.6:
    cb9ca9b4f2f4 ("ANDROID: fips140: avoid crypto driver name collisions")
    8b1881ad162a ("ANDROID: fips140: add SHA-3 as an approved algorithm")
    145f51aca09e ("ANDROID: fips140: remove unnecessary no_sanitize(cfi)")
    eb1f7db04a47 ("ANDROID: fix kernelci GCC builds of fips140.ko")

Bug: 153614920
Bug: 188620248
Test: Tested that the module builds and can be loaded on a device.
Change-Id: I3fde49dbc3d16b149b072a27ba5b4c6219015c94
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
2024-12-06 12:32:52 +00:00

818 lines
26 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright 2021 Google LLC
* Author: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@google.com>
*
* This file is the core of fips140.ko, which contains various crypto algorithms
* that are also built into vmlinux. At load time, this module overrides the
* built-in implementations of these algorithms with its implementations. It
* also runs self-tests on these algorithms and verifies the integrity of its
* code and data. If either of these steps fails, the kernel will panic.
*
* This module is intended to be loaded at early boot time in order to meet
* FIPS 140 and NIAP FPT_TST_EXT.1 requirements. It shouldn't be used if you
* don't need to meet these requirements.
*/
/*
* Since this .c file is the real entry point of fips140.ko, it needs to be
* compiled normally, so undo the hacks that were done in fips140-defs.h.
*/
#define MODULE
#undef KBUILD_MODFILE
#undef __DISABLE_EXPORTS
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <crypto/rng.h>
#include <trace/hooks/fips140.h>
#include "fips140-module.h"
#include "internal.h"
/*
* FIPS 140-2 prefers the use of HMAC with a public key over a plain hash.
*/
u8 __initdata fips140_integ_hmac_key[] = "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog";
/* this is populated by the build tool */
u8 __initdata fips140_integ_hmac_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
const initcall_entry_t __fips140_initcalls_start __section(".initcalls._start");
const initcall_entry_t __fips140_initcalls_end __section(".initcalls._end");
const u8 __fips140_text_start __section(".text.._start");
const u8 __fips140_text_end __section(".text.._end");
const u8 __fips140_rodata_start __section(".rodata.._start");
const u8 __fips140_rodata_end __section(".rodata.._end");
/*
* We need this little detour to prevent Clang from detecting out of bounds
* accesses to the above *_start symbols, which exist only to delineate the
* corresponding sections, and so their sizes are not relevant to us.
*/
const initcall_entry_t *fips140_initcalls_start = &__fips140_initcalls_start;
const u8 *fips140_text_start = &__fips140_text_start;
const u8 *fips140_rodata_start = &__fips140_rodata_start;
/*
* fips140_algs[] lists the algorithms that this module unregisters from the
* kernel crypto API so that it can register its own implementation(s) of them.
*
* There are two reasons to do the unregistration, i.e. replace the kernel's
* algorithms instead of just adding more algorithms. First, the kernel crypto
* API doesn't allow algorithms with duplicate driver names. Second, for FIPS
* approved algorithms we have to ensure that the FIPS copies are actually used.
*/
static struct fips140_alg {
/*
* Either cra_name or cra_driver_name is set.
*
* cra_name makes the entry match all software implementations of a
* given algorithm. This is used when the module is meant to replace
* *all* software implementations of the algorithm. This is required
* for FIPS approved algorithms (approved=true). When using this style
* of matching, it must be ensured that the module contains all the same
* implementations of the algorithm as the kernel itself; otherwise the
* kernel's functionality and/or performance could be impacted by the
* insertion of the fips140 module.
*
* cra_driver_name makes the entry match a single implementation of an
* algorithm. This is used for some specific non FIPS approved
* algorithm implementations that get pulled in by being located in the
* same source files as implementations of FIPS approved algorithms.
*/
const char *cra_name;
const char *cra_driver_name;
/*
* approved is true if fips140_is_approved_service() should return that
* the algorithm is approved. This requires cra_name != NULL.
*/
bool approved;
/*
* maybe_uninstantiated is true if the module provides this algorithm
* but doesn't register it directly at module initialization time. This
* occurs for some of the HMAC variants because they are provided by a
* template which isn't immediately instantiated for every SHA variant
* (since the HMAC self-test only has to test one SHA variant).
