From c85efe6e13743cac6ba4ccf144cb91f44c86231a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tengda Wu Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2025 12:21:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 01/25] tracing: Fix use-after-free in print_graph_function_flags during tracer switching commit 7f81f27b1093e4895e87b74143c59c055c3b1906 upstream. Kairui reported a UAF issue in print_graph_function_flags() during ftrace stress testing [1]. This issue can be reproduced if puting a 'mdelay(10)' after 'mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock)' in s_start(), and executing the following script: $ echo function_graph > current_tracer $ cat trace > /dev/null & $ sleep 5 # Ensure the 'cat' reaches the 'mdelay(10)' point $ echo timerlat > current_tracer The root cause lies in the two calls to print_graph_function_flags within print_trace_line during each s_show(): * One through 'iter->trace->print_line()'; * Another through 'event->funcs->trace()', which is hidden in print_trace_fmt() before print_trace_line returns. Tracer switching only updates the former, while the latter continues to use the print_line function of the old tracer, which in the script above is print_graph_function_flags. Moreover, when switching from the 'function_graph' tracer to the 'timerlat' tracer, s_start only calls graph_trace_close of the 'function_graph' tracer to free 'iter->private', but does not set it to NULL. This provides an opportunity for 'event->funcs->trace()' to use an invalid 'iter->private'. To fix this issue, set 'iter->private' to NULL immediately after freeing it in graph_trace_close(), ensuring that an invalid pointer is not passed to other tracers. Additionally, clean up the unnecessary 'iter->private = NULL' during each 'cat trace' when using wakeup and irqsoff tracers. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231112150030.84609-1-ryncsn@gmail.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers Cc: Zheng Yejian Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250320122137.23635-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com Fixes: eecb91b9f98d ("tracing: Fix memleak due to race between current_tracer and trace") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAMgjq7BW79KDSCyp+tZHjShSzHsScSiJxn5ffskp-QzVM06fxw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: Kairui Song Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c | 1 + kernel/trace/trace_irqsoff.c | 2 -- kernel/trace/trace_sched_wakeup.c | 2 -- 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c index ebb61ddca749..655246a9bec3 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c @@ -1353,6 +1353,7 @@ void graph_trace_close(struct trace_iterator *iter) if (data) { free_percpu(data->cpu_data); kfree(data); + iter->private = NULL; } } diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_irqsoff.c b/kernel/trace/trace_irqsoff.c index fce064e20570..10ea6d0a35e8 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_irqsoff.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_irqsoff.c @@ -233,8 +233,6 @@ static void irqsoff_trace_open(struct trace_iterator *iter) { if (is_graph(iter->tr)) graph_trace_open(iter); - else - iter->private = NULL; } static void irqsoff_trace_close(struct trace_iterator *iter) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_sched_wakeup.c b/kernel/trace/trace_sched_wakeup.c index ae2ace5e515a..039382576bc1 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_sched_wakeup.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_sched_wakeup.c @@ -170,8 +170,6 @@ static void wakeup_trace_open(struct trace_iterator *iter) { if (is_graph(iter->tr)) graph_trace_open(iter); - else - iter->private = NULL; } static void wakeup_trace_close(struct trace_iterator *iter) From cffc2a6718e43ef4219bf3c5017146b9090e4a45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Douglas Raillard Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2025 18:09:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 02/25] tracing: Ensure module defining synth event cannot be unloaded while tracing commit 21581dd4e7ff6c07d0ab577e3c32b13a74b31522 upstream. Currently, using synth_event_delete() will fail if the event is being used (tracing in progress), but that is normally done in the module exit function. At that stage, failing is problematic as returning a non-zero status means the module will become locked (impossible to unload or reload again). Instead, ensure the module exit function does not get called in the first place by increasing the module refcnt when the event is enabled. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers Fixes: 35ca5207c2d11 ("tracing: Add synthetic event command generation functions") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250318180906.226841-1-douglas.raillard@arm.com Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c index c82b401a294d..7fe73fbd4e38 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c @@ -859,6 +859,34 @@ static struct trace_event_fields synth_event_fields_array[] = { {} }; +static int synth_event_reg(struct trace_event_call *call, + enum trace_reg type, void *data) +{ + struct synth_event *event = container_of(call, struct synth_event, call); + + switch (type) { + case TRACE_REG_REGISTER: + case TRACE_REG_PERF_REGISTER: + if (!try_module_get(event->mod)) + return -EBUSY; + break; + default: + break; + } + + int ret = trace_event_reg(call, type, data); + + switch (type) { + case TRACE_REG_UNREGISTER: + case TRACE_REG_PERF_UNREGISTER: + module_put(event->mod); + break; + default: + break; + } + return ret; +} + static int register_synth_event(struct synth_event *event) { struct trace_event_call *call = &event->call; @@ -888,7 +916,7 @@ static int register_synth_event(struct synth_event *event) goto out; } call->flags = TRACE_EVENT_FL_TRACEPOINT; - call->class->reg = trace_event_reg; + call->class->reg = synth_event_reg; call->class->probe = trace_event_raw_event_synth; call->data = event; call->tp = event->tp; From 33052e7f52c56b41bd07f5c9a25dab3177cb4c97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Douglas Raillard Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2025 16:52:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 03/25] tracing: Fix synth event printk format for str fields commit 4d38328eb442dc06aec4350fd9594ffa6488af02 upstream. The printk format for synth event uses "%.*s" to print string fields, but then only passes the pointer part as var arg. Replace %.*s with %s as the C string is guaranteed to be null-terminated. The output in print fmt should never have been updated as __get_str() handles the string limit because it can access the length of the string in the string meta data that is saved in the ring buffer. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers Fixes: 8db4d6bfbbf92 ("tracing: Change synthetic event string format to limit printed length") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250325165202.541088-1-douglas.raillard@arm.com Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c index 7fe73fbd4e38..7c03973341b6 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static const char *synth_field_fmt(char *type) else if (strcmp(type, "gfp_t") == 0) fmt = "%x"; else if (synth_field_is_string(type)) - fmt = "%.*s"; + fmt = "%s"; else if (synth_field_is_stack(type)) fmt = "%s"; From 1abca855ea9f9f45a8980c8c3c11f6ad39ef6cb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ran Xiaokai Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2025 09:52:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 04/25] tracing/osnoise: Fix possible recursive locking for cpus_read_lock() commit 7e6b3fcc9c5294aeafed0dbe1a09a1bc899bd0f2 upstream. Lockdep reports this deadlock log: osnoise: could not start sampling thread ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected -------------------------------------------- CPU0 ---- lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); Call Trace: print_deadlock_bug+0x282/0x3c0 __lock_acquire+0x1610/0x29a0 lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2d0 cpus_read_lock+0x49/0x120 stop_per_cpu_kthreads+0x7/0x60 start_kthread+0x103/0x120 osnoise_hotplug_workfn+0x5e/0x90 process_one_work+0x44f/0xb30 worker_thread+0x33e/0x5e0 kthread+0x206/0x3b0 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 This is the deadlock scenario: osnoise_hotplug_workfn() guard(cpus_read_lock)(); // first lock call start_kthread(cpu) if (IS_ERR(kthread)) { stop_per_cpu_kthreads(); { cpus_read_lock(); // second lock call. Cause the AA deadlock } } It is not necessary to call stop_per_cpu_kthreads() which stops osnoise kthread for every other CPUs in the system if a failure occurs during hotplug of a certain CPU. For start_per_cpu_kthreads(), if the start_kthread() call fails, this function calls stop_per_cpu_kthreads() to handle the error. Therefore, similarly, there is no need to call stop_per_cpu_kthreads() again within start_kthread(). So just remove stop_per_cpu_kthreads() from start_kthread to solve this issue. