Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (90 commits)
  AppArmor: fix build warnings for non-const use of get_task_cred
  selinux: convert the policy type_attr_map to flex_array
  AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module
  TOMOYO: Use pathname specified by policy rather than execve()
  AppArmor: update path_truncate method to latest version
  AppArmor: core policy routines
  AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy
  AppArmor: mediation of non file objects
  AppArmor: LSM interface, and security module initialization
  AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module
  AppArmor: update Maintainer and Documentation
  AppArmor: functions for domain transitions
  AppArmor: file enforcement routines
  AppArmor: userspace interfaces
  AppArmor: dfa match engine
  AppArmor: contexts used in attaching policy to system objects
  AppArmor: basic auditing infrastructure.
  AppArmor: misc. base functions and defines
  TOMOYO: Update version to 2.3.0
  TOMOYO: Fix quota check.
  ...

Documentation/apparmor.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+--- What is AppArmor? ---
+
+AppArmor is MAC style security extension for the Linux kernel.  It implements
+a task centered policy, with task "profiles" being created and loaded
+from user space.  Tasks on the system that do not have a profile defined for
+them run in an unconfined state which is equivalent to standard Linux DAC
+permissions.
+
+--- How to enable/disable ---
+
+set CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
+
+If AppArmor should be selected as the default security module then
+   set CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY="apparmor"
+   and CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1
+
+Build the kernel
+
+If AppArmor is not the default security module it can be enabled by passing
+security=apparmor on the kernel's command line.
+
+If AppArmor is the default security module it can be disabled by passing
+apparmor=0, security=XXXX (where XXX is valid security module), on the
+kernel's command line
+
+For AppArmor to enforce any restrictions beyond standard Linux DAC permissions
+policy must be loaded into the kernel from user space (see the Documentation
+and tools links).
+
+--- Documentation ---
+
+Documentation can be found on the wiki.
+
+--- Links ---
+
+Mailing List - apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com
+Wiki - http://apparmor.wiki.kernel.org/
+User space tools - https://launchpad.net/apparmor
+Kernel module - git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev.git

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ parameter is applicable:
 			Documentation/scsi/.
 	SECURITY Different security models are enabled.
 	SELINUX SELinux support is enabled.
+	APPARMOR AppArmor support is enabled.
 	SERIAL	Serial support is enabled.
 	SH	SuperH architecture is enabled.
 	SMP	The kernel is an SMP kernel.
@@ -2312,6 +2313,13 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file
 			If enabled at boot time, /selinux/disable can be used
 			later to disable prior to initial policy load.
 
+	apparmor=	[APPARMOR] Disable or enable AppArmor at boot time
+			Format: { "0" | "1" }
+			See security/apparmor/Kconfig help text
+			0 -- disable.
+			1 -- enable.
+			Default value is set via kernel config option.
+
 	serialnumber	[BUGS=X86-32]
 
 	shapers=	[NET]

Documentation/tomoyo.txt

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
 TOMOYO is a name-based MAC extension (LSM module) for the Linux kernel.
 
 LiveCD-based tutorials are available at
-http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.6.x/1st-step/ubuntu8.04-live/
-http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.6.x/1st-step/centos5-live/ .
+http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/1st-step/ubuntu10.04-live/
+http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/1st-step/centos5-live/ .
 Though these tutorials use non-LSM version of TOMOYO, they are useful for you
 to know what TOMOYO is.
 
@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ to know what TOMOYO is.
 Build the kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO=y and pass "security=tomoyo" on
 kernel's command line.
 
-Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/2.2.x/ for details.
+Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/ for details.
 
 --- Where is documentation? ---
 
 User <-> Kernel interface documentation is available at
-http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/2.2.x/policy-reference.html .
+http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/policy-reference.html .
 
 Materials we prepared for seminars and symposiums are available at
 http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/?category_id=532&language_id=1 .
@@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ multiple LSM modules at the same time. We feel sorry that you have to give up
 SELinux/SMACK/AppArmor etc. when you want to use TOMOYO.
 
 We hope that LSM becomes stackable in future. Meanwhile, you can use non-LSM
-version of TOMOYO, available at http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.6.x/ .
+version of TOMOYO, available at http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/ .
 LSM version of TOMOYO is a subset of non-LSM version of TOMOYO. We are planning
 to port non-LSM version's functionalities to LSM versions.

MAINTAINERS

@@ -5061,6 +5061,14 @@ S:	Supported
 F:	include/linux/selinux*
 F:	security/selinux/
 
+APPARMOR SECURITY MODULE
+M:	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+L:	apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com (subscribers-only, general discussion)
+W:	apparmor.wiki.kernel.org
+T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev.git
+S:	Supported
+F:	security/apparmor/
+
 SENSABLE PHANTOM
 M:	Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
 S:	Maintained
@@ -5605,7 +5613,7 @@ L:	tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers and us
 L:	tomoyo-dev@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in Japanese)
 L:	tomoyo-users@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in Japanese)
 W:	http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/
-T:	quilt http://svn.sourceforge.jp/svnroot/tomoyo/trunk/2.2.x/tomoyo-lsm/patches/
+T:	quilt http://svn.sourceforge.jp/svnroot/tomoyo/trunk/2.3.x/tomoyo-lsm/patches/
 S:	Maintained
 F:	security/tomoyo/
 

fs/fuse/dir.c

@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ static int fuse_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 		   exist.  So if permissions are revoked this won't be
 		   noticed immediately, only after the attribute
 		   timeout has expired */
-	} else if (mask & MAY_ACCESS) {
+	} else if (mask & (MAY_ACCESS | MAY_CHDIR)) {
 		err = fuse_access(inode, mask);
 	} else if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
 		if (!(inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO)) {

fs/namei.c

@@ -282,8 +282,7 @@ int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
 
-	return security_inode_permission(inode,
-			mask & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND));
+	return security_inode_permission(inode, mask);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1484,8 +1483,7 @@ static int handle_truncate(struct path *path)
 	 */
 	error = locks_verify_locked(inode);
 	if (!error)
-		error = security_path_truncate(path, 0,
-				       ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN);
+		error = security_path_truncate(path);
 	if (!error) {
 		error = do_truncate(path->dentry, 0,
 				    ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN,

fs/nfs/dir.c

@@ -1953,7 +1953,7 @@ int nfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if ((mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)) == 0)
 		goto out;
 	/* Is this sys_access() ? */
-	if (mask & MAY_ACCESS)
+	if (mask & (MAY_ACCESS | MAY_CHDIR))
 		goto force_lookup;
 
 	switch (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) {

fs/open.c

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static long do_sys_truncate(const char __user *pathname, loff_t length)
 
 	error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length);
 	if (!error)
-		error = security_path_truncate(&path, length, 0);
+		error = security_path_truncate(&path);
 	if (!error)
 		error = do_truncate(path.dentry, length, 0, NULL);
 
@@ -165,8 +165,7 @@ static long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small)
 
 	error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length);
 	if (!error)
-		error = security_path_truncate(&file->f_path, length,
-					       ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME);
+		error = security_path_truncate(&file->f_path);
 	if (!error)
 		error = do_truncate(dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, file);
 out_putf:
@@ -367,7 +366,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chdir, const char __user *, filename)
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
-	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_ACCESS);
+	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
@@ -396,7 +395,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd)
 	if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
 		goto out_putf;
 
-	error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_ACCESS);
+	error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (!error)
 		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &file->f_path);
 out_putf:
@@ -414,7 +413,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
-	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_ACCESS);
+	error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 

include/linux/capability.h

@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
 } __user *cap_user_data_t;
 
 
-#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
-#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
-
 #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK	0xFF000000
 #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT	24
 #define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK	~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK

include/linux/fs.h

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct inodes_stat_t {
 #define MAY_APPEND 8
 #define MAY_ACCESS 16
 #define MAY_OPEN 32
+#define MAY_CHDIR 64
 