*/
bool maybe_uninstantiated;
/*
* unregistered_inkern gets set to true at runtime if at least one
* algorithm matching this entry was unregistered from the kernel. This
* is used to detect unregistrations with no matching registration.
*/
bool unregistered_inkern;
} fips140_algs[] = {
/* Approved algorithms, all specified by cra_name */
{ .cra_name = "aes", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "cbc(aes)", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "cmac(aes)", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "ctr(aes)", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "cts(cbc(aes))", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "ecb(aes)", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "hmac(sha1)", .approved = true,
.maybe_uninstantiated = true },
{ .cra_name = "hmac(sha224)", .approved = true,
.maybe_uninstantiated = true },
{ .cra_name = "hmac(sha256)", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "hmac(sha384)", .approved = true,
.maybe_uninstantiated = true },
{ .cra_name = "hmac(sha512)", .approved = true,
.maybe_uninstantiated = true },
{ .cra_name = "sha1", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "sha224", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "sha256", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "sha384", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "sha512", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "sha3-224", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "sha3-256", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "sha3-384", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "sha3-512", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "stdrng", .approved = true },
{ .cra_name = "xts(aes)", .approved = true },
/*
* Non-approved algorithms specified by cra_name.
*
* Due to a quirk in the FIPS requirements, AES-GCM can't be FIPS
* approved. But we treat it the same as approved algorithms in that we
* ensure that a self-test and all needed implementations are included.
*
* The Jitter RNG is needed in the module as an entropy source for the
* DRBG algorithms, but it's not considered to be approved itself.
*/
{ .cra_name = "gcm(aes)" },
{ .cra_name = "jitterentropy_rng" },
/* Non-approved algorithms specified by cra_driver_name */
{ .cra_driver_name = "essiv-cbc-aes-sha256-ce" },
{ .cra_driver_name = "essiv-cbc-aes-sha256-neon" },
{ .cra_driver_name = "cbcmac-aes-ce" },
{ .cra_driver_name = "cbcmac-aes-neon" },
{ .cra_driver_name = "rfc4106-gcm-aes-ce" },
{ .cra_driver_name = "xcbc-aes-ce" },
{ .cra_driver_name = "xcbc-aes-neon" },
{ .cra_driver_name = "xctr-aes-ce" },
{ .cra_driver_name = "xctr-aes-neon" },
};
/*
* Return true if the crypto API algorithm @calg is matched by the fips140
* module algorithm specification @falg.
*/
static bool __init fips140_alg_matches(const struct fips140_alg *falg,
const struct crypto_alg *calg)
{
/*
* All software algorithms are synchronous. Hardware algorithms must be
* covered by their own FIPS 140 certification.
*/
if (calg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC)
return false;
if (falg->cra_name != NULL &&
strcmp(falg->cra_name, calg->cra_name) == 0)
return true;
if (falg->cra_driver_name != NULL &&
strcmp(falg->cra_driver_name, calg->cra_driver_name) == 0)
return true;
return false;
}
/* Find the entry in fips140_algs[], if any, that @calg is matched by. */
static struct fips140_alg *__init
fips140_find_matching_alg(const struct crypto_alg *calg)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fips140_algs); i++) {
if (fips140_alg_matches(&fips140_algs[i], calg))
return &fips140_algs[i];
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* FIPS 140-3 service indicators. FIPS 140-3 requires that all services
* "provide an indicator when the service utilises an approved cryptographic
* algorithm, security function or process in an approved manner". What this
* means is very debatable, even with the help of the FIPS 140-3 Implementation
* Guidance document. However, it was decided that a function that takes in an
* algorithm name and returns whether that algorithm is approved or not will
* meet this requirement. Note, this relies on some properties of the module:
*
* - The module doesn't distinguish between "services" and "algorithms"; its
* services are simply its algorithms.
*
* - The status of an approved algorithm is never non-approved, since (a) the
* module doesn't support operating in a non-approved mode, such as a mode
* where the self-tests are skipped; (b) there are no cases where the module
* supports non-approved settings for approved algorithms, e.g.
* non-approved key sizes; and (c) this function isn't available to be
* called until the module_init function has completed, so it's guaranteed
* that the self-tests and integrity check have already passed.
*
* - The module does support some non-approved algorithms, so a single static
* indicator ("return true;") would not be acceptable.