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250321095249.2739397-1-ranxiaokai627@163.com Fixes: c8895e271f79 ("trace/osnoise: Support hotplug operations") Signed-off-by: Ran Xiaokai Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c b/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c index 032fdeba37d3..a94790f5cda7 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c @@ -2038,7 +2038,6 @@ static int start_kthread(unsigned int cpu) if (IS_ERR(kthread)) { pr_err(BANNER "could not start sampling thread\n"); - stop_per_cpu_kthreads(); return -ENOMEM; } From 2e877ff3492267def06dd50cb165dc9ab8838e7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Hildenbrand Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 20:37:43 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 05/25] mm/gup: reject FOLL_SPLIT_PMD with hugetlb VMAs commit 8977752c8056a6a094a279004a49722da15bace3 upstream. Patch series "mm: fixes for device-exclusive entries (hmm)", v2. Discussing the PageTail() call in make_device_exclusive_range() with Willy, I recently discovered [1] that device-exclusive handling does not properly work with THP, making the hmm-tests selftests fail if THPs are enabled on the system. Looking into more details, I found that hugetlb is not properly fenced, and I realized that something that was bugging me for longer -- how device-exclusive entries interact with mapcounts -- completely breaks migration/swapout/split/hwpoison handling of these folios while they have device-exclusive PTEs. The program below can be used to allocate 1 GiB worth of pages and making them device-exclusive on a kernel with CONFIG_TEST_HMM. Once they are device-exclusive, these folios cannot get swapped out (proc$pid/smaps_rollup will always indicate 1 GiB RSS no matter how much one forces memory reclaim), and when having a memory block onlined to ZONE_MOVABLE, trying to offline it will loop forever and complain about failed migration of a page that should be movable. # echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state # echo online_movable > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state # ./hmm-swap & ... wait until everything is device-exclusive # echo offline > /sys/devices/system/memory/memory136/state [ 285.193431][T14882] page: refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7f20671f7 pfn:0x442b6a [ 285.196618][T14882] memcg:ffff888179298000 [ 285.198085][T14882] anon flags: 0x5fff0000002091c(referenced|uptodate| dirty|active|owner_2|swapbacked|node=1|zone=3|lastcpupid=0x7ff) [ 285.201734][T14882] raw: ... [ 285.204464][T14882] raw: ... [ 285.207196][T14882] page dumped because: migration failure [ 285.209072][T14882] page_owner tracks the page as allocated [ 285.210915][T14882] page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Movable, gfp_mask 0x140dca(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), id 14926, tgid 14926 (hmm-swap), ts 254506295376, free_ts 227402023774 [ 285.216765][T14882] post_alloc_hook+0x197/0x1b0 [ 285.218874][T14882] get_page_from_freelist+0x76e/0x3280 [ 285.220864][T14882] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x38e/0x2740 [ 285.223302][T14882] alloc_pages_mpol+0x1fc/0x540 [ 285.225130][T14882] folio_alloc_mpol_noprof+0x36/0x340 [ 285.227222][T14882] vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0xee/0x1a0 [ 285.229074][T14882] __handle_mm_fault+0x2b38/0x56a0 [ 285.230822][T14882] handle_mm_fault+0x368/0x9f0 ... This series fixes all issues I found so far. There is no easy way to fix without a bigger rework/cleanup. I have a bunch of cleanups on top (some previous sent, some the result of the discussion in v1) that I will send out separately once this landed and I get to it. I wish we could just use some special present PROT_NONE PTEs instead of these (non-present, non-none) fake-swap entries; but that just results in the same problem we keep having (lack of spare PTE bits), and staring at other similar fake-swap entries, that ship has sailed. With this series, make_device_exclusive() doesn't actually belong into mm/rmap.c anymore, but I'll leave moving that for another day. I only tested this series with the hmm-tests selftests due to lack of HW, so I'd appreciate some testing, especially if the interaction between two GPUs wanting a device-exclusive entry works as expected. #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE _IOWR('H', 0x05, struct hmm_dmirror_cmd) struct hmm_dmirror_cmd { __u64 addr; __u64 ptr; __u64 npages; __u64 cpages; __u64 faults; }; const size_t size = 1 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024ul; const size_t chunk_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024ul; int main(void) { struct hmm_dmirror_cmd cmd; size_t cur_size; int fd, ret; char *addr, *mirror; fd = open("/dev/hmm_dmirror1", O_RDWR, 0); if (fd < 0) { perror("open failed\n"); exit(1); } addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); if (addr == MAP_FAILED) { perror("mmap failed\n"); exit(1); } madvise(addr, size, MADV_NOHUGEPAGE); memset(addr, 1, size); mirror = malloc(chunk_size); for (cur_size = 0; cur_size < size; cur_size += chunk_size) { cmd.addr = (uintptr_t)addr + cur_size; cmd.ptr = (uintptr_t)mirror; cmd.npages = chunk_size / getpagesize(); ret = ioctl(fd, HMM_DMIRROR_EXCLUSIVE, &cmd); if (ret) { perror("ioctl failed\n"); exit(1); } } pause(); return 0; } [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/25e02685-4f1d-47fa-be5b-01ff85bb0ce2@redhat.com This patch (of 17): We only have two FOLL_SPLIT_PMD users. While uprobe refuses hugetlb early, make_device_exclusive_range() can end up getting called on hugetlb VMAs. Right now, this means that with a PMD-sized hugetlb page, we can end up calling split_huge_pmd(), because pmd_trans_huge() also succeeds with hugetlb PMDs. For example, using a modified hmm-test selftest one can trigger: [ 207.017134][T14945] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 207.018614][T14945] kernel BUG at mm/page_table_check.c:87! [ 207.019716][T14945] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 207.021072][T14945] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: ... [ 207.023036][T14945] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 [ 207.024834][T14945] RIP: 0010:page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.026128][T14945] Code: ... [ 207.029965][T14945] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000cb8f348 EFLAGS: 00010293 [ 207.031139][T14945] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000ffffffff RCX: ffffffff8249a0cd [ 207.032649][T14945] RDX: ffff88811e883c80 RSI: ffffffff8249a357 RDI: ffff88811e883c80 [ 207.034183][T14945] RBP: ffff888105c0a050 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 207.035688][T14945] R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 207.037203][T14945] R13: 0000000000000200 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: dffffc0000000000 [ 207.038711][T14945] FS: 00007f2783275740(0000) GS:ffff8881f4980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 207.040407][T14945] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 207.041660][T14945] CR2: 00007f2782c00000 CR3: 0000000132356000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 207.043196][T14945] PKRU: 55555554 [ 207.043880][T14945] Call Trace: [ 207.044506][T14945] [ 207.045086][T14945] ? __die+0x51/0x92 [ 207.045864][T14945] ? die+0x29/0x50 [ 207.046596][T14945] ? do_trap+0x250/0x320 [ 207.047430][T14945] ? do_error_trap+0xe7/0x220 [ 207.048346][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.049535][T14945] ? handle_invalid_op+0x34/0x40 [ 207.050494][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.051681][T14945] ? exc_invalid_op+0x2e/0x50 [ 207.052589][T14945] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 207.053596][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x1fd/0x510 [ 207.054790][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x487/0x510 [ 207.055993][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x488/0x510 [ 207.057195][T14945] ? page_table_check_clear.part.0+0x487/0x510 [ 207.058384][T14945] __page_table_check_pmd_clear+0x34b/0x5a0 [ 207.059524][T14945] ? __pfx___page_table_check_pmd_clear+0x10/0x10 [ 207.060775][T14945] ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 [ 207.061940][T14945] ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 [ 207.062967][T14945] pmdp_huge_clear_flush+0x279/0x360 [ 207.064024][T14945] split_huge_pmd_locked+0x82b/0x3750 ... Before commit 9cb28da54643 ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic follow_page_mask code"), we would have ignored the flag; instead, let's simply refuse the combination completely in check_vma_flags(): the caller is likely not prepared to handle any hugetlb folios. We'll teach make_device_exclusive_range() separately to ignore any hugetlb folios as a future-proof safety net. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250210193801.781278-1-david@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250210193801.781278-2-david@redhat.com Fixes: 9cb28da54643 ("mm/gup: handle hugetlb in the generic follow_page_mask code") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand Reviewed-by: John Hubbard Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple Tested-by: Alistair Popple Cc: Alex Shi Cc: Danilo Krummrich Cc: Dave Airlie Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Jason Gunthorpe Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Karol Herbst Cc: Liam Howlett Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes Cc: Lyude Cc: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" Cc: Oleg Nesterov Cc: Pasha Tatashin Cc: Peter Xu Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: SeongJae Park Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Yanteng Si Cc: Simona Vetter Cc: Barry Song Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/gup.