 /*
  * flags in file.f_mode.  Note that FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE must correspond

include/linux/lsm_audit.h

@@ -90,9 +90,41 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 			u32 requested;
 			u32 audited;
 			u32 denied;
+			/*
+			 * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive.  See the
+			 * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage.
+			 */
+			u32 auditdeny;
 			struct av_decision *avd;
 			int result;
 		} selinux_audit_data;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+		struct {
+			int error;
+			int op;
+			int type;
+			void *profile;
+			const char *name;
+			const char *info;
+			union {
+				void *target;
+				struct {
+					long pos;
+					void *target;
+				} iface;
+				struct {
+					int rlim;
+					unsigned long max;
+				} rlim;
+				struct {
+					const char *target;
+					u32 request;
+					u32 denied;
+					uid_t ouid;
+				} fs;
+			};
+		} apparmor_audit_data;
 #endif
 	};
 	/* these callback will be implemented by a specific LSM */

include/linux/security.h

@@ -470,8 +470,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  * @path_truncate:
  *	Check permission before truncating a file.
  *	@path contains the path structure for the file.
- *	@length is the new length of the file.
- *	@time_attrs is the flags passed to do_truncate().
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_getattr:
  *	Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
@@ -1412,8 +1410,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*path_rmdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
 	int (*path_mknod) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 			   unsigned int dev);
-	int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path, loff_t length,
-			      unsigned int time_attrs);
+	int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path);
 	int (*path_symlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 			     const char *old_name);
 	int (*path_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
@@ -2806,8 +2803,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode);
 int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 			unsigned int dev);
-int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
-			   unsigned int time_attrs);
+int security_path_truncate(struct path *path);
 int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 			  const char *old_name);
 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
@@ -2841,8 +2837,7 @@ static inline int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
-					 unsigned int time_attrs)
+static inline int security_path_truncate(struct path *path)
 {
 	return 0;
 }

include/linux/xattr.h

@@ -33,6 +33,20 @@
 #define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."
 #define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
 
+/* Security namespace */
+#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
+#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
+
+#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64"
+#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN"
+#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT"
+#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX
+#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN
+#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
+
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
+#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
+
 struct inode;
 struct dentry;
 

security/Kconfig

@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
+source security/apparmor/Kconfig
 
 source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
 
@@ -148,6 +149,7 @@ choice
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 
 	help
@@ -163,6 +165,9 @@ choice
 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
 		bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
 
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+		bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
+
 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
 
@@ -173,6 +178,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
 	default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
 	default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
 	default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
 	default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 
 endmenu

security/Makefile

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS)			+= keys/
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)	+= selinux
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)        += tomoyo
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)	+= apparmor
 
 # always enable default capabilities
 obj-y					+= commoncap.o
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)			+= lsm_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)		+= apparmor/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
 
 # Object integrity file lists

security/apparmor/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#
+# Generated include files
+#
+af_names.h
+capability_names.h

security/apparmor/Kconfig

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	bool "AppArmor support"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	select AUDIT
+	select SECURITY_PATH
+	select SECURITYFS
+	select SECURITY_NETWORK
+	default n
+	help
+	  This enables the AppArmor security module.
+	  Required userspace tools (if they are not included in your
+	  distribution) and further information may be found at
+	  http://apparmor.wiki.kernel.org
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
+	int "AppArmor boot parameter default value"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	range 0 1
+	default 1
+	help
+	  This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
+	  'apparmor', which allows AppArmor to be enabled or disabled
+          at boot.  If this option is set to 0 (zero), the AppArmor
+	  kernel parameter will default to 0, disabling AppArmor at
+	  boot.  If this option is set to 1 (one), the AppArmor
+	  kernel parameter will default to 1, enabling AppArmor at
+	  boot.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.

security/apparmor/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Makefile for AppArmor Linux Security Module
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+
+apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+              path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+              resource.o sid.o file.o
+
+clean-files: capability_names.h af_names.h
+
+quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n -e "/CAP_FS_MASK/d" -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+CAP_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\$$/[\\2]  = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@
+
+quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n --e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+RLIMIT_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/[\\2]  = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ ; echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ; sed -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+\\(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/\\1,/p" $< >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@
+
+$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
+$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
+$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h
+	$(call cmd,make-caps)
+$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h
+	$(call cmd,make-af)
+$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h
+	$(call cmd,make-rlim)

security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c

@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor /sys/kernel/security/apparmor interface functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/**
+ * aa_simple_write_to_buffer - common routine for getting policy from user
+ * @op: operation doing the user buffer copy
+ * @userbuf: user buffer to copy data from  (NOT NULL)
+ * @alloc_size: size of user buffer
+ * @copy_size: size of data to copy from user buffer
+ * @pos: position write is at in the file (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: kernel buffer containing copy of user buffer data or an
+ *          ERR_PTR on failure.
+ */
+static char *aa_simple_write_to_buffer(int op, const char __user *userbuf,
+				       size_t alloc_size, size_t copy_size,
+				       loff_t *pos)
+{
+	char *data;
+
+	if (*pos != 0)
+		/* only writes from pos 0, that is complete writes */
+		return ERR_PTR(-ESPIPE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't allow profile load/replace/remove from profiles that don't
+	 * have CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+	 */
+	if (!aa_may_manage_policy(op))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+
+	/* freed by caller to simple_write_to_buffer */
+	data = kvmalloc(alloc_size);
+	if (data == NULL)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	if (copy_from_user(data, userbuf, copy_size)) {
+		kvfree(data);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+	}
+
+	return data;
+}
+
+
+/* .load file hook fn to load policy */
+static ssize_t profile_load(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, size_t size,
+			    loff_t *pos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	ssize_t error;
+
+	data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(OP_PROF_LOAD, buf, size, size, pos);
+
+	error = PTR_ERR(data);
+	if (!IS_ERR(data)) {
+		error = aa_replace_profiles(data, size, PROF_ADD);
+		kvfree(data);
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_load = {
+	.write = profile_load
+};
+
+/* .replace file hook fn to load and/or replace policy */
+static ssize_t profile_replace(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
+			       size_t size, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	ssize_t error;
+
+	data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(OP_PROF_REPL, buf, size, size, pos);
+	error = PTR_ERR(data);
+	if (!IS_ERR(data)) {
+		error = aa_replace_profiles(data, size, PROF_REPLACE);
+		kvfree(data);
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_replace = {
+	.write = profile_replace
+};
+
+/* .remove file hook fn to remove loaded policy */
+static ssize_t profile_remove(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t size, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	char *data;
+	ssize_t error;
+
+	/*
+	 * aa_remove_profile needs a null terminated string so 1 extra
+	 * byte is allocated and the copied data is null terminated.
+	 */
+	data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(OP_PROF_RM, buf, size + 1, size, pos);
+
+	error = PTR_ERR(data);
+	if (!IS_ERR(data)) {
+		data[size] = 0;
+		error = aa_remove_profiles(data, size);
+		kvfree(data);
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_remove = {
+	.write = profile_remove
+};
+
+/** Base file system setup **/
+
+static struct dentry *aa_fs_dentry __initdata;
+
+static void __init aafs_remove(const char *name)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+
+	dentry = lookup_one_len(name, aa_fs_dentry, strlen(name));
+	if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		securityfs_remove(dentry);
+		dput(dentry);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aafs_create - create an entry in the apparmor filesystem
+ * @name: name of the entry (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: file permission mask of the file
+ * @fops: file operations for the file (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Used aafs_remove to remove entries created with this fn.
+ */
+static int __init aafs_create(const char *name, int mask,
+			      const struct file_operations *fops)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+
+	dentry = securityfs_create_file(name, S_IFREG | mask, aa_fs_dentry,
+					NULL, fops);
+
+	return IS_ERR(dentry) ? PTR_ERR(dentry) : 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_destroy_aafs - cleanup and free aafs
+ *
+ * releases dentries allocated by aa_create_aafs
+ */
+void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void)
+{
+	if (aa_fs_dentry) {
+		aafs_remove(".remove");
+		aafs_remove(".replace");
+		aafs_remove(".load");
+
+		securityfs_remove(aa_fs_dentry);
+		aa_fs_dentry = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_create_aafs - create the apparmor security filesystem
+ *
+ * dentries created here are released by aa_destroy_aafs
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!apparmor_initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (aa_fs_dentry) {
+		AA_ERROR("%s: AppArmor securityfs already exists\n", __func__);
+		return -EEXIST;
+	}
+
+	aa_fs_dentry = securityfs_create_dir("apparmor", NULL);
+	if (IS_ERR(aa_fs_dentry)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(aa_fs_dentry);
+		aa_fs_dentry = NULL;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	error = aafs_create(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load);
+	if (error)
+		goto error;
+	error = aafs_create(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace);
+	if (error)
+		goto error;
+	error = aafs_create(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove);
+	if (error)
+		goto error;
+
+	/* TODO: add support for apparmorfs_null and apparmorfs_mnt */
+
+	/* Report that AppArmor fs is enabled */
+	aa_info_message("AppArmor Filesystem Enabled");
+	return 0;
+
+error:
+	aa_destroy_aafs();
+	AA_ERROR("Error creating AppArmor securityfs\n");
+	return error;
+}
+
+fs_initcall(aa_create_aafs);