*/
bool fips140_is_approved_service(const char *name)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fips140_algs); i++) {
if (fips140_algs[i].approved &&
fips140_algs[i].cra_name != NULL &&
strcmp(name, fips140_algs[i].cra_name) == 0)
return true;
}
return false;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fips140_is_approved_service);
/*
* FIPS 140-3 requires that modules provide a "service" that outputs "the name
* or module identifier and the versioning information that can be correlated
* with a validation record". This function meets that requirement.
*
* Note: the module also prints this same information to the kernel log when it
* is loaded. That might meet the requirement by itself. However, given the
* vagueness of what counts as a "service", we provide this function too, just
* in case the certification lab or CMVP is happier with an explicit function.
*
* Note: /sys/modules/fips140/scmversion also provides versioning information
* about the module. However that file just shows the bare git commit ID, so it
* probably isn't sufficient to meet the FIPS requirement, which seems to want
* the "official" module name and version number used in the FIPS certificate.
*/
const char *fips140_module_version(void)
{
return FIPS140_MODULE_NAME " " FIPS140_MODULE_VERSION;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fips140_module_version);
static LIST_HEAD(existing_live_algos);
/*
* Release a list of algorithms which have been removed from crypto_alg_list.
*
* Note that even though the list is a private list, we have to hold
* crypto_alg_sem while iterating through it because crypto_unregister_alg() may
* run concurrently (as we haven't taken a reference to the algorithms on the
* list), and crypto_unregister_alg() will remove the algorithm from whichever
* list it happens to be on, while holding crypto_alg_sem. That's okay, since
* in that case crypto_unregister_alg() will handle the crypto_alg_put().
*/
static void fips140_remove_final(struct list_head *list)
{
struct crypto_alg *alg;
struct crypto_alg *n;
/*
* We need to take crypto_alg_sem to safely traverse the list (see
* comment above), but we have to drop it when doing each
* crypto_alg_put() as that may take crypto_alg_sem again.
*/
down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
list_for_each_entry_safe(alg, n, list, cra_list) {
list_del_init(&alg->cra_list);
up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
crypto_alg_put(alg);
down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
}
up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
}
static void __init unregister_existing_fips140_algos(void)
{
struct crypto_alg *calg, *tmp;
LIST_HEAD(remove_list);
LIST_HEAD(spawns);
down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
/*
* Find all registered algorithms that we care about, and move them to a
* private list so that they are no longer exposed via the algo lookup
* API. Subsequently, we will unregister them if they are not in active
* use. If they are, we can't fully unregister them but we can ensure
* that new users won't use them.
*/
list_for_each_entry_safe(calg, tmp, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list) {
struct fips140_alg *falg = fips140_find_matching_alg(calg);
if (!falg)
continue;
falg->unregistered_inkern = true;
if (refcount_read(&calg->cra_refcnt) == 1) {
/*
* This algorithm is not currently in use, but there may
* be template instances holding references to it via
* spawns. So let's tear it down like
* crypto_unregister_alg() would, but without releasing
* the lock, to prevent races with concurrent TFM
* allocations.
*/
calg->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_DEAD;
list_move(&calg->cra_list, &remove_list);
crypto_remove_spawns(calg, &spawns, NULL);
} else {
/*
* This algorithm is live, i.e. it has TFMs allocated,
* so we can't fully unregister it. It's not necessary
* to dynamically redirect existing users to the FIPS
* code, given that they can't be relying on FIPS
* certified crypto in the first place. However, we do
* need to ensure that new users will get the FIPS code.
*
* In most cases, setting calg->cra_priority to 0
* achieves this. However, that isn't enough for
* algorithms like "hmac(sha256)" that need to be
* instantiated from a template, since existing
* algorithms always take priority over a template being
* instantiated. Therefore, we move the algorithm to
* a private list so that algorithm lookups won't find
* it anymore. To further distinguish it from the FIPS
* algorithms, we also append "+orig" to its name.
*/
pr_info("found already-live algorithm '%s' ('%s')\n",
calg->cra_name, calg->cra_driver_name);
calg->cra_priority = 0;
strlcat(calg->cra_name, "+orig", CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
strlcat(calg->cra_driver_name, "+orig",
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
list_move(&calg->cra_list, &existing_live_algos);
}
}
up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
fips140_remove_final(&remove_list);
fips140_remove_final(&spawns);
}
/*
* The algorithms unregistered by fips140.ko are determined by fips140_algs[],
* but the algorithms registered by fips140.ko are determined by its initcalls.