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c index 44c536904a83..d27e7c9e2596 100644 --- a/mm/gup.c +++ b/mm/gup.c @@ -1283,6 +1283,9 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags) if ((gup_flags & FOLL_LONGTERM) && vma_is_fsdax(vma)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if ((gup_flags & FOLL_SPLIT_PMD) && is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (vma_is_secretmem(vma)) return -EFAULT; From 2df8ee605eb6806cd41c2095306db05206633a08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Angelos Oikonomopoulos Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2025 10:51:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/25] arm64: Don't call NULL in do_compat_alignment_fixup() commit c28f31deeacda307acfee2f18c0ad904e5123aac upstream. do_alignment_t32_to_handler() only fixes up alignment faults for specific instructions; it returns NULL otherwise (e.g. LDREX). When that's the case, signal to the caller that it needs to proceed with the regular alignment fault handling (i.e. SIGBUS). Without this patch, the kernel panics: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000086000006 EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000800164aa000 [0000000000000000] pgd=0800081fdbd22003, p4d=0800081fdbd22003, pud=08000815d51c6003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000006 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: cfg80211 rfkill xt_nat xt_tcpudp xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_nat nf_conntrack_netlink nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype nft_compat br_netfilter veth nvme_fa> libcrc32c crc32c_generic raid0 multipath linear dm_mod dax raid1 md_mod xhci_pci nvme xhci_hcd nvme_core t10_pi usbcore igb crc64_rocksoft crc64 crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic crct10dif_ce crct10dif_common usb_common i2c_algo_bit i2c> CPU: 2 PID: 3932954 Comm: WPEWebProcess Not tainted 6.1.0-31-arm64 #1 Debian 6.1.128-1 Hardware name: GIGABYTE MP32-AR1-00/MP32-AR1-00, BIOS F18v (SCP: 1.08.20211002) 12/01/2021 pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : 0x0 lr : do_compat_alignment_fixup+0xd8/0x3dc sp : ffff80000f973dd0 x29: ffff80000f973dd0 x28: ffff081b42526180 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: 0000000000000004 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000001 x20: 00000000e8551f00 x19: ffff80000f973eb0 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffaebc949bc488 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000400000 x4 : 0000fffffffffffe x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff80000f973eb0 x1 : 00000000e8551f00 x0 : 0000000000000001 Call trace: 0x0 do_alignment_fault+0x40/0x50 do_mem_abort+0x4c/0xa0 el0_da+0x48/0xf0 el0t_32_sync_handler+0x110/0x140 el0t_32_sync+0x190/0x194 Code: bad PC value ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Angelos Oikonomopoulos Fixes: 3fc24ef32d3b ("arm64: compat: Implement misalignment fixups for multiword loads") Cc: # 6.1.x Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250401085150.148313-1-angelos@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/compat_alignment.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/compat_alignment.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/compat_alignment.c index deff21bfa680..b68e1d328d4c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/compat_alignment.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/compat_alignment.c @@ -368,6 +368,8 @@ int do_compat_alignment_fixup(unsigned long addr, struct pt_regs *regs) return 1; } + if (!handler) + return 1; type = handler(addr, instr, regs); if (type == TYPE_ERROR || type == TYPE_FAULT) From 0cfea60966e4b1239d20bebf02258295e189e82a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ming Yen Hsieh Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 11:33:42 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 07/25] wifi: mt76: mt7921: fix kernel panic due to null pointer dereference commit adc3fd2a2277b7cc0b61692463771bf9bd298036 upstream. Address a kernel panic caused by a null pointer dereference in the `mt792x_rx_get_wcid` function. The issue arises because the `deflink` structure is not properly initialized with the `sta` context. This patch ensures that the `deflink` structure is correctly linked to the `sta` context, preventing the null pointer dereference. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000400 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 470 Comm: mt76-usb-rx phy Not tainted 6.12.13-gentoo-dist #1 Hardware name: /AMD HUDSON-M1, BIOS 4.6.4 11/15/2011 RIP: 0010:mt792x_rx_get_wcid+0x48/0x140 [mt792x_lib] RSP: 0018:ffffa147c055fd98 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8e9ecb652000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e9ecb652000 RBP: 0000000000000685 R08: ffff8e9ec6570000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8e9ecd2ca000 R11: ffff8e9f22a217c0 R12: 0000000038010119 R13: 0000000080843801 R14: ffff8e9ec6570000 R15: ffff8e9ecb652000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e9f22a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000400 CR3: 000000000d2ea000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x2f0 ? search_module_extables+0x19/0x60 ? search_bpf_extables+0x5f/0x80 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? mt792x_rx_get_wcid+0x48/0x140 [mt792x_lib] mt7921_queue_rx_skb+0x1c6/0xaa0 [mt7921_common] mt76u_alloc_queues+0x784/0x810 [mt76_usb] ? __pfx___mt76_worker_fn+0x10/0x10 [mt76] __mt76_worker_fn+0x4f/0x80 [mt76] kthread+0xd2/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Reported-by: Nick Morrow Closes: https://github.com/morrownr/USB-WiFi/issues/577 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 90c10286b176 ("wifi: mt76: mt7925: Update mt792x_rx_get_wcid for per-link STA") Signed-off-by: Ming Yen Hsieh Tested-by: Salah Coronya Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250218033343.1999648-1-mingyen.hsieh@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7921/main.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7921/main.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7921/main.c index e2dfd3670c4c..6a3629f71caa 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7921/main.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7921/main.c @@ -805,6 +805,7 @@ int mt7921_mac_sta_add(struct mt76_dev *mdev, struct ieee80211_vif *vif, msta->deflink.wcid.phy_idx = mvif->bss_conf.mt76.band_idx; msta->deflink.wcid.tx_info |= MT_WCID_TX_INFO_SET; msta->deflink.last_txs = jiffies; + msta->deflink.sta = msta; ret = mt76_connac_pm_wake(&dev->mphy, &dev->pm); if (ret) From 13d6f8ba5074a030f6b972a8af4b056ce03f816b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Theodore Ts'o Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2025 00:38:42 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 08/25] ext4: don't over-report free space or inodes in statvfs commit f87d3af7419307ae26e705a2b2db36140db367a2 upstream. This fixes an analogus bug that was fixed in xfs in commit 4b8d867ca6e2 ("xfs: don't over-report free space or inodes in statvfs") where statfs can report misleading / incorrect information where project quota is enabled, and the free space is less than the remaining quota. This commit will resolve a test failure in generic/762 which tests for this bug. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 689c958cbe6b ("ext4: add project quota support") Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/super.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 940ac1a49b72..d3795c6c0a9d 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -6781,22 +6781,29 @@ static int ext4_statfs_project(struct super_block *sb, dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit); limit >>= sb->s_blocksize_bits; - if (limit && buf->f_blocks > limit) { + if (limit) { + uint64_t remaining = 0; + curblock = (dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_curspace + dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_rsvspace) >> sb->s_blocksize_bits; - buf->f_blocks = limit; - buf->f_bfree = buf->f_bavail = - (buf->f_blocks > curblock) ? - (buf->f_blocks - curblock) : 0; + if (limit > curblock) + remaining = limit - curblock; + + buf->f_blocks = min(buf->f_blocks, limit); + buf->f_bfree = min(buf->f_bfree, remaining); + buf->f_bavail = min(buf->f_bavail, remaining); } limit = min_not_zero(dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_isoftlimit, dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_ihardlimit); - if (limit && buf->f_files > limit) { - buf->f_files = limit; - buf->f_ffree = - (buf->f_files > dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_curinodes) ? - (buf->f_files - dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_curinodes) : 0; + if (limit) { + uint64_t remaining = 0; + + if (limit > dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_curinodes) + remaining = limit - dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_curinodes; + + buf->f_files = min(buf->f_files, limit); + buf->f_ffree = min(buf->f_ffree, remaining); } spin_unlock(&dquot->dq_dqb_lock); From b47584c556444cf7acb66b26a62cbc348eb92b78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Acs, Jakub" Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2025 15:46:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 09/25] ext4: fix OOB read when checking dotdot dir commit d5e206778e96e8667d3bde695ad372c296dc9353 upstream. Mounting a corrupted filesystem with directory which contains '.' dir entry with rec_len == block size results in out-of-bounds read (later on, when the corrupted directory is removed). ext4_empty_dir() assumes every ext4 directory contains at least '.' and '..' as directory entries in the first data block. It first loads the '.' dir entry, performs sanity checks by calling ext4_check_dir_entry() and then uses its rec_len member to compute the location of '..' dir entry (in ext4_next_entry). It assumes the '..' dir entry fits into the same data block. If the