security/apparmor/audit.c

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor auditing functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+const char *op_table[] = {
+	"null",
+
+	"sysctl",
+	"capable",
+
+	"unlink",
+	"mkdir",
+	"rmdir",
+	"mknod",
+	"truncate",
+	"link",
+	"symlink",
+	"rename_src",
+	"rename_dest",
+	"chmod",
+	"chown",
+	"getattr",
+	"open",
+
+	"file_perm",
+	"file_lock",
+	"file_mmap",
+	"file_mprotect",
+
+	"create",
+	"post_create",
+	"bind",
+	"connect",
+	"listen",
+	"accept",
+	"sendmsg",
+	"recvmsg",
+	"getsockname",
+	"getpeername",
+	"getsockopt",
+	"setsockopt",
+	"socket_shutdown",
+
+	"ptrace",
+
+	"exec",
+	"change_hat",
+	"change_profile",
+	"change_onexec",
+
+	"setprocattr",
+	"setrlimit",
+
+	"profile_replace",
+	"profile_load",
+	"profile_remove"
+};
+
+const char *audit_mode_names[] = {
+	"normal",
+	"quiet_denied",
+	"quiet",
+	"noquiet",
+	"all"
+};
+
+static char *aa_audit_type[] = {
+	"AUDIT",
+	"ALLOWED",
+	"DENIED",
+	"HINT",
+	"STATUS",
+	"ERROR",
+	"KILLED"
+};
+
+/*
+ * Currently AppArmor auditing is fed straight into the audit framework.
+ *
+ * TODO:
+ * netlink interface for complain mode
+ * user auditing, - send user auditing to netlink interface
+ * system control of whether user audit messages go to system log
+ */
+
+/**
+ * audit_base - core AppArmor function.
+ * @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL)
+ * @ca: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Record common AppArmor audit data from @sa
+ */
+static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = ca;
+	struct task_struct *tsk = sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current;
+
+	if (aa_g_audit_header) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=");
+		audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad.type]);
+	}
+
+	if (sa->aad.op) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " operation=");
+		audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad.op]);
+	}
+
+	if (sa->aad.info) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " info=");
+		audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad.info);
+		if (sa->aad.error)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad.error);
+	}
+
+	if (sa->aad.profile) {
+		struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad.profile;
+		pid_t pid;
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		pid = tsk->real_parent->pid;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%d", pid);
+		if (profile->ns != root_ns) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->base.hname);
+		}
+		audit_log_format(ab, " profile=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname);
+	}
+
+	if (sa->aad.name) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.name);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit_msg - Log a message to the audit subsystem
+ * @sa: audit event structure (NOT NULL)
+ * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+		  void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
+{
+	sa->aad.type = type;
+	sa->lsm_pre_audit = audit_pre;
+	sa->lsm_post_audit = cb;
+	common_lsm_audit(sa);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem
+ * @type: audit type for the message
+ * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL)
+ * @gfp: allocation flags to use
+ * @sa: audit event (NOT NULL)
+ * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
+	     struct common_audit_data *sa,
+	     void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *))
+{
+	BUG_ON(!profile);
+
+	if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) {
+		if (likely(!sa->aad.error)) {
+			if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+				return 0;
+			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+		} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED;
+		else
+			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED;
+	}
+	if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
+	    (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
+	     AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET))
+		return sa->aad.error;
+
+	if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+	if (!unconfined(profile))
+		sa->aad.profile = profile;
+
+	aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb);
+
+	if (sa->aad.type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
+		(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current);
+
+	if (sa->aad.type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
+		return complain_error(sa->aad.error);
+
+	return sa->aad.error;
+}

security/apparmor/capability.c

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor capability mediation functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+
+/*
+ * Table of capability names: we generate it from capabilities.h.
+ */
+#include "capability_names.h"
+
+struct audit_cache {
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	kernel_cap_t caps;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct audit_cache, audit_cache);
+
+/**
+ * audit_cb - call back for capability components of audit struct
+ * @ab - audit buffer   (NOT NULL)
+ * @va - audit struct to audit data from  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	audit_log_format(ab, " capname=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, capability_names[sa->u.cap]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_caps - audit a capability
+ * @profile: profile confining task (NOT NULL)
+ * @task: task capability test was performed against (NOT NULL)
+ * @cap: capability tested
+ * @error: error code returned by test
+ *
+ * Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching
+ * and duplicate message elimination.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or sa->error on success,  error code on failure
+ */
+static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
+		      int cap, int error)
+{
+	struct audit_cache *ent;
+	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, CAP);
+	sa.tsk = task;
+	sa.u.cap = cap;
+	sa.aad.op = OP_CAPABLE;
+	sa.aad.error = error;
+
+	if (likely(!error)) {
+		/* test if auditing is being forced */
+		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
+			   !cap_raised(profile->caps.audit, cap)))
+			return 0;
+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+	} else if (KILL_MODE(profile) ||
+		   cap_raised(profile->caps.kill, cap)) {
+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+	} else if (cap_raised(profile->caps.quiet, cap) &&
+		   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+		   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) {
+		/* quiet auditing */
+		return error;
+	}
+
+	/* Do simple duplicate message elimination */
+	ent = &get_cpu_var(audit_cache);
+	if (profile == ent->profile && cap_raised(ent->caps, cap)) {
+		put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
+		if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+			return complain_error(error);
+		return error;
+	} else {
+		aa_put_profile(ent->profile);
+		ent->profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
+		cap_raise(ent->caps, cap);
+	}
+	put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
+
+	return aa_audit(type, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap
+ * @profile: profile being enforced    (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined)
+ * @cap: capability to test if allowed
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM
+ */
+static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap)
+{
+	return cap_raised(profile->caps.allow, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_capable - test permission to use capability
+ * @task: task doing capability test against (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: profile confining @task (NOT NULL)
+ * @cap: capability to be tested
+ * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
+ *
+ * Look up capability in profile capability set.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code.
+ */
+int aa_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
+	       int audit)
+{
+	int error = profile_capable(profile, cap);
+
+	if (!audit) {
+		if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+			return complain_error(error);
+		return error;
+	}
+
+	return audit_caps(profile, task, cap, error);
+}