* There is a chance these get out of sync. Therefore, this function detects
* cases where an algorithm was unregistered without a replacement being
* registered. It returns true if things look ok or false if there's a problem.
*/
static bool __init fips140_verify_no_extra_unregistrations(void)
{
bool ok = true;
size_t i;
down_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fips140_algs); i++) {
const struct fips140_alg *falg = &fips140_algs[i];
const struct crypto_alg *calg;
bool registered = false;
if (falg->maybe_uninstantiated || !falg->unregistered_inkern)
continue;
list_for_each_entry(calg, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list) {
if (fips140_alg_matches(falg, calg)) {
registered = true;
break;
}
}
if (!registered) {
pr_err("This module unregistered %s but did not replace it!\n",
falg->cra_name ?: falg->cra_driver_name);
pr_err("Either remove it from fips140_algs[], or fix the module to include it.\n");
ok = false;
}
}
up_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
return ok;
}
static void __init unapply_text_relocations(void *section, int section_size,
const Elf64_Rela *rela, int numrels)
{
while (numrels--) {
u32 *place = (u32 *)(section + rela->r_offset);
BUG_ON(rela->r_offset >= section_size);
switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rela->r_info)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
case R_AARCH64_ABS32: /* for KCFI */
*place = 0;
break;
case R_AARCH64_JUMP26:
case R_AARCH64_CALL26:
*place &= ~GENMASK(25, 0);
break;
case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_LO21:
case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21:
case R_AARCH64_ADR_PREL_PG_HI21_NC:
*place &= ~(GENMASK(30, 29) | GENMASK(23, 5));
break;
case R_AARCH64_ADD_ABS_LO12_NC:
case R_AARCH64_LDST8_ABS_LO12_NC:
case R_AARCH64_LDST16_ABS_LO12_NC:
case R_AARCH64_LDST32_ABS_LO12_NC:
case R_AARCH64_LDST64_ABS_LO12_NC:
case R_AARCH64_LDST128_ABS_LO12_NC:
*place &= ~GENMASK(21, 10);
break;
default:
pr_err("unhandled relocation type %llu\n",
ELF64_R_TYPE(rela->r_info));
BUG();
#else
#error
#endif
}
rela++;
}
}
static void __init unapply_rodata_relocations(void *section, int section_size,
const Elf64_Rela *rela, int numrels)
{
while (numrels--) {
void *place = section + rela->r_offset;
BUG_ON(rela->r_offset >= section_size);
switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rela->r_info)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
case R_AARCH64_ABS64:
*(u64 *)place = 0;
break;
default:
pr_err("unhandled relocation type %llu\n",
ELF64_R_TYPE(rela->r_info));
BUG();
#else
#error
#endif
}
rela++;
}
}
enum {
PACIASP = 0xd503233f,
AUTIASP = 0xd50323bf,
SCS_PUSH = 0xf800865e,
SCS_POP = 0xf85f8e5e,
};
/*
* To make the integrity check work with dynamic Shadow Call Stack (SCS),
* replace all instructions that push or pop from the SCS with the Pointer
* Authentication Code (PAC) instructions that were present originally.
