selftests/landlock: Add a new test for setuid()

commit c5efa393d82cf68812e0ae4d93e339873eabe9fe upstream.

The new signal_scoping_thread_setuid tests check that the libc's
setuid() function works as expected even when a thread is sandboxed with
scoped signal restrictions.

Before the signal scoping fix, this test would have failed with the
setuid() call:

  [pid    65] getpid()                    = 65
  [pid    65] tgkill(65, 66, SIGRT_1)     = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
  [pid    65] futex(0x40a66cdc, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1) = 0
  [pid    65] setuid(1001)                = 0

After the fix, tgkill(2) is successfully leveraged to synchronize
credentials update across threads:

  [pid    65] getpid()                    = 65
  [pid    65] tgkill(65, 66, SIGRT_1)     = 0
  [pid    66] <... read resumed>0x40a65eb7, 1) = ? ERESTARTSYS (To be restarted if SA_RESTART is set)
  [pid    66] --- SIGRT_1 {si_signo=SIGRT_1, si_code=SI_TKILL, si_pid=65, si_uid=1000} ---
  [pid    66] getpid()                    = 65
  [pid    66] setuid(1001)                = 0
  [pid    66] futex(0x40a66cdc, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1) = 0
  [pid    66] rt_sigreturn({mask=[]})     = 0
  [pid    66] read(3,  <unfinished ...>
  [pid    65] setuid(1001)                = 0

Test coverage for security/landlock is 92.9% of 1137 lines according to
gcc/gcov-14.

Fixes: c899496501 ("selftests/landlock: Test signal scoping for threads")
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318161443.279194-8-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Update test coverage]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Mickaël Salaün
2025-03-18 17:14:42 +01:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 76ab50fa6e
commit e98f77f74c
2 changed files with 60 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static void _init_caps(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, bool drop_all)
CAP_MKNOD,
CAP_NET_ADMIN,
CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE,
CAP_SETUID,
CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
CAP_SYS_CHROOT,
/* clang-format on */

View File

@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ enum thread_return {
THREAD_INVALID = 0,
THREAD_SUCCESS = 1,
THREAD_ERROR = 2,
THREAD_TEST_FAILED = 3,
};
static void *thread_sync(void *arg)
@@ -316,6 +317,64 @@ TEST(signal_scoping_thread_after)
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(thread_pipe[1]));
}
struct thread_setuid_args {
int pipe_read, new_uid;
};
void *thread_setuid(void *ptr)
{
const struct thread_setuid_args *arg = ptr;
char buf;
if (read(arg->pipe_read, &buf, 1) != 1)
return (void *)THREAD_ERROR;
/* libc's setuid() should update all thread's credentials. */
if (getuid() != arg->new_uid)
return (void *)THREAD_TEST_FAILED;
return (void *)THREAD_SUCCESS;
}
TEST(signal_scoping_thread_setuid)
{
struct thread_setuid_args arg;
pthread_t no_sandbox_thread;
enum thread_return ret = THREAD_INVALID;
int pipe_parent[2];
int prev_uid;
disable_caps(_metadata);
/* This test does not need to be run as root. */
prev_uid = getuid();
arg.new_uid = prev_uid + 1;
EXPECT_LT(0, arg.new_uid);
ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_parent, O_CLOEXEC));
arg.pipe_read = pipe_parent[0];
/* Capabilities must be set before creating a new thread. */
set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
ASSERT_EQ(0, pthread_create(&no_sandbox_thread, NULL, thread_setuid,
&arg));
/* Enforces restriction after creating the thread. */
create_scoped_domain(_metadata, LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL);
EXPECT_NE(arg.new_uid, getuid());
EXPECT_EQ(0, setuid(arg.new_uid));
EXPECT_EQ(arg.new_uid, getuid());
EXPECT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
EXPECT_EQ(0, pthread_join(no_sandbox_thread, (void **)&ret));
EXPECT_EQ(THREAD_SUCCESS, ret);
clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[0]));
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[1]));
}
const short backlog = 10;
static volatile sig_atomic_t signal_received;