security/apparmor/context.c

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor functions used to manipulate object security
+ * contexts.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ *
+ * AppArmor sets confinement on every task, via the the aa_task_cxt and
+ * the aa_task_cxt.profile, both of which are required and are not allowed
+ * to be NULL.  The aa_task_cxt is not reference counted and is unique
+ * to each cred (which is reference count).  The profile pointed to by
+ * the task_cxt is reference counted.
+ *
+ * TODO
+ * If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old
+ * cred or task context but instead creates a new one.  Ideally the task
+ * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_task_context - allocate a new task_cxt
+ * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
+ *
+ * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_task_cxt *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags)
+{
+	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_cxt), flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_task_context - free a task_cxt
+ * @cxt: task_cxt to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt)
+{
+	if (cxt) {
+		aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+		aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+		aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+
+		kzfree(cxt);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dup_task_context - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
+ * @new: a blank task context      (NOT NULL)
+ * @old: the task context to copy  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old)
+{
+	*new = *old;
+	aa_get_profile(new->profile);
+	aa_get_profile(new->previous);
+	aa_get_profile(new->onexec);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_replace_current_profile - replace the current tasks profiles
+ * @profile: new profile  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security;
+	struct cred *new;
+	BUG_ON(!profile);
+
+	if (cxt->profile == profile)
+		return 0;
+
+	new  = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cxt = new->security;
+	if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns)) {
+		/* if switching to unconfined or a different profile namespace
+		 * clear out context state
+		 */
+		aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+		aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+		cxt->previous = NULL;
+		cxt->onexec = NULL;
+		cxt->token = 0;
+	}
+	/* be careful switching cxt->profile, when racing replacement it
+	 * is possible that cxt->profile->replacedby is the reference keeping
+	 * @profile valid, so make sure to get its reference before dropping
+	 * the reference on cxt->profile */
+	aa_get_profile(profile);
+	aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+	cxt->profile = profile;
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_set_current_onexec - set the tasks change_profile to happen onexec
+ * @profile: system profile to set at exec  (MAYBE NULL to clear value)
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cxt = new->security;
+	aa_get_profile(profile);
+	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+	cxt->onexec = profile;
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_set_current_hat - set the current tasks hat
+ * @profile: profile to set as the current hat  (NOT NULL)
+ * @token: token value that must be specified to change from the hat
+ *
+ * Do switch of tasks hat.  If the task is currently in a hat
+ * validate the token to match.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token)
+{
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	BUG_ON(!profile);
+
+	cxt = new->security;
+	if (!cxt->previous) {
+		/* transfer refcount */
+		cxt->previous = cxt->profile;
+		cxt->token = token;
+	} else if (cxt->token == token) {
+		aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+	} else {
+		/* previous_profile && cxt->token != token */
+		abort_creds(new);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+	cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(profile));
+	/* clear exec on switching context */
+	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+	cxt->onexec = NULL;
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_restore_previous_profile - exit from hat context restoring the profile
+ * @token: the token that must be matched to exit hat context
+ *
+ * Attempt to return out of a hat to the previous profile.  The token
+ * must match the stored token value.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error of failure
+ */
+int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token)
+{
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cxt = new->security;
+	if (cxt->token != token) {
+		abort_creds(new);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+	/* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
+	if (!cxt->previous) {
+		abort_creds(new);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+	cxt->profile = aa_newest_version(cxt->previous);
+	BUG_ON(!cxt->profile);
+	if (unlikely(cxt->profile != cxt->previous)) {
+		aa_get_profile(cxt->profile);
+		aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+	}
+	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
+	cxt->previous = NULL;
+	cxt->token = 0;
+	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+	cxt->onexec = NULL;
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return 0;
+}