*/
static void __init unapply_scs_patch(void *section, int section_size)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_ARM64) && defined(CONFIG_UNWIND_PATCH_PAC_INTO_SCS)
u32 *insns = section;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < section_size / sizeof(insns[0]); i++) {
if (insns[i] == SCS_PUSH)
insns[i] = PACIASP;
else if (insns[i] == SCS_POP)
insns[i] = AUTIASP;
}
#endif
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS140_MOD_DEBUG_INTEGRITY_CHECK
static struct {
const void *text;
int textsize;
const void *rodata;
int rodatasize;
} saved_integrity_check_info;
static ssize_t fips140_text_read(struct file *file, char __user *to,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
return simple_read_from_buffer(to, count, ppos,
saved_integrity_check_info.text,
saved_integrity_check_info.textsize);
}
static ssize_t fips140_rodata_read(struct file *file, char __user *to,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
return simple_read_from_buffer(to, count, ppos,
saved_integrity_check_info.rodata,
saved_integrity_check_info.rodatasize);
}
static const struct file_operations fips140_text_fops = {
.read = fips140_text_read,
};
static const struct file_operations fips140_rodata_fops = {
.read = fips140_rodata_read,
};
static void fips140_init_integrity_debug_files(const void *text, int textsize,
const void *rodata,
int rodatasize)
{
struct dentry *dir;
dir = debugfs_create_dir("fips140", NULL);
saved_integrity_check_info.text = kmemdup(text, textsize, GFP_KERNEL);
saved_integrity_check_info.textsize = textsize;
if (saved_integrity_check_info.text)
debugfs_create_file("text", 0400, dir, NULL,
&fips140_text_fops);
saved_integrity_check_info.rodata = kmemdup(rodata, rodatasize,
GFP_KERNEL);
saved_integrity_check_info.rodatasize = rodatasize;
if (saved_integrity_check_info.rodata)
debugfs_create_file("rodata", 0400, dir, NULL,
&fips140_rodata_fops);
}
#else /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS140_MOD_DEBUG_INTEGRITY_CHECK */
static void fips140_init_integrity_debug_files(const void *text, int textsize,
const void *rodata,
int rodatasize)
{
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS140_MOD_DEBUG_INTEGRITY_CHECK */
extern struct {
u32 offset;
u32 count;
} fips140_rela_text, fips140_rela_rodata;
static bool __init check_fips140_module_hmac(void)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL;
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, dontcare);
u8 digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
void *textcopy, *rodatacopy;
int textsize, rodatasize;
bool ok = false;
int err;
textsize = &__fips140_text_end - &__fips140_text_start;
rodatasize = &__fips140_rodata_end - &__fips140_rodata_start;
pr_info("text size : 0x%x\n", textsize);
pr_info("rodata size: 0x%x\n", rodatasize);
textcopy = kmalloc(textsize + rodatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!textcopy) {
pr_err("Failed to allocate memory for copy of .text\n");
goto out;
}
rodatacopy = textcopy + textsize;
memcpy(textcopy, fips140_text_start, textsize);
memcpy(rodatacopy, fips140_rodata_start, rodatasize);
// apply the relocations in reverse on the copies of .text and .rodata
unapply_text_relocations(textcopy, textsize,
offset_to_ptr(&fips140_rela_text.offset),
fips140_rela_text.count);
unapply_rodata_relocations(rodatacopy, rodatasize,
offset_to_ptr(&fips140_rela_rodata.offset),
fips140_rela_rodata.count);
unapply_scs_patch(textcopy, textsize);
fips140_init_integrity_debug_files(textcopy, textsize,
rodatacopy, rodatasize);
fips140_inject_integrity_failure(textcopy);
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(sha256)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
pr_err("failed to allocate hmac tfm (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(tfm));
tfm = NULL;
goto out;
}
desc->tfm = tfm;
pr_info("using '%s' for integrity check\n",
crypto_shash_driver_name(tfm));
err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, fips140_integ_hmac_key,
strlen(fips140_integ_hmac_key)) ?:
crypto_shash_init(desc) ?:
crypto_shash_update(desc, textcopy, textsize) ?:
crypto_shash_finup(desc, rodatacopy, rodatasize, digest);
/* Zeroizing this is important; see the comment below. */
shash_desc_zero(desc);
if (err) {
pr_err("failed to calculate hmac shash (%d)\n", err);
goto out;
}
if (memcmp(digest, fips140_integ_hmac_digest, sizeof(digest))) {
pr_err("provided_digest : %*phN\n", (int)sizeof(digest),
fips140_integ_hmac_digest);
pr_err("calculated digest: %*phN\n", (int)sizeof(digest),
digest);
goto out;
}
ok = true;
out:
/*
* FIPS 140-3 requires that all "temporary value(s) generated during the
* integrity test" be zeroized (ref: FIPS 140-3 IG 9.7.B). There is no
* technical reason to do this given that these values are public
* information, but this is the requirement so we follow it.
