exec: fix the racy usage of fs_struct->in_exec
commit af7bb0d2ca459f15cb5ca604dab5d9af103643f0 upstream. check_unsafe_exec() sets fs->in_exec under cred_guard_mutex, then execve() paths clear fs->in_exec lockless. This is fine if exec succeeds, but if it fails we have the following race: T1 sets fs->in_exec = 1, fails, drops cred_guard_mutex T2 sets fs->in_exec = 1 T1 clears fs->in_exec T2 continues with fs->in_exec == 0 Change fs/exec.c to clear fs->in_exec with cred_guard_mutex held. Reported-by: syzbot+1c486d0b62032c82a968@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67dc67f0.050a0220.25ae54.001f.GAE@google.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250324160003.GA8878@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent
747e3eec1d
commit
e2d8e7bd33
@@ -1246,13 +1246,12 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
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*/
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*/
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bprm->point_of_no_return = true;
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bprm->point_of_no_return = true;
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/*
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/* Make this the only thread in the thread group */
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* Make this the only thread in the thread group.
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*/
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retval = de_thread(me);
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retval = de_thread(me);
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if (retval)
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if (retval)
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goto out;
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goto out;
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/* see the comment in check_unsafe_exec() */
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current->fs->in_exec = 0;
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/*
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/*
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* Cancel any io_uring activity across execve
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* Cancel any io_uring activity across execve
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*/
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*/
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@@ -1514,6 +1513,8 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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}
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}
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free_arg_pages(bprm);
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free_arg_pages(bprm);
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if (bprm->cred) {
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if (bprm->cred) {
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/* in case exec fails before de_thread() succeeds */
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current->fs->in_exec = 0;
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mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
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mutex_unlock(¤t->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
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abort_creds(bprm->cred);
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abort_creds(bprm->cred);
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}
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}
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@@ -1620,6 +1621,10 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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* suid exec because the differently privileged task
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* suid exec because the differently privileged task
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* will be able to manipulate the current directory, etc.
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* will be able to manipulate the current directory, etc.
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* It would be nice to force an unshare instead...
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* It would be nice to force an unshare instead...
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*
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* Otherwise we set fs->in_exec = 1 to deny clone(CLONE_FS)
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* from another sub-thread until de_thread() succeeds, this
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* state is protected by cred_guard_mutex we hold.
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*/
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*/
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n_fs = 1;
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n_fs = 1;
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spin_lock(&p->fs->lock);
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spin_lock(&p->fs->lock);
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@@ -1878,7 +1883,6 @@ static int bprm_execve(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current);
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sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current);
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/* execve succeeded */
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/* execve succeeded */
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current->fs->in_exec = 0;
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current->in_execve = 0;
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current->in_execve = 0;
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rseq_execve(current);
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rseq_execve(current);
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user_events_execve(current);
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user_events_execve(current);
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@@ -1897,7 +1901,6 @@ out:
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force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV);
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force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV);
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sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current);
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sched_mm_cid_after_execve(current);
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current->fs->in_exec = 0;
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current->in_execve = 0;
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current->in_execve = 0;
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return retval;
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return retval;
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