security/apparmor/domain.c

@@ -0,0 +1,823 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy attachment and domain transitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/domain.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_domain_entries - free entries in a domain table
+ * @domain: the domain table to free  (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain)
+{
+	int i;
+	if (domain) {
+		if (!domain->table)
+			return;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++)
+			kzfree(domain->table[i]);
+		kzfree(domain->table);
+		domain->table = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
+ * @task: task we want to change profile of   (NOT NULL)
+ * @to_profile: profile to change to  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Check if the task is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed
+ * to trace the new domain
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed
+ */
+static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
+				     struct aa_profile *to_profile)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tracer;
+	const struct cred *cred = NULL;
+	struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(task);
+	if (tracer) {
+		/* released below */
+		cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
+		tracerp = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	/* not ptraced */
+	if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp))
+		goto out;
+
+	error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+
+out:
+	if (cred)
+		put_cred(cred);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * change_profile_perms - find permissions for change_profile
+ * @profile: the current profile  (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: the namespace being switched to  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: the name of the profile to change to  (NOT NULL)
+ * @request: requested perms
+ * @start: state to start matching in
+ *
+ * Returns: permission set
+ */
+static struct file_perms change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					      struct aa_namespace *ns,
+					      const char *name, u32 request,
+					      unsigned int start)
+{
+	struct file_perms perms;
+	struct path_cond cond = { };
+	unsigned int state;
+
+	if (unconfined(profile)) {
+		perms.allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
+		perms.audit = perms.quiet = perms.kill = 0;
+		return perms;
+	} else if (!profile->file.dfa) {
+		return nullperms;
+	} else if ((ns == profile->ns)) {
+		/* try matching against rules with out namespace prepended */
+		aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, start, name, &cond, &perms);
+		if (COMBINED_PERM_MASK(perms) & request)
+			return perms;
+	}
+
+	/* try matching with namespace name and then profile */
+	state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, start, ns->base.name);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
+	aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms);
+
+	return perms;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match
+ * @name - to match against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @head - profile list to walk  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list.  There is a matching
+ * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses
+ * expressions to match, and matching expressions with the greatest
+ * xmatch_len are preferred.
+ *
+ * Requires: @head not be shared or have appropriate locks held
+ *
+ * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
+					 struct list_head *head)
+{
+	int len = 0;
+	struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(profile, head, base.list) {
+		if (profile->flags & PFLAG_NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (profile->xmatch && profile->xmatch_len > len) {
+			unsigned int state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch,
+							  DFA_START, name);
+			u32 perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
+			/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
+			if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
+				candidate = profile;
+				len = profile->xmatch_len;
+			}
+		} else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name))
+			/* exact non-re match, no more searching required */
+			return profile;
+	}
+
+	return candidate;
+}
+
+/**
+ * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes
+ * @ns: the current namespace  (NOT NULL)
+ * @list: list to search  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: the executable name to match against  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *find_attach(struct aa_namespace *ns,
+				      struct list_head *list, const char *name)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+	read_lock(&ns->lock);
+	profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list));
+	read_unlock(&ns->lock);
+
+	return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * separate_fqname - separate the namespace and profile names
+ * @fqname: the fqname name to split  (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns_name: the namespace name if it exists  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This is the xtable equivalent routine of aa_split_fqname.  It finds the
+ * split in an xtable fqname which contains an embedded \0 instead of a :
+ * if a namespace is specified.  This is done so the xtable is constant and
+ * isn't re-split on every lookup.
+ *
+ * Either the profile or namespace name may be optional but if the namespace
+ * is specified the profile name termination must be present.  This results
+ * in the following possible encodings:
+ * profile_name\0
+ * :ns_name\0profile_name\0
+ * :ns_name\0\0
+ *
+ * NOTE: the xtable fqname is pre-validated at load time in unpack_trans_table
+ *
+ * Returns: profile name if it is specified else NULL
+ */
+static const char *separate_fqname(const char *fqname, const char **ns_name)
+{
+	const char *name;
+
+	if (fqname[0] == ':') {
+		/* In this case there is guaranteed to be two \0 terminators
+		 * in the string.  They are verified at load time by
+		 * by unpack_trans_table
+		 */
+		*ns_name = fqname + 1;		/* skip : */
+		name = *ns_name + strlen(*ns_name) + 1;
+		if (!*name)
+			name = NULL;
+	} else {
+		*ns_name = NULL;
+		name = fqname;
+	}
+
+	return name;
+}
+
+static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * x_table_lookup - lookup an x transition name via transition table
+ * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
+ * @xindex: index into x transition table
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+	struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+	u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
+	int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
+	const char *name;
+
+	/* index is guaranteed to be in range, validated at load time */
+	for (name = profile->file.trans.table[index]; !new_profile && name;
+	     name = next_name(xtype, name)) {
+		struct aa_namespace *new_ns;
+		const char *xname = NULL;
+
+		new_ns = NULL;
+		if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) {
+			/* release by caller */
+			new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, name);
+			continue;
+		} else if (*name == ':') {
+			/* switching namespace */
+			const char *ns_name;
+			xname = name = separate_fqname(name, &ns_name);
+			if (!xname)
+				/* no name so use profile name */
+				xname = profile->base.hname;
+			if (*ns_name == '@') {
+				/* TODO: variable support */
+				;
+			}
+			/* released below */
+			new_ns = aa_find_namespace(ns, ns_name);
+			if (!new_ns)
+				continue;
+		} else if (*name == '@') {
+			/* TODO: variable support */
+			continue;
+		} else {
+			/* basic namespace lookup */
+			xname = name;
+		}
+
+		/* released by caller */
+		new_profile = aa_lookup_profile(new_ns ? new_ns : ns, xname);
+		aa_put_namespace(new_ns);
+	}
+
+	/* released by caller */
+	return new_profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * x_to_profile - get target profile for a given xindex
+ * @profile: current profile  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL)
+ * @xindex: index into x transition table
+ *
+ * find profile for a transition index
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted profile or NULL if not found available
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *x_to_profile(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				       const char *name, u32 xindex)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+	struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+	u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
+
+	switch (xtype) {
+	case AA_X_NONE:
+		/* fail exec unless ix || ux fallback - handled by caller */
+		return NULL;
+	case AA_X_NAME:
+		if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
+			/* released by caller */
+			new_profile = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles,
+						  name);
+		else
+			/* released by caller */
+			new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles,
+						  name);
+		break;
+	case AA_X_TABLE:
+		/* released by caller */
+		new_profile = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* released by caller */
+	return new_profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_set_creds - set the new creds on the bprm struct
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
+ */
+int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+	struct aa_profile *profile, *new_profile = NULL;
+	struct aa_namespace *ns;
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+	unsigned int state;
+	struct file_perms perms = {};
+	struct path_cond cond = {
+		bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+		bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+	};
+	const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
+	int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+		return 0;
+
+	cxt = bprm->cred->security;
+	BUG_ON(!cxt);
+
+	profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile));
+	/*
+	 * get the namespace from the replacement profile as replacement
+	 * can change the namespace
+	 */
+	ns = profile->ns;
+	state = profile->file.start;
+
+	/* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
+	error = aa_get_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer,
+			    &name);
+	if (error) {
+		if (profile->flags &
+		    (PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | PFLAG_UNCONFINED))
+			error = 0;
+		info = "Exec failed name resolution";
+		name = bprm->filename;
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+	/* Test for onexec first as onexec directives override other
+	 * x transitions.
+	 */
+	if (unconfined(profile)) {
+		/* unconfined task */
+		if (cxt->onexec)
+			/* change_profile on exec already been granted */
+			new_profile = aa_get_profile(cxt->onexec);
+		else
+			new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name);
+		if (!new_profile)
+			goto cleanup;
+		goto apply;
+	}
+
+	/* find exec permissions for name */
+	state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms);
+	if (cxt->onexec) {
+		struct file_perms cp;
+		info = "change_profile onexec";
+		if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
+			goto audit;
+
+		/* test if this exec can be paired with change_profile onexec.
+		 * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing
+		 * exec\0change_profile
+		 */
+		state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
+		cp = change_profile_perms(profile, cxt->onexec->ns, name,
+					  AA_MAY_ONEXEC, state);
+
+		if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
+			goto audit;
+		new_profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec));
+		goto apply;
+	}
+
+	if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) {
+		/* exec permission determine how to transition */
+		new_profile = x_to_profile(profile, name, perms.xindex);
+		if (!new_profile) {
+			if (perms.xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) {
+				/* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do
+				 * use the newest version, which was picked
+				 * up above when getting profile
+				 */
+				info = "ix fallback";
+				new_profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
+				goto x_clear;
+			} else if (perms.xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) {
+				new_profile = aa_get_profile(ns->unconfined);
+				info = "ux fallback";
+			} else {
+				error = -ENOENT;
+				info = "profile not found";
+			}
+		}
+	} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
+		/* no exec permission - are we in learning mode */
+		new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0);
+		if (!new_profile) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			info = "could not create null profile";
+		} else {
+			error = -EACCES;
+			target = new_profile->base.hname;
+		}
+		perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
+	} else
+		/* fail exec */
+		error = -EACCES;
+
+	if (!new_profile)
+		goto audit;
+
+	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
+		/* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */
+		;
+	}
+
+	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, new_profile);
+		if (error) {
+			aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+			goto audit;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Determine if secure exec is needed.
+	 * Can be at this point for the following reasons:
+	 * 1. unconfined switching to confined
+	 * 2. confined switching to different confinement
+	 * 3. confined switching to unconfined
+	 *
+	 * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec
+	 * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec")
+	 *
+	 * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission
+	 * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec
+	 */
+	if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) {
+		AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n",
+			 name, new_profile->base.hname);
+		bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
+	}
+apply:
+	target = new_profile->base.hname;
+	/* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */
+	bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+x_clear:
+	aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+	/* transfer new profile reference will be released when cxt is freed */
+	cxt->profile = new_profile;
+
+	/* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */
+	aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+	cxt->previous = NULL;
+	cxt->onexec = NULL;
+	cxt->token = 0;
+
+audit:
+	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
+			      name, target, cond.uid, info, error);
+
+cleanup:
+	aa_put_profile(profile);
+	kfree(buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed
+ * @bprm: binprm for exec  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0
+ */
+int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
+
+	/* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
+	 * and stored in bprm->unsafe.
+	 */
+	if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED))
+		ret = 1;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
+	struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = bprm->cred->security;
+
+	/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
+	if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) ||
+	    (unconfined(new_cxt->profile)))
+		return;
+
+	current->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+	/* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new profile */
+	__aa_transition_rlimits(profile, new_cxt->profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * apparmor_bprm_commited_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed
+ * @bprm: binprm for the exec  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	/* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Functions for self directed profile change
+ */
+
+/**
+ * new_compound_name - create an hname with @n2 appended to @n1
+ * @n1: base of hname  (NOT NULL)
+ * @n2: name to append (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: new name or NULL on error
+ */
+static char *new_compound_name(const char *n1, const char *n2)
+{
+	char *name = kmalloc(strlen(n1) + strlen(n2) + 3, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (name)
+		sprintf(name, "%s//%s", n1, n2);
+	return name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile
+ * @hats: vector of hat names to try changing into (MAYBE NULL if @count == 0)
+ * @count: number of hat names in @hats
+ * @token: magic value to validate the hat change
+ * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test
+ *
+ * Change to the first profile specified in @hats that exists, and store
+ * the @hat_magic in the current task context.  If the count == 0 and the
+ * @token matches that stored in the current task context, return to the
+ * top level profile.
+ *
+ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
+ */
+int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+	struct aa_profile *profile, *previous_profile, *hat = NULL;
+	char *name = NULL;
+	int i;
+	struct file_perms perms = {};
+	const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	/* released below */
+	cred = get_current_cred();
+	cxt = cred->security;
+	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+	previous_profile = cxt->previous;
+
+	if (unconfined(profile)) {
+		info = "unconfined";
+		error = -EPERM;
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+	if (count) {
+		/* attempting to change into a new hat or switch to a sibling */
+		struct aa_profile *root;
+		root = PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile) ? profile->parent : profile;
+
+		/* find first matching hat */
+		for (i = 0; i < count && !hat; i++)
+			/* released below */
+			hat = aa_find_child(root, hats[i]);
+		if (!hat) {
+			if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(root) || permtest) {
+				if (list_empty(&root->base.profiles))
+					error = -ECHILD;
+				else
+					error = -ENOENT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * In complain mode and failed to match any hats.
+			 * Audit the failure is based off of the first hat
+			 * supplied.  This is done due how userspace
+			 * interacts with change_hat.
+			 *
+			 * TODO: Add logging of all failed hats
+			 */
+
+			/* freed below */
+			name = new_compound_name(root->base.hname, hats[0]);
+			target = name;
+			/* released below */
+			hat = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 1);
+			if (!hat) {
+				info = "failed null profile create";
+				error = -ENOMEM;
+				goto audit;
+			}
+		} else {
+			target = hat->base.hname;
+			if (!PROFILE_IS_HAT(hat)) {
+				info = "target not hat";
+				error = -EPERM;
+				goto audit;
+			}
+		}
+
+		error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, hat);
+		if (error) {
+			info = "ptraced";
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto audit;
+		}
+
+		if (!permtest) {
+			error = aa_set_current_hat(hat, token);
+			if (error == -EACCES)
+				/* kill task in case of brute force attacks */
+				perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT;
+			else if (name && !error)
+				/* reset error for learning of new hats */
+				error = -ENOENT;
+		}
+	} else if (previous_profile) {
+		/* Return to saved profile.  Kill task if restore fails
+		 * to avoid brute force attacks
+		 */
+		target = previous_profile->base.hname;
+		error = aa_restore_previous_profile(token);
+		perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT;
+	} else
+		/* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
+		goto out;
+
+audit:
+	if (!permtest)
+		error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL,
+				      OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL,
+				      target, 0, info, error);
+
+out:
+	aa_put_profile(hat);
+	kfree(name);
+	put_cred(cred);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
+ * @ns_name: name of the profile namespace to change to (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @hname: name of profile to change to (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @onexec: whether this transition is to take place immediately or at exec
+ * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test
+ *
+ * Change to new profile @name.  Unlike with hats, there is no way
+ * to change back.  If @name isn't specified the current profile name is
+ * used.
+ * If @onexec then the transition is delayed until
+ * the next exec.
+ *
+ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
+ */
+int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
+		      bool permtest)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+	struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL;
+	struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
+	struct file_perms perms = {};
+	const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+	int op, error = 0;
+	u32 request;
+
+	if (!hname && !ns_name)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (onexec) {
+		request = AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
+		op = OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC;
+	} else {
+		request = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
+		op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE;
+	}
+
+	cred = get_current_cred();
+	cxt = cred->security;
+	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+
+	if (ns_name) {
+		/* released below */
+		ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name);
+		if (!ns) {
+			/* we don't create new namespace in complain mode */
+			name = ns_name;
+			info = "namespace not found";
+			error = -ENOENT;
+			goto audit;
+		}
+	} else
+		/* released below */
+		ns = aa_get_namespace(profile->ns);
+
+	/* if the name was not specified, use the name of the current profile */
+	if (!hname) {
+		if (unconfined(profile))
+			hname = ns->unconfined->base.hname;
+		else
+			hname = profile->base.hname;
+	}
+
+	perms = change_profile_perms(profile, ns, hname, request,
+				     profile->file.start);
+	if (!(perms.allow & request)) {
+		error = -EACCES;
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+	/* released below */
+	target = aa_lookup_profile(ns, hname);
+	if (!target) {
+		info = "profile not found";
+		error = -ENOENT;
+		if (permtest || !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+			goto audit;
+		/* released below */
+		target = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0);
+		if (!target) {
+			info = "failed null profile create";
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto audit;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
+	error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, target);
+	if (error) {
+		info = "ptrace prevents transition";
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+	if (permtest)
+		goto audit;
+
+	if (onexec)
+		error = aa_set_current_onexec(target);
+	else
+		error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
+
+audit:
+	if (!permtest)
+		error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request,
+				      name, hname, 0, info, error);
+
+	aa_put_namespace(ns);
+	aa_put_profile(target);
+	put_cred(cred);
+
+	return error;
+}