*/
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
memzero_explicit(digest, sizeof(digest));
kfree_sensitive(textcopy);
return ok;
}
static void fips140_sha256(void *p, const u8 *data, unsigned int len, u8 *out,
int *hook_inuse)
{
sha256(data, len, out);
*hook_inuse = 1;
}
static void fips140_aes_expandkey(void *p, struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx,
const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len,
int *err)
{
*err = aes_expandkey(ctx, in_key, key_len);
}
static void fips140_aes_encrypt(void *priv, const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx,
u8 *out, const u8 *in, int *hook_inuse)
{
aes_encrypt(ctx, out, in);
*hook_inuse = 1;
}
static void fips140_aes_decrypt(void *priv, const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx,
u8 *out, const u8 *in, int *hook_inuse)
{
aes_decrypt(ctx, out, in);
*hook_inuse = 1;
}
static bool update_fips140_library_routines(void)
{
int ret;
ret = register_trace_android_vh_sha256(fips140_sha256, NULL) ?:
register_trace_android_vh_aes_expandkey(fips140_aes_expandkey, NULL) ?:
register_trace_android_vh_aes_encrypt(fips140_aes_encrypt, NULL) ?:
register_trace_android_vh_aes_decrypt(fips140_aes_decrypt, NULL);
return ret == 0;
}
/* Initialize the FIPS 140 module */
static int __init fips140_init(void)
{
const initcall_entry_t *initcall;
pr_info("loading " FIPS140_MODULE_NAME " " FIPS140_MODULE_VERSION "\n");
fips140_init_thread = current;
unregister_existing_fips140_algos();
/* iterate over all init routines present in this module and call them */
for (initcall = fips140_initcalls_start + 1;
initcall < &__fips140_initcalls_end;
initcall++) {
initcall_t init = offset_to_ptr(initcall);
int err = init();
/*
* ENODEV is expected from initcalls that only register
* algorithms that depend on non-present CPU features. Besides
* that, errors aren't expected here.
*/
if (err && err != -ENODEV) {
pr_err("initcall %ps() failed: %d\n", init, err);
goto panic;
}
}
if (!fips140_run_selftests())
goto panic;
if (!fips140_verify_no_extra_unregistrations())
goto panic;
/*
* It may seem backward to perform the integrity check last, but this
* is intentional: the check itself uses hmac(sha256) which is one of
* the algorithms that are replaced with versions from this module, and
* the integrity check must use the replacement version. Also, to be
* ready for FIPS 140-3, the integrity check algorithm must have already
* been self-tested.
*/
if (!check_fips140_module_hmac()) {
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS140_MOD_DEBUG_INTEGRITY_CHECK)) {
pr_crit("integrity check failed -- giving up!\n");
goto panic;
}
pr_crit("ignoring integrity check failure due to debug mode\n");
} else {
pr_info("integrity check passed\n");
}
complete_all(&fips140_tests_done);
if (!update_fips140_library_routines())
goto panic;
if (!fips140_eval_testing_init())
goto panic;
pr_info("module successfully loaded\n");
return 0;
panic:
panic("FIPS 140 module load failure");
}
module_init(fips140_init);
MODULE_IMPORT_NS(CRYPTO_INTERNAL);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
/*
* Below are copies of some selected "crypto-related" helper functions that are
* used by fips140.ko but are not already built into it, due to them being
* defined in a file that cannot easily be built into fips140.ko (e.g.,
* crypto/algapi.c) instead of one that can (e.g., most files in lib/).
*
* There is no hard rule about what needs to be included here, as this is for
* FIPS certifiability, not any technical reason. FIPS modules are supposed to
* implement the "crypto" themselves, but to do so they are allowed to call
* non-cryptographic helper functions from outside the module. Something like
* memcpy() is "clearly" non-cryptographic. However, there is is ambiguity
* about functions like crypto_inc() which aren't cryptographic by themselves,
* but are more closely associated with cryptography than e.g. memcpy(). To err
* on the side of caution, we define copies of some selected functions below so
* that calls to them from within fips140.ko will remain in fips140.ko.
*/
static inline void crypto_inc_byte(u8 *a, unsigned int size)
{
u8 *b = (a + size);
u8 c;
for (; size; size--) {
c = *--b + 1;
*b = c;
if (c)
break;
}
}
void crypto_inc(u8 *a, unsigned int size)
{
__be32 *b = (__be32 *)(a + size);
u32 c;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) ||
IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)b, __alignof__(*b)))
for (; size >= 4; size -= 4) {
c = be32_to_cpu(*--b) + 1;
*b = cpu_to_be32(c);
if (likely(c))
return;
}
crypto_inc_byte(a, size);
}