rec_len of '.' is precisely one block (4KB), it slips through the sanity checks (it is considered the last directory entry in the data block) and leaves "struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de" point exactly past the memory slot allocated to the data block. The following call to ext4_check_dir_entry() on new value of de then dereferences this pointer which results in out-of-bounds mem access. Fix this by extending __ext4_check_dir_entry() to check for '.' dir entries that reach the end of data block. Make sure to ignore the phony dir entries for checksum (by checking name_len for non-zero). Note: This is reported by KASAN as use-after-free in case another structure was recently freed from the slot past the bound, but it is really an OOB read. This issue was found by syzkaller tool. Call Trace: [ 38.594108] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.594649] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88802b41a004 by task syz-executor/5375 [ 38.595158] [ 38.595288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5375 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7 #1 [ 38.595298] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 38.595304] Call Trace: [ 38.595308] [ 38.595311] dump_stack_lvl+0xa7/0xd0 [ 38.595325] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3f0 [ 38.595339] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595349] print_report+0xaa/0x250 [ 38.595359] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595368] ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0x9/0x90 [ 38.595378] kasan_report+0xab/0xe0 [ 38.595389] ? __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595400] __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x67e/0x710 [ 38.595410] ext4_empty_dir+0x465/0x990 [ 38.595421] ? __pfx_ext4_empty_dir+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595432] ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x29a/0xd10 [ 38.595441] ? __dquot_initialize+0x2a7/0xbf0 [ 38.595455] ? __pfx_ext4_rmdir.part.0+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595464] ? __pfx___dquot_initialize+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595478] ? down_write+0xdb/0x140 [ 38.595487] ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595497] ext4_rmdir+0xee/0x140 [ 38.595506] vfs_rmdir+0x209/0x670 [ 38.595517] ? lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x3b/0x190 [ 38.595529] do_rmdir+0x363/0x3c0 [ 38.595537] ? __pfx_do_rmdir+0x10/0x10 [ 38.595544] ? strncpy_from_user+0x1ff/0x2e0 [ 38.595561] __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130 [ 38.595570] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180 [ 38.595583] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: ac27a0ec112a0 ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Signed-off-by: Jakub Acs Cc: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Andreas Dilger Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mahmoud Adam Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: security@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b3ae36a6794c4a01944c7d70b403db5b@amazon.de Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/dir.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c index ef6a3c8f3a9a..b278b5703c19 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c @@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ int __ext4_check_dir_entry(const char *function, unsigned int line, else if (unlikely(le32_to_cpu(de->inode) > le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(dir->i_sb)->s_es->s_inodes_count))) error_msg = "inode out of bounds"; + else if (unlikely(next_offset == size && de->name_len == 1 && + de->name[0] == '.')) + error_msg = "'.' directory cannot be the last in data block"; else return 0; From 0beddc2a3f9b9cf7d8887973041e36c2d0fa3652 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qasim Ijaz Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 21:05:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 10/25] jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get() commit fdf480da5837c23b146c4743c18de97202fcab37 upstream. During the "size_check" label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs "ea_get: invalid extended attribute" and calls print_hex_dump(). Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped: int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)); Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads "size" to wrap around and become negative (-184549328). The "size" is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called "len" in print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned type), this is then stored inside a variable called "int remaining", which is then assigned to "int linelen" which is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump() the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is 18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer() on each iteration: for (i = 0; i < len; i += rowsize) { linelen = min(remaining, rowsize); remaining -= rowsize; hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize, linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii); ... } The expected stopping condition (i < len) is effectively broken since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to the "ptr+i" being passed to hex_dump_to_buffer() to get closer to the end of the actual bounds of "ptr", eventually an out of bounds access is done in hex_dump_to_buffer() in the following for loop: for (j = 0; j < len; j++) { if (linebuflen < lx + 2) goto overflow2; ch = ptr[j]; ... } To fix this we should validate "EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)" before it is utilised. Reported-by: syzbot Tested-by: syzbot Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e6e7e4279d046613bc5 Fixes: d9f9d96136cb ("jfs: xattr: check invalid xattr size more strictly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Qasim Ijaz Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/jfs/xattr.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/jfs/xattr.c b/fs/jfs/xattr.c index 24afbae87225..11d7f74d207b 100644 --- a/fs/jfs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/jfs/xattr.c @@ -559,11 +559,16 @@ static int ea_get(struct inode *inode, struct ea_buffer *ea_buf, int min_size) size_check: if (EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) != ea_size) { - int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)); + if (unlikely(EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) > INT_MAX)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: extended attribute size too large: %u > INT_MAX\n", + EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)); + } else { + int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)); - printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n"); - print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, - ea_buf->xattr, size, 1); + printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n"); + print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, + ea_buf->xattr, size, 1); + } ea_release(inode, ea_buf); rc = -EIO; goto clean_up; From 2d9709690f31540adc3e97923878f539db07d0f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Roman Smirnov Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2025 11:25:22 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 11/25] jfs: add index corruption check to DT_GETPAGE() commit a8dfb2168906944ea61acfc87846b816eeab882d upstream. If the file system is corrupted, the header.stblindex variable may become greater than 127. Because of this, an array access out of bounds may occur: ------------[ cut here ]------------ UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3096:10 index 237 is out of range for type 'struct dtslot[128]' CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5822 Comm: syz-executor740 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00110-g4099a71718b0 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x121/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:429 dtReadFirst+0x622/0xc50 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3096 dtReadNext fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3147 [inline] jfs_readdir+0x9aa/0x3c50 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:2862 wrap_directory_iterator+0x91/0xd0 fs/readdir.c:65 iterate_dir+0x571/0x800 fs/readdir.c:108 __do_sys_getdents64 fs/readdir.c:403 [inline] __se_sys_getdents64+0x1e2/0x4b0 fs/readdir.c:389 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f ---[ end trace ]--- Add a stblindex check for corruption. Reported-by: syzbot Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9120834fc227768625ba Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c index 8f85177f284b..93db6eec4465 100644 --- a/fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c +++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c @@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ do { \ if (!