security/apparmor/file.c

@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+struct file_perms nullperms;
+
+
+/**
+ * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ */
+static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask)
+{
+	char str[10];
+
+	char *m = str;
+
+	if (mask & AA_EXEC_MMAP)
+		*m++ = 'm';
+	if (mask & (MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ))
+		*m++ = 'r';
+	if (mask & (MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CHMOD |
+		    AA_MAY_CHOWN))
+		*m++ = 'w';
+	else if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
+		*m++ = 'a';
+	if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE)
+		*m++ = 'c';
+	if (mask & AA_MAY_DELETE)
+		*m++ = 'd';
+	if (mask & AA_MAY_LINK)
+		*m++ = 'l';
+	if (mask & AA_MAY_LOCK)
+		*m++ = 'k';
+	if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+		*m++ = 'x';
+	*m = '\0';
+
+	audit_log_string(ab, str);
+}
+
+/**
+ * file_audit_cb - call back for file specific audit fields
+ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	uid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
+
+	if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
+		audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.request);
+	}
+	if (sa->aad.fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
+		audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.denied);
+	}
+	if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", fsuid);
+		audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad.fs.ouid);
+	}
+
+	if (sa->aad.fs.target) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.fs.target);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations
+ * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
+ * @gfp: allocation flags
+ * @op: operation being mediated
+ * @request: permissions requested
+ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @target: name of target (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @ouid: object uid
+ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
+ */
+int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
+		  gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name,
+		  const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error)
+{
+	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+	sa.aad.op = op,
+	sa.aad.fs.request = request;
+	sa.aad.name = name;
+	sa.aad.fs.target = target;
+	sa.aad.fs.ouid = ouid;
+	sa.aad.info = info;
+	sa.aad.error = error;
+
+	if (likely(!sa.aad.error)) {
+		u32 mask = perms->audit;
+
+		if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
+			mask = 0xffff;
+
+		/* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
+		sa.aad.fs.request &= mask;
+
+		if (likely(!sa.aad.fs.request))
+			return 0;
+		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+	} else {
+		/* only report permissions that were denied */
+		sa.aad.fs.request = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+
+		if (sa.aad.fs.request & perms->kill)
+			type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+		/* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
+		if ((sa.aad.fs.request & perms->quiet) &&
+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+			sa.aad.fs.request &= ~perms->quiet;
+
+		if (!sa.aad.fs.request)
+			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad.error;
+	}
+
+	sa.aad.fs.denied = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow;
+	return aa_audit(type, profile, gfp, &sa, file_audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * map_old_perms - map old file perms layout to the new layout
+ * @old: permission set in old mapping
+ *
+ * Returns: new permission mapping
+ */
+static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old)
+{
+	u32 new = old & 0xf;
+	if (old & MAY_READ)
+		new |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
+	if (old & MAY_WRITE)
+		new |= AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CREATE | AA_MAY_DELETE |
+			AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN;
+	if (old & 0x10)
+		new |= AA_MAY_LINK;
+	/* the old mapping lock and link_subset flags where overlaid
+	 * and use was determined by part of a pair that they were in
+	 */
+	if (old & 0x20)
+		new |= AA_MAY_LOCK | AA_LINK_SUBSET;
+	if (old & 0x40)	/* AA_EXEC_MMAP */
+		new |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+
+	new |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
+
+	return new;
+}
+
+/**
+ * compute_perms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms
+ * @dfa: dfa to compute perms for   (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: state in dfa
+ * @cond:  conditions to consider  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry, do computation conversion
+ *       at load time.
+ *
+ * Returns: computed permission set
+ */
+static struct file_perms compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
+				       struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+	struct file_perms perms;
+
+	/* FIXME: change over to new dfa format
+	 * currently file perms are encoded in the dfa, new format
+	 * splits the permissions from the dfa.  This mapping can be
+	 * done at profile load
+	 */
+	perms.kill = 0;
+
+	if (current_fsuid() == cond->uid) {
+		perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state));
+		perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa, state));
+		perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state));
+		perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
+	} else {
+		perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(dfa, state));
+		perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_other_audit(dfa, state));
+		perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state));
+		perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state);
+	}
+
+	/* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
+	if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000)
+		perms.allow |= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
+
+	return perms;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_str_perms - find permission that match @name
+ * @dfa: to match against  (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @state: state to start matching in
+ * @name: string to match against dfa  (NOT NULL)
+ * @cond: conditions to consider for permission set computation  (NOT NULL)
+ * @perms: Returns - the permissions found when matching @name
+ *
+ * Returns: the final state in @dfa when beginning @start and walking @name
+ */
+unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+			  const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
+			  struct file_perms *perms)
+{
+	unsigned int state;
+	if (!dfa) {
+		*perms = nullperms;
+		return DFA_NOMATCH;
+	}
+
+	state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, name);
+	*perms = compute_perms(dfa, state, cond);
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked
+ * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %1 if deleted else %0
+ */
+static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (d_unlinked(dentry) && dentry->d_inode->i_nlink == 0)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @path: path to check permissions of  (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies
+ * @request: requested permissions
+ * @cond: conditional info for this request  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error
+ */
+int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+		 int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+	char *buffer = NULL;
+	struct file_perms perms = {};
+	const char *name, *info = NULL;
+	int error;
+
+	flags |= profile->path_flags | (S_ISDIR(cond->mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0);
+	error = aa_get_name(path, flags, &buffer, &name);
+	if (error) {
+		if (error == -ENOENT && is_deleted(path->dentry)) {
+			/* Access to open files that are deleted are
+			 * give a pass (implicit delegation)
+			 */
+			error = 0;
+			perms.allow = request;
+		} else if (error == -ENOENT)
+			info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
+		else if (error == -ESTALE)
+			info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
+		else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
+			info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";
+		else
+			info = "Failed name lookup";
+	} else {
+		aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, name, cond,
+			     &perms);
+		if (request & ~perms.allow)
+			error = -EACCES;
+	}
+	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, name,
+			      NULL, cond->uid, info, error);
+	kfree(buffer);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * xindex_is_subset - helper for aa_path_link
+ * @link: link permission set
+ * @target: target permission set
+ *
+ * test target x permissions are equal OR a subset of link x permissions
+ * this is done as part of the subset test, where a hardlink must have
+ * a subset of permissions that the target has.
+ *
+ * Returns: %1 if subset else %0
+ */
+static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target)
+{
+	if (((link & ~AA_X_UNSAFE) != (target & ~AA_X_UNSAFE)) ||
+	    ((link & AA_X_UNSAFE) && !(target & AA_X_UNSAFE)))
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check
+ * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @old_dentry: the target dentry  (NOT NULL)
+ * @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in  (NOT NULL)
+ * @new_dentry: the link being created  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Handle the permission test for a link & target pair.  Permission
+ * is encoded as a pair where the link permission is determined
+ * first, and if allowed, the target is tested.  The target test
+ * is done from the point of the link match (not start of DFA)
+ * making the target permission dependent on the link permission match.
+ *
+ * The subset test if required forces that permissions granted
+ * on link are a subset of the permission granted to target.
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 if allowed else error
+ */
+int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+		 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct path link = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
+	struct path target = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
+	struct path_cond cond = {
+		old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+		old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+	};
+	char *buffer = NULL, *buffer2 = NULL;
+	const char *lname, *tname = NULL, *info = NULL;
+	struct file_perms lperms, perms;
+	u32 request = AA_MAY_LINK;
+	unsigned int state;
+	int error;
+
+	lperms = nullperms;
+
+	/* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */
+	error = aa_get_name(&link, profile->path_flags, &buffer, &lname);
+	if (error)
+		goto audit;
+
+	/* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
+	error = aa_get_name(&target, profile->path_flags, &buffer2, &tname);
+	if (error)
+		goto audit;
+
+	error = -EACCES;
+	/* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */
+	state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, lname,
+			     &cond, &lperms);
+
+	if (!(lperms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK))
+		goto audit;
+
+	/* test to see if target can be paired with link */
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
+	aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, tname, &cond, &perms);
+
+	/* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry
+	 * in the link pair.
+	 */
+	lperms.audit = perms.audit;
+	lperms.quiet = perms.quiet;
+	lperms.kill = perms.kill;
+
+	if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK)) {
+		info = "target restricted";
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+	/* done if link subset test is not required */
+	if (!(perms.allow & AA_LINK_SUBSET))
+		goto done_tests;
+
+	/* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are a
+	 * subset of the allowed permissions on target.
+	 */
+	aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, tname, &cond,
+		     &perms);
+
+	/* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */
+	request = lperms.allow & ~AA_MAY_LINK;
+	lperms.allow &= perms.allow | AA_MAY_LINK;
+
+	request |= AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK & (lperms.allow & ~perms.allow);
+	if (request & ~lperms.allow) {
+		goto audit;
+	} else if ((lperms.allow & MAY_EXEC) &&
+		   !xindex_is_subset(lperms.xindex, perms.xindex)) {
+		lperms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
+		request |= MAY_EXEC;
+		info = "link not subset of target";
+		goto audit;
+	}
+
+done_tests:
+	error = 0;
+
+audit:
+	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_LINK, request,
+			      lname, tname, cond.uid, info, error);
+	kfree(buffer);
+	kfree(buffer2);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @profile: profile being enforced   (NOT NULL)
+ * @file: file to revalidate access permissions on  (NOT NULL)
+ * @request: requested permissions
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error
+ */
+int aa_file_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
+		 u32 request)
+{
+	struct path_cond cond = {
+		.uid = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+		.mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+	};
+
+	return aa_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED,
+			    request, &cond);
+}

security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor basic global and lib definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __APPARMOR_H
+#define __APPARMOR_H
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+
+#include "match.h"
+
+/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
+extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+extern int aa_g_audit_header;
+extern int aa_g_debug;
+extern int aa_g_lock_policy;
+extern int aa_g_logsyscall;
+extern int aa_g_paranoid_load;
+extern unsigned int aa_g_path_max;
+
+/*
+ * DEBUG remains global (no per profile flag) since it is mostly used in sysctl
+ * which is not related to profile accesses.
+ */
+
+#define AA_DEBUG(fmt, args...)						\
+	do {								\
+		if (aa_g_debug && printk_ratelimit())			\
+			printk(KERN_DEBUG "AppArmor: " fmt, ##args);	\
+	} while (0)
+
+#define AA_ERROR(fmt, args...)						\
+	do {								\
+		if (printk_ratelimit())					\
+			printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor: " fmt, ##args);	\
+	} while (0)
+
+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+extern int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+
+/* fn's in lib */
+char *aa_split_fqname(char *args, char **ns_name);
+void aa_info_message(const char *str);
+void *kvmalloc(size_t size);
+void kvfree(void *buffer);
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring
+ * @str: a null terminated string
+ * @sub: a substring, not necessarily null terminated
+ * @len: length of @sub to compare
+ *
+ * The @str string must be full consumed for this to be considered a match
+ */
+static inline bool aa_strneq(const char *str, const char *sub, int len)
+{
+	return !strncmp(str, sub, len) && !str[len];
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_null_transition - step to next state after null character
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match against
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_null_transition transitions to the next state after a null
+ * character which is not used in standard matching and is only
+ * used to separate pairs.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
+						  unsigned int start)
+{
+	/* the null transition only needs the string's null terminator byte */
+	return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, start, "", 1);
+}
+
+static inline bool mediated_filesystem(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return !(inode->i_sb->s_flags & MS_NOUSER);
+}
+
+#endif /* __APPARMOR_H */

security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor filesystem definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_APPARMORFS_H
+#define __AA_APPARMORFS_H
+
+extern void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void);
+
+#endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */

security/apparmor/include/audit.h

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor auditing function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_AUDIT_H
+#define __AA_AUDIT_H
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "file.h"
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+extern const char *audit_mode_names[];
+#define AUDIT_MAX_INDEX 5
+
+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO 0	/* auto choose audit message type */
+
+enum audit_mode {
+	AUDIT_NORMAL,		/* follow normal auditing of accesses */
+	AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED,	/* quiet all denied access messages */
+	AUDIT_QUIET,		/* quiet all messages */
+	AUDIT_NOQUIET,		/* do not quiet audit messages */
+	AUDIT_ALL		/* audit all accesses */
+};
+
+enum audit_type {
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_HINT,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL
+};
+
+extern const char *op_table[];
+enum aa_ops {
+	OP_NULL,
+
+	OP_SYSCTL,
+	OP_CAPABLE,
+
+	OP_UNLINK,
+	OP_MKDIR,
+	OP_RMDIR,
+	OP_MKNOD,
+	OP_TRUNC,
+	OP_LINK,
+	OP_SYMLINK,
+	OP_RENAME_SRC,
+	OP_RENAME_DEST,
+	OP_CHMOD,
+	OP_CHOWN,
+	OP_GETATTR,
+	OP_OPEN,
+
+	OP_FPERM,
+	OP_FLOCK,
+	OP_FMMAP,
+	OP_FMPROT,
+
+	OP_CREATE,
+	OP_POST_CREATE,
+	OP_BIND,
+	OP_CONNECT,
+	OP_LISTEN,
+	OP_ACCEPT,
+	OP_SENDMSG,
+	OP_RECVMSG,
+	OP_GETSOCKNAME,
+	OP_GETPEERNAME,
+	OP_GETSOCKOPT,
+	OP_SETSOCKOPT,
+	OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN,
+
+	OP_PTRACE,
+
+	OP_EXEC,
+	OP_CHANGE_HAT,
+	OP_CHANGE_PROFILE,
+	OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC,
+
+	OP_SETPROCATTR,
+	OP_SETRLIMIT,
+
+	OP_PROF_REPL,
+	OP_PROF_LOAD,
+	OP_PROF_RM,
+};
+
+
+/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data portion of common_audit_data */
+#define aad apparmor_audit_data
+
+void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+		  void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
+	     struct common_audit_data *sa,
+	     void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
+
+static inline int complain_error(int error)
+{
+	if (error == -EPERM || error == -EACCES)
+		return 0;
+	return error;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */

security/apparmor/include/capability.h

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor capability mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_CAPABILITY_H
+#define __AA_CAPABILITY_H
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+/* aa_caps - confinement data for capabilities
+ * @allowed: capabilities mask
+ * @audit: caps that are to be audited
+ * @quiet: caps that should not be audited
+ * @kill: caps that when requested will result in the task being killed
+ * @extended: caps that are subject finer grained mediation
+ */
+struct aa_caps {
+	kernel_cap_t allow;
+	kernel_cap_t audit;
+	kernel_cap_t quiet;
+	kernel_cap_t kill;
+	kernel_cap_t extended;
+};
+
+int aa_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
+	       int audit);
+
+static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
+{
+	/* NOP */
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_CAPBILITY_H */

security/apparmor/include/context.h

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor contexts used to associate "labels" to objects.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_CONTEXT_H
+#define __AA_CONTEXT_H
+
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#include "policy.h"
+
+/* struct aa_file_cxt - the AppArmor context the file was opened in
+ * @perms: the permission the file was opened with
+ *
+ * The file_cxt could currently be directly stored in file->f_security
+ * as the profile reference is now stored in the f_cred.  However the
+ * cxt struct will expand in the future so we keep the struct.
+ */
+struct aa_file_cxt {
+	u16 allow;
+};
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_file_context - allocate file_cxt
+ * @gfp: gfp flags for allocation
+ *
+ * Returns: file_cxt or NULL on failure
+ */
+static inline struct aa_file_cxt *aa_alloc_file_context(gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_file_cxt), gfp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_file_context - free a file_cxt
+ * @cxt: file_cxt to free  (MAYBE_NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_free_file_context(struct aa_file_cxt *cxt)
+{
+	if (cxt)
+		kzfree(cxt);
+}
+
+/**
+ * struct aa_task_cxt - primary label for confined tasks
+ * @profile: the current profile   (NOT NULL)
+ * @exec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
+ *
+ * Contains the task's current profile (which could change due to
+ * change_hat).  Plus the hat_magic needed during change_hat.
+ *
+ * TODO: make so a task can be confined by a stack of contexts
+ */
+struct aa_task_cxt {
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	struct aa_profile *onexec;
+	struct aa_profile *previous;
+	u64 token;
+};
+
+struct aa_task_cxt *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags);
+void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt);
+void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new,
+			 const struct aa_task_cxt *old);
+int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile);
+int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile);
+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token);
+int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 cookie);
+
+/**
+ * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
+ * @task: task to check confinement of  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
+ */
+static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = __task_cred(task)->security;
+
+	BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
+	if (unconfined(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile)))
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_cred_profile - obtain cred's profiles
+ * @cred: cred to obtain profiles from  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: confining profile
+ *
+ * does NOT increment reference count
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_cred_profile(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
+	BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
+	return aa_newest_version(cxt->profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining profile or the ns unconfined profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This fn will not update the tasks cred to the most up to date version
+ * of the profile so it is safe to call when inside of locks.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_current_profile(void)
+{
+	return aa_cred_profile(current_cred());
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile and do updates
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining profile or the ns unconfined profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This fn will update the tasks cred structure if the profile has been
+ * replaced.  Not safe to call inside locks
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void)
+{
+	const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
+
+	profile = aa_newest_version(cxt->profile);
+	/*
+	 * Whether or not replacement succeeds, use newest profile so
+	 * there is no need to update it after replacement.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely((cxt->profile != profile)))
+		aa_replace_current_profile(profile);
+
+	return profile;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */

security/apparmor/include/domain.h

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor security domain transition function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifndef __AA_DOMAIN_H
+#define __AA_DOMAIN_H
+
+struct aa_domain {
+	int size;
+	char **table;
+};
+
+int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+
+void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain);
+int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest);
+int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *name, bool onexec,
+		      bool permtest);
+
+#endif /* __AA_DOMAIN_H */

security/apparmor/include/file.h

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_FILE_H
+#define __AA_FILE_H
+
+#include <linux/path.h>
+
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+/*
+ * We use MAY_EXEC, MAY_WRITE, MAY_READ, MAY_APPEND and the following flags
+ * for profile permissions
+ */
+#define AA_MAY_CREATE                  0x0010
+#define AA_MAY_DELETE                  0x0020
+#define AA_MAY_META_WRITE              0x0040
+#define AA_MAY_META_READ               0x0080
+
+#define AA_MAY_CHMOD                   0x0100
+#define AA_MAY_CHOWN                   0x0200
+#define AA_MAY_LOCK                    0x0400
+#define AA_EXEC_MMAP                   0x0800
+
+#define AA_MAY_LINK			0x1000
+#define AA_LINK_SUBSET			AA_MAY_LOCK	/* overlaid */
+#define AA_MAY_ONEXEC			0x40000000	/* exec allows onexec */
+#define AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE		0x80000000
+#define AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT		0x80000000	/* ctrl auditing only */
+
+#define AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK	(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND |\
+				 AA_MAY_CREATE | AA_MAY_DELETE |	\
+				 AA_MAY_META_READ | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | \
+				 AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_LOCK | \
+				 AA_EXEC_MMAP | AA_MAY_LINK)
+
+/*
+ * The xindex is broken into 3 parts
+ * - index - an index into either the exec name table or the variable table
+ * - exec type - which determines how the executable name and index are used
+ * - flags - which modify how the destination name is applied
+ */
+#define AA_X_INDEX_MASK		0x03ff
+
+#define AA_X_TYPE_MASK		0x0c00
+#define AA_X_TYPE_SHIFT		10
+#define AA_X_NONE		0x0000
+#define AA_X_NAME		0x0400	/* use executable name px */
+#define AA_X_TABLE		0x0800	/* use a specified name ->n# */
+
+#define AA_X_UNSAFE		0x1000
+#define AA_X_CHILD		0x2000	/* make >AA_X_NONE apply to children */
+#define AA_X_INHERIT		0x4000
+#define AA_X_UNCONFINED		0x8000
+
+/* AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED - is passed in the bprm->unsafe field */
+#define AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED	0x8000
+
+/* need to make conditional which ones are being set */
+struct path_cond {
+	uid_t uid;
+	umode_t mode;
+};
+
+/* struct file_perms - file permission
+ * @allow: mask of permissions that are allowed
+ * @audit: mask of permissions to force an audit message for
+ * @quiet: mask of permissions to quiet audit messages for
+ * @kill: mask of permissions that when matched will kill the task
+ * @xindex: exec transition index if @allow contains MAY_EXEC
+ *
+ * The @audit and @queit mask should be mutually exclusive.
+ */
+struct file_perms {
+	u32 allow;
+	u32 audit;
+	u32 quiet;
+	u32 kill;
+	u16 xindex;
+};
+
+extern struct file_perms nullperms;
+
+#define COMBINED_PERM_MASK(X) ((X).allow | (X).audit | (X).quiet | (X).kill)
+
+/* FIXME: split perms from dfa and match this to description
+ *        also add delegation info.
+ */
+static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask)
+{
+	u16 old_index = (mask >> 10) & 0xf;
+	u16 index = 0;
+
+	if (mask & 0x100)
+		index |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
+	if (mask & 0x200)
+		index |= AA_X_INHERIT;
+	