(RC)) { \ if (((P)->header.nextindex > \ (((BN) == 0) ? DTROOTMAXSLOT : (P)->header.maxslot)) || \ - ((BN) && ((P)->header.maxslot > DTPAGEMAXSLOT))) { \ + ((BN) && (((P)->header.maxslot > DTPAGEMAXSLOT) || \ + ((P)->header.stblindex >= DTPAGEMAXSLOT)))) { \ BT_PUTPAGE(MP); \ jfs_error((IP)->i_sb, \ "DT_GETPAGE: dtree page corrupt\n"); \ From 747e3eec1d7d124ea90ed3d7b85369df8b4e36d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yosry Ahmed Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2025 18:56:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 12/25] mm: zswap: fix crypto_free_acomp() deadlock in zswap_cpu_comp_dead() commit c11bcbc0a517acf69282c8225059b2a8ac5fe628 upstream. Currently, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() calls crypto_free_acomp() while holding the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. crypto_free_acomp() then holds scomp_lock (through crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()). On the other hand, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() holds the scomp_lock (through crypto_scomp_init_tfm()), and then allocates memory. If the allocation results in reclaim, we may attempt to hold the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. The above dependencies can cause an ABBA deadlock. For example in the following scenario: (1) Task A running on CPU #1: crypto_alloc_acomp_node() Holds scomp_lock Enters reclaim Reads per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) (2) Task A is descheduled (3) CPU #1 goes offline zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU #1) Holds per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)) Calls crypto_free_acomp() Waits for scomp_lock (4) Task A running on CPU #2: Waits for per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Read on CPU #1 DEADLOCK Since there is no requirement to call crypto_free_acomp() with the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex held in zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), move it after the mutex is unlocked. Also move the acomp_request_free() and kfree() calls for consistency and to avoid any potential sublte locking dependencies in the future. With this, only setting acomp_ctx fields to NULL occurs with the mutex held. This is similar to how zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() only initializes acomp_ctx fields with the mutex held, after performing all allocations before holding the mutex. Opportunistically, move the NULL check on acomp_ctx so that it takes place before the mutex dereference. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250226185625.2672936-1-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev Fixes: 12dcb0ef5406 ("mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Co-developed-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed Reported-by: syzbot+1a517ccfcbc6a7ab0f82@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67bcea51.050a0220.bbfd1.0096.GAE@google.com/ Acked-by: Herbert Xu Reviewed-by: Chengming Zhou Reviewed-by: Nhat Pham Tested-by: Nhat Pham Cc: David S. Miller Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Chris Murphy Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/zswap.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/zswap.c b/mm/zswap.c index 7fefb2eb3fcd..00d51d013757 100644 --- a/mm/zswap.c +++ b/mm/zswap.c @@ -876,18 +876,32 @@ static int zswap_cpu_comp_dead(unsigned int cpu, struct hlist_node *node) { struct zswap_pool *pool = hlist_entry(node, struct zswap_pool, node); struct crypto_acomp_ctx *acomp_ctx = per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, cpu); + struct acomp_req *req; + struct crypto_acomp *acomp; + u8 *buffer; + + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx)) + return 0; mutex_lock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); - if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx)) { - if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx->req)) - acomp_request_free(acomp_ctx->req); - acomp_ctx->req = NULL; - if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp_ctx->acomp)) - crypto_free_acomp(acomp_ctx->acomp); - kfree(acomp_ctx->buffer); - } + req = acomp_ctx->req; + acomp = acomp_ctx->acomp; + buffer = acomp_ctx->buffer; + acomp_ctx->req = NULL; + acomp_ctx->acomp = NULL; + acomp_ctx->buffer = NULL; mutex_unlock(&acomp_ctx->mutex); + /* + * Do the actual freeing after releasing the mutex to avoid subtle + * locking dependencies causing deadlocks. + */ + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(req)) + acomp_request_free(req); + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acomp)) + crypto_free_acomp(acomp); + kfree(buffer); + return 0; } From e2d8e7bd3314485e0b3b08380c659b3d1d67ed6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 17:00:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 13/25] exec: fix the racy usage of fs_struct->in_exec commit af7bb0d2ca459f15cb5ca604dab5d9af103643f0 upstream. check_unsafe_exec() sets fs->in_exec under cred_guard_mutex, then execve() paths clear fs->in_exec lockless. This is fine if exec succeeds, but if it fails we have the following race: T1 sets fs->in_exec = 1, fails, drops cred_guard_mutex T2 sets fs->in_exec = 1 T1 clears fs->in_exec T2 continues with fs->in_exec == 0 Change fs/exec.c to clear fs->in_exec with cred_guard_mutex held. Reported-by: syzbot+1c486d0b62032c82a968@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67dc67f0.050a0220.25ae54.001f.GAE@google.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250324160003.GA8878@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/exec.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 67513bd606c2..d60794372963 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1246,13 +1246,12 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) */ bprm->point_of_no_return = true; - /* - * Make this the only thread in the thread group. - */ + /* Make this the only thread in the thread group */ retval = de_thread(me); if (retval) goto out; - + /* see the comment in check_unsafe_exec() */ + current->fs->in_exec = 0; /* * Cancel any io_uring activity across execve */ @@ -1514,6 +1513,8 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } free_arg_pages(bprm); if (bprm->cred) { + /* in case exec fails before de_thread() succeeds */ + current->fs->in_exec = 0; mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex); abort_creds(bprm->cred); } @@ -1620,6 +1621,10 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * suid exec because the differently privileged task * will be able to manipulate the current directory, etc. * It would be nice to force an unshare instead... + * + * Otherwise we set fs->in_exec = 1 to deny clone(CLONE_FS) + * from another sub-thread until de_thread() succeeds, this + * state is protected by cred_guard_mutex we hold. */ n_fs = 1; spin_lock(&p->fs->lock); @@ -1878,7 +1883,6 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm) sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current); /* execve succeeded */ - current->fs->in_exec = 0; current->in_execve = 0; rseq_execve(current); user_events_execve(current); @@ -1897,7 +1901,6 @@ out: force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV); sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current); - current->fs->in_exec = 0; current->in_execve = 0; return retval; From 845e9286ff99ee88cfdeb2b748f730003a512190 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Zhandarovich Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2025 17:58:25 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 14/25] media: vimc: skip .s_stream() for stopped entities commit 36cef585e2a31e4ddf33a004b0584a7a572246de upstream. Syzbot reported [1] a warning prompted by a check in call_s_stream() that checks whether .s_stream() operation is warranted for unstarted or stopped subdevs. Add a simple fix in vimc_streamer_pipeline_terminate() ensuring that entities skip a call to .s_stream() unless they have been previously properly started. [1] Syzbot report: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5933 at drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-subdev.c:460 call_s_stream+0x2df/0x350 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-subdev.c:460 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5933 Comm: syz-executor330 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-syzkaller-00362-g2d8308bf5b67 #0 ... Call Trace: vimc_streamer_pipeline_terminate+0x218/0x320 drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c:62 vimc_streamer_pipeline_init drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c:101 [inline] vimc_streamer_s_stream+0x650/0x9a0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c:203 vimc_capture_start_streaming+0xa1/0x130 drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-capture.c:256 vb2_start_streaming+0x15f/0x5a0 drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-core.c:1789 vb2_core_streamon+0x2a7/0x450 drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-core.c:2348 vb2_streamon drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-v4l2.c:875 [inline] vb2_ioctl_streamon+0xf4/0x170 drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-v4l2.c:1118 __video_do_ioctl+0xaf0/0xf00 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:3122 video_usercopy+0x4d2/0x1620 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:3463 v4l2_ioctl+0x1ba/0x250 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-dev.c:366 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:892 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x190/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f2b85c01b19 ... Reported-by: syzbot+5bcd7c809d365e14c4df@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5bcd7c809d365e14c4df Fixes: adc589d2a208 ("media: vimc: Add vimc-streamer for stream control") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c b/drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c index 807551a5143b..15d863f97cbf 100644 --- a/drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c +++ b/drivers/media/test-drivers/vimc/vimc-streamer.c @@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ static void vimc_streamer_pipeline_terminate(struct vimc_stream *stream) continue; sd = media_entity_to_v4l2_subdev(ved->ent); + /* + * Do not call .s_stream() to stop an already + * stopped/unstarted subdev. + */ + if (!v4l2_subdev_is_streaming(sd)) + continue; v4l2_subdev_call(sd, video, s_stream, 0); } } From adf0ddb914c9e5b3e50da4c97959e82de2df75c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Murad Masimov Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2025 13:51:30 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 15/25] media: streamzap: fix race between device disconnection and urb callback commit f656cfbc7a293a039d6a0c7100e1c846845148c1 upstream. Syzkaller has reported a general protection fault at function ir_raw_event_store_with_filter(). This crash is caused by a NULL pointer dereference of dev->raw pointer, even though it is checked for NULL in the same function, which means there is a race condition. It occurs due to the incorrect order of actions in the streamzap_disconnect() function: rc_unregister_device() is called before usb_kill_urb(). The dev->raw pointer is freed and set to NULL in rc_unregister_device(), and only after that usb_kill_urb() waits for in-progress requests to finish. If rc_unregister_device() is called while streamzap_callback() handler is not finished, this can lead to accessing freed resources. Thus rc_unregister_device() should be called after usb_kill_urb(). Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 8e9e60640067 ("V4L/DVB: staging/lirc: port lirc_streamzap to ir-core") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+34008406ee9a31b13c73@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=34008406ee9a31b13c73 Signed-off-by: Murad Masimov Signed-off-by: Sean Young Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/rc/streamzap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/rc/streamzap.c b/drivers/media/rc/streamzap.c index 9b209e687f25..2ce62fe5d60f 100644 --- a/drivers/media/rc/streamzap.c +++ b/drivers/media/rc/streamzap.c @@ -385,8 +385,8 @@ static void streamzap_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface) if (!sz) return; - rc_unregister_device(sz->rdev); usb_kill_urb(sz->urb_in); + rc_unregister_device(sz->rdev); usb_free_urb(sz->urb_in); usb_free_coherent(usbdev, sz->buf_in_len, sz->buf_in, sz->dma_in); From 52e209203c35a4fbff8af23cd3613efe5df40102 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 09:08:29 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 16/25] nfsd: allow SC_STATUS_FREEABLE when searching via nfs4_lookup_stateid() commit d1bc15b147d35b4cb7ca99a9a7d79d41ca342c13 upstream. The pynfs DELEG8 test fails when run against nfsd. It acquires a delegation and then lets the lease time out. It then tries to use the deleg stateid and expects to see NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED, but it gets bad NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID instead. When a delegation is revoked, it's initially marked with SC_STATUS_REVOKED, or SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED and later, it's marked with the SC_STATUS_FREEABLE flag, which denotes that it is waiting for s FREE_STATEID call. nfs4_lookup_stateid() accepts a statusmask that includes the status flags that a found stateid is allowed to have. Currently, that mask never includes SC_STATUS_FREEABLE, which means that revoked delegations are (almost) never found. Add SC_STATUS_FREEABLE to the always-allowed status flags, and remove it from nfsd4_delegreturn() since it's now always implied. Fixes: 8dd91e8d31fe ("nfsd: fix race between laundromat and free_stateid") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index 57f8818aa47c..cd9fa5cbe23f 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -6880,7 +6880,7 @@ nfsd4_lookup_stateid(struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, */ statusmask |= SC_STATUS_REVOKED; - statusmask |= SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED; + statusmask |= SC_STATUS_ADMIN_REVOKED | SC_STATUS_FREEABLE; if (ZERO_STATEID(stateid) || ONE_STATEID(stateid) || CLOSE_STATEID(stateid)) @@ -7535,9 +7535,7 @@ nfsd4_delegreturn(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, if ((status = fh_verify(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, S_IFREG, 0))) return status; - status = nfsd4_lookup_stateid(cstate, stateid, SC_TYPE_DELEG, - SC_STATUS_REVOKED | SC_STATUS_FREEABLE, - &s, nn); + status = nfsd4_lookup_stateid(cstate, stateid, SC_TYPE_DELEG, SC_STATUS_REVOKED, &s, nn); if (status) goto out; dp = delegstateid(s); From cad3479b63661a399c9df1d0b759e1806e2df3c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Li Lingfeng Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2025 22:42:20 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 17/25] nfsd: put dl_stid if fail to queue dl_recall commit 230ca758453c63bd38e4d9f4a21db698f7abada8 upstream. Before calling nfsd4_run_cb to queue dl_recall to the callback_wq, we increment the reference count of dl_stid. We expect that after the corresponding work_struct is processed, the reference count of dl_stid will be decremented through the callback function nfsd4_cb_recall_release. However, if the call to nfsd4_run_cb fails, the incremented reference count of dl_stid will not be decremented correspondingly, leading to the following nfs4_stid leak: unreferenced object 0xffff88812067b578 (size 344): comm "nfsd", pid 2761, jiffies 4295044002 (age 5541.241s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b 6b b8 02 c0 e2 81 88 ff ff ....kkkk........ 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de .kkkkkkk.....N.. backtrace: kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b9/0x700 nfsd4_process_open1+0x34/0x300 nfsd4_open+0x2d1/0x9d0 nfsd4_proc_compound+0x7a2/0xe30 nfsd_dispatch+0x241/0x3e0 svc_process_common+0x5d3/0xcc0 svc_process+0x2a3/0x320 nfsd+0x180/0x2e0 kthread+0x199/0x1d0 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 unreferenced object 0xffff8881499f4d28 (size 368): comm "nfsd", pid 2761, jiffies 4295044005 (age 5541.239s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 4d 9f 49 81 88 ff ff ........0M.I.... 30 4d 9f 49 81 88 ff ff 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 0M.I.... ....... backtrace: kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b9/0x700 nfs4_alloc_stid+0x29/0x210 alloc_init_deleg+0x92/0x2e0 nfs4_set_delegation+0x284/0xc00 nfs4_open_delegation+0x216/0x3f0 nfsd4_process_open2+0x2b3/0xee0 nfsd4_open+0x770/0x9d0 nfsd4_proc_compound+0x7a2/0xe30 nfsd_dispatch+0x241/0x3e0 svc_process_common+0x5d3/0xcc0 svc_process+0x2a3/0x320 nfsd+0x180/0x2e0 kthread+0x199/0x1d0 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 Fix it by checking the result of nfsd4_run_cb and call nfs4_put_stid if fail to queue dl_recall. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index cd9fa5cbe23f..d53ad2249e4b 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -1057,6 +1057,12 @@ static struct nfs4_ol_stateid * nfs4_alloc_open_stateid(struct nfs4_client *clp) return openlockstateid(stid); } +/* + * As the sc_free callback of deleg, this may be called by nfs4_put_stid + * in nfsd_break_one_deleg. + * Considering nfsd_break_one_deleg is called with the flc->flc_lock held, + * this function mustn't ever sleep. + */ static void nfs4_free_deleg(struct nfs4_stid *stid) { struct nfs4_delegation *dp = delegstateid(stid); @@ -5269,6 +5275,7 @@ static const struct nfsd4_callback_ops nfsd4_cb_recall_ops = { static void nfsd_break_one_deleg(struct nfs4_delegation *dp) { + bool queued; /* * We're assuming the state code never drops its reference * without first removing the lease. Since we're in this lease @@ -5277,7 +5284,10 @@ static void nfsd_break_one_deleg(struct nfs4_delegation *dp) * we know it's safe to take a reference. */ refcount_inc(&dp->dl_stid.sc_count); - WARN_ON_ONCE(!nfsd4_run_cb(&dp->dl_recall)); + queued = nfsd4_run_cb(&dp->dl_recall); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!queued); + if (!queued) + nfs4_put_stid(&dp->dl_stid); } /* Called from break_lease() with flc_lock held. */ From a84c80515ca8a0cdf6d06f1b6ca721224b08453e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Olga Kornievskaia Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 11:32:58 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 18/25] nfsd: fix management of listener transports commit d093c90892607be505e801469d6674459e69ab89 upstream. Currently, when no active threads are running, a root user using nfsdctl command can try to remove a particular listener from the list of previously added ones, then start the server by increasing the number of threads, it leads to the following problem: [ 158.835354] refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. [ 158.835603] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 9145 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x160/0x1a0 [ 158.836017] Modules linked in: rpcrdma rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace overlay isofs uinput snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 rfkill ip_set nf_tables qrtr sunrpc vfat fat uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops uvc videobuf2_v4l2 videodev videobuf2_common snd_hda_codec_generic mc e1000e snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore sg loop dm_multipath dm_mod nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vmw_vmci vsock xfs libcrc32c crct10dif_ce ghash_ce vmwgfx sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sr_mod sha1_ce cdrom nvme drm_client_lib drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_core drm_kms_helper nvme_auth drm fuse [ 158.840093] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 9145 Comm: nfsd Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B W 6.13.0-rc6+ #7 [ 158.840624] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN [ 158.840802] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/VBSA, BIOS VMW201.00V.24006586.BA64.2406042154 06/04/2024 [ 158.841220] pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 158.841563] pc : refcount_warn_saturate+0x160/0x1a0 [ 158.841780] lr : refcount_warn_saturate+0x160/0x1a0 [ 158.842000] sp : ffff800089be7d80 [ 158.842147] x29: ffff800089be7d80 x28: ffff00008e68c148 x27: ffff00008e68c148 [ 158.842492] x26: ffff0002e3b5c000 x25: ffff600011cd1829 x24: ffff00008653c010 [ 158.842832] x23: ffff00008653c000 x22: 1fffe00011cd1829 x21: ffff00008653c028 [ 158.843175] x20: 0000000000000002 x19: ffff00008653c010 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 158.843505] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 158.843836] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: ffff600050a26493 [ 158.844143] x11: 1fffe00050a26492 x10: ffff600050a26492 x9 : dfff800000000000 [ 158.844475] x8 : 00009fffaf5d9b6e x7 : ffff000285132493 x6 : 0000000000000001 [ 158.844823] x5 : ffff000285132490 x4 : ffff600050a26493 x3 : ffff8000805e72bc [ 158.845174] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000098588000 [ 158.845528] Call trace: [ 158.845658] refcount_warn_saturate+0x160/0x1a0 (P) [ 158.845894] svc_recv+0x58c/0x680 [sunrpc] [ 158.846183] nfsd+0x1fc/0x348 [nfsd] [ 158.846390] kthread+0x274/0x2f8 [ 158.846546] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 158.846714] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() would manipulate the list of transports of server's sv_permsocks and close the specified listener but the other list of transports (server's sp_xprts list) would not be changed leading to the problem above. Instead, determined if the nfsdctl is trying to remove a listener, in which case, delete all the existing listener transports and re-create all-but-the-removed ones. Fixes: 16a471177496 ("NFSD: add listener-{set,get} netlink command") Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c index 3adbc05ebaac..e83629f39604 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c @@ -1959,6 +1959,7 @@ int nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) struct svc_serv *serv; LIST_HEAD(permsocks); struct nfsd_net *nn; + bool delete = false; int err, rem; mutex_lock(&nfsd_mutex); @@ -2019,34 +2020,28 @@ int nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) } } - /* For now, no removing old sockets while server is running */ - if (serv->sv_nrthreads && !list_empty(&permsocks)) { + /* + * If there are listener transports remaining on the permsocks list, + * it means we were asked to remove a listener. + */ + if (!list_empty(&permsocks)) { list_splice_init(&permsocks, &serv->sv_permsocks); - spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_lock); + delete = true; + } + spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_lock); + + /* Do not remove listeners while there are active threads. */ + if (serv->sv_nrthreads) { err = -EBUSY; goto out_unlock_mtx; } - /* Close the remaining sockets on the permsocks list */ - while (!list_empty(&permsocks)) { - xprt = list_first_entry(&permsocks, struct svc_xprt, xpt_list); - list_move(&xprt->xpt_list, &serv->sv_permsocks); - - /* - * Newly-created sockets are born with the BUSY bit set. Clear - * it if there are no threads, since nothing can pick it up - * in that case. - */ - if (!serv->sv_nrthreads) - clear_bit(XPT_BUSY, &xprt->xpt_flags); - - set_bit(XPT_CLOSE, &xprt->xpt_flags); - spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_lock); - svc_xprt_close(xprt); - spin_lock_bh(&serv->sv_lock); - } - - spin_unlock_bh(&serv->sv_lock); + /* + * Since we can't delete an arbitrary llist entry, destroy the + * remaining listeners and recreate the list. + */ + if (delete) + svc_xprt_destroy_all(serv, net); /* walk list of addrs again, open any that still don't exist */ nlmsg_for_each_attr(attr, info->nlhdr, GENL_HDRLEN, rem) { @@ -2073,6 +2068,9 @@ int nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) xprt = svc_find_listener(serv, xcl_name, net, sa); if (xprt) { + if (delete) + WARN_ONCE(1, "Transport type=%s already exists\n", + xcl_name); svc_xprt_put(xprt); continue; } From 101fd0aa0d7d502ea947cdc20abdc9a6e565dea0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2025 16:50:17 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 19/25] NFSD: nfsd_unlink() clobbers non-zero status returned from fh_fill_pre_attrs() commit d7d8e3169b56e7696559a2427c922c0d55debcec upstream. If fh_fill_pre_attrs() returns a non-zero status, the error flow takes it through out_unlock, which then overwrites the returned status code with err = nfserrno(host_err); Fixes: a332018a91c4 ("nfsd: handle failure to collect pre/post-op attrs more sanely") Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index d6d4f2a0e898..82530d505626 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -2015,11 +2015,9 @@ out_nfserr: * error status. */ err = nfserr_file_open; - } else { - err = nfserrno(host_err); } out: - return err; + return err != nfs_ok ? err : nfserrno(host_err); out_unlock: inode_unlock(dirp); goto out_drop_write; From afec5b5010de3f8494e10fc904a9453003d9a0aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2025 16:50:18 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 20/25] NFSD: Never return NFS4ERR_FILE_OPEN when removing a directory commit 370345b4bd184a49ac68d6591801e5e3605b355a upstream. RFC 8881 Section 18.25.4 paragraph 5 tells us that the server should return NFS4ERR_FILE_OPEN only if the target object is an opened file. This suggests that returning this status when removing a directory will confuse NFS clients. This is a version-specific issue; nfsd_proc_remove/rmdir() and nfsd3_proc_remove/rmdir() already return nfserr_access as appropriate. Unfortunately there is no quick way for nfsd4_remove() to determine whether the target object is a file or not, so the check is done in in nfsd_unlink() for now. Reported-by: Trond Myklebust Fixes: 466e16f0920f ("nfsd: check for EBUSY from vfs_rmdir/vfs_unink.") Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index 82530d505626..ca29a5e1600f 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -1935,9 +1935,17 @@ out: return err; } -/* - * Unlink a file or directory - * N.B. After this call fhp needs an fh_put +/** + * nfsd_unlink - remove a directory entry + * @rqstp: RPC transaction context + * @fhp: the file handle of the parent directory to be modified + * @type: enforced file type of the object to be removed + * @fname: the name of directory entry to be removed + * @flen: length of @fname in octets + * + * After this call fhp needs an fh_put. + * + * Returns a generic NFS status code in network byte-order. */ __be32 nfsd_unlink(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type, @@ -2011,10 +2019,14 @@ out_drop_write: fh_drop_write(fhp); out_nfserr: if (host_err == -EBUSY) { - /* name is mounted-on. There is no perfect - * error status. + /* + * See RFC 8881 Section 18.25.4 para 4: NFSv4 REMOVE + * wants a status unique to the object type. */ - err = nfserr_file_open; + if (type != S_IFDIR) + err = nfserr_file_open; + else + err = nfserr_acces; } out: return err != nfs_ok ? err : nfserrno(host_err); From c6f2a8146da1c30d947bbdddd5cd84566ed8ae5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2025 17:09:24 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 21/25] NFSD: Skip sending CB_RECALL_ANY when the backchannel isn't up commit 8a388c1fabeb6606e16467b23242416c0dbeffad upstream. NFSD sends CB_RECALL_ANY to clients when the server is low on memory or that client has a large number of delegations outstanding. We've seen cases where NFSD attempts to send CB_RECALL_ANY requests to disconnected clients, and gets confused. These calls never go anywhere if a backchannel transport to the target client isn't available. Before the server can send any backchannel operation, the client has to connect first and then do a BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION. This patch doesn't address the root cause of the confusion, but there's no need to queue up these optional operations if they can't go anywhere. Fixes: 44df6f439a17 ("NFSD: add delegation reaper to react to low memory condition") Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index d53ad2249e4b..5e81c819c384 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -6699,14 +6699,19 @@ deleg_reaper(struct nfsd_net *nn) spin_lock(&nn->client_lock); list_for_each_safe(pos, next, &nn->client_lru) { clp = list_entry(pos, struct nfs4_client, cl_lru); - if (clp->cl_state != NFSD4_ACTIVE || - list_empty(&clp->cl_delegations) || - atomic_read(&clp->cl_delegs_in_recall) || - test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_CB_RECALL_ANY, &clp->cl_flags) || - (ktime_get_boottime_seconds() - - clp->cl_ra_time < 5)) { + + if (clp->cl_state != NFSD4_ACTIVE) + continue; + if (list_empty(&clp->cl_delegations)) + continue; + if (atomic_read(&clp->cl_delegs_in_recall)) + continue; + if (test_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_CB_RECALL_ANY, &clp->cl_flags)) + continue; + if (ktime_get_boottime_seconds() - clp->cl_ra_time < 5) + continue; + if (clp->cl_cb_state != NFSD4_CB_UP) continue; - } list_add(&clp->cl_ra_cblist, &cblist); /* release in nfsd4_cb_recall_any_release */ From 59fc42318305cb38efb4f5565408150419be8451 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nathan Chancellor Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2025 22:33:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 22/25] ARM: 9443/1: Require linker to support KEEP within OVERLAY for DCE commit e7607f7d6d81af71dcc5171278aadccc94d277cd upstream. ld.lld prior to 21.0.0 does not support using the KEEP keyword within an overlay description, which may be needed to avoid discarding necessary sections within an overlay with '--gc-sections', which can be enabled for the kernel via CONFIG_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION. Disallow CONFIG_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION without support for KEEP within OVERLAY and introduce a macro, OVERLAY_KEEP, that can be used to conditionally add KEEP when it is properly supported to avoid breaking old versions of ld.lld. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/381599f1fe973afad3094e55ec99b1620dba7d8c Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) [nathan: Fix conflict in init/Kconfig due to lack of RUSTC symbols] Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h | 6 ++++++ init/Kconfig | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig index 202397be76d8..d0040fb67c36 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ config ARM select HAVE_KERNEL_XZ select HAVE_KPROBES if !XIP_KERNEL && !CPU_ENDIAN_BE32 && !CPU_V7M select HAVE_KRETPROBES if HAVE_KPROBES - select HAVE_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION if (LD_VERSION >= 23600 || LD_IS_LLD) + select HAVE_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION if (LD_VERSION >= 23600 || LD_CAN_USE_KEEP_IN_OVERLAY) select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC select HAVE_NMI select HAVE_OPTPROBES if !THUMB2_KERNEL diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h index f6623fc6cc39..14811b4f48ec 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h @@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ #define NOCROSSREFS #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_LD_CAN_USE_KEEP_IN_OVERLAY +#define OVERLAY_KEEP(x) KEEP(x) +#else +#define OVERLAY_KEEP(x) x +#endif + /* Set start/end symbol names to the LMA for the section */ #define ARM_LMA(sym, section) \ sym##_start = LOADADDR(section); \ diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 293c565c6216..243d0087f944 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -129,6 +129,11 @@ config CC_HAS_COUNTED_BY # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/112636 depends on !(CC_IS_CLANG && CLANG_VERSION < 190103) +config LD_CAN_USE_KEEP_IN_OVERLAY + # ld.lld prior to 21.0.0 did not support KEEP within an overlay description + # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/130661 + def_bool LD_IS_BFD || LLD_VERSION >= 210000 + config PAHOLE_VERSION int default $(shell,$(srctree)/scripts/pahole-version.sh $(PAHOLE)) From 625e9b91eb136280f084859d4e3994ff598a0d28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Rostedt Date: Sun, 23 Mar 2025 15:21:51 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 23/25] tracing: Do not use PERF enums when perf is not defined commit 8eb1518642738c6892bd629b46043513a3bf1a6a upstream. An update was made to up the module ref count when a synthetic event is registered for both trace and perf events. But if perf is not configured in, the perf enums used will cause the kernel to fail to build. Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers Cc: Douglas Raillard Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250323152151.528b5ced@batman.local.home Fixes: 21581dd4e7ff ("tracing: Ensure module defining synth event cannot be unloaded while tracing") Reported-by: kernel test robot Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202503232230.TeREVy8R-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c index 7c03973341b6..24c9962c40db 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c @@ -865,8 +865,10 @@ static int synth_event_reg(struct trace_event_call *call, struct synth_event *event = container_of(call, struct synth_event, call); switch (type) { - case TRACE_REG_REGISTER: +#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS case TRACE_REG_PERF_REGISTER: +#endif + case TRACE_REG_REGISTER: if (!try_module_get(event->mod)) return -EBUSY; break; @@ -877,8 +879,10 @@ static int synth_event_reg(struct trace_event_call *call, int ret = trace_event_reg(call, type, data); switch (type) { - case TRACE_REG_UNREGISTER: +#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS case TRACE_REG_PERF_UNREGISTER: +#endif + case TRACE_REG_UNREGISTER: module_put(event->mod); break; default: From e70b4b8f93d7fcf8ee063a1d1f18782c4da3d335 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2025 22:48:29 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 24/25] platform/x86/amd/pmf: fix cleanup in amd_pmf_init_smart_pc() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 5b1122fc4995f308b21d7cfc64ef9880ac834d20 upstream. There are a few problems in this code: First, if amd_pmf_tee_init() fails then the function returns directly instead of cleaning up. We cannot simply do a "goto error;" because the amd_pmf_tee_init() cleanup calls tee_shm_free(dev->fw_shm_pool); and amd_pmf_tee_deinit() calls it as well leading to a double free. I have re-written this code to use an unwind ladder to free the allocations. Second, if amd_pmf_start_policy_engine() fails on every iteration though the loop then the code calls amd_pmf_tee_deinit() twice which is also a double free. Call amd_pmf_tee_deinit() inside the loop for each failed iteration. Also on that path the error codes are not necessarily negative kernel error codes. Set the error code to -EINVAL. There is a very subtle third bug which is that if the call to input_register_device() in amd_pmf_register_input_device() fails then we call input_unregister_device() on an input device that wasn't registered. This will lead to a reference counting underflow because of the device_del(&dev->dev) in __input_unregister_device(). It's unlikely that anyone would ever hit this bug in real life. Fixes: 376a8c2a1443 ("platform/x86/amd/pmf: Update PMF Driver for Compatibility with new PMF-TA") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/232231fc-6a71-495e-971b-be2a76f6db4c@stanley.mountain Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/tee-if.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/tee-if.c b/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/tee-if.c index 35495ef2c87d..09131507d7a9 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/tee-if.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/tee-if.c @@ -510,18 +510,18 @@ int amd_pmf_init_smart_pc(struct amd_pmf_dev *dev) ret = amd_pmf_set_dram_addr(dev, true); if (ret) - goto error; + goto err_cancel_work; dev->policy_base = devm_ioremap(dev->dev, dev->policy_addr, dev->policy_sz); if (!dev->policy_base) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto error; + goto err_free_dram_buf; } dev->policy_buf = kzalloc(dev->policy_sz, GFP_KERNEL); if (!dev->policy_buf) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto error; + goto err_free_dram_buf; } memcpy_fromio(dev->policy_buf, dev->policy_base, dev->policy_sz); @@ -531,13 +531,13 @@ int amd_pmf_init_smart_pc(struct amd_pmf_dev *dev) dev->prev_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev->prev_data), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dev->prev_data) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto error; + goto err_free_policy; } for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(amd_pmf_ta_uuid); i++) { ret = amd_pmf_tee_init(dev, &amd_pmf_ta_uuid[i]); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_free_prev_data; ret = amd_pmf_start_policy_engine(dev); switch (ret) { @@ -550,27 +550,41 @@ int amd_pmf_init_smart_pc(struct amd_pmf_dev *dev) status = false; break; default: - goto error; + ret = -EINVAL; + amd_pmf_tee_deinit(dev); + goto err_free_prev_data; } if (status) break; } - if (!status && !pb_side_load) - goto error; + if (!status && !pb_side_load) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_free_prev_data; + } if (pb_side_load) amd_pmf_open_pb(dev, dev->dbgfs_dir); ret = amd_pmf_register_input_device(dev); if (ret) - goto error; + goto err_pmf_remove_pb; return 0; -error: - amd_pmf_deinit_smart_pc(dev); +err_pmf_remove_pb: + if (pb_side_load && dev->esbin) + amd_pmf_remove_pb(dev); + amd_pmf_tee_deinit(dev); +err_free_prev_data: + kfree(dev->prev_data); +err_free_policy: + kfree(dev->policy_buf); +err_free_dram_buf: + kfree(dev->buf); +err_cancel_work: + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&dev->pb_work); return ret; } From 83b4161a63b87ce40d9f24f09b5b006f63d95b7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 14:39:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 25/25] Linux 6.12.23 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250408104845.675475678@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Markus Reichelt Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250408154121.378213016@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Peter Schneider Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: SeongJae Park Tested-by: Ron Economos Tested-by: Jon Hunter Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Shuah Khan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250409115859.721906906@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda Tested-by: Mark Brown Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Peter Schneider Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing Tested-by: Jon Hunter Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index f380005d1600..6a2a60eb67a3 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 6 PATCHLEVEL = 12 -SUBLEVEL = 22 +SUBLEVEL = 23 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Baby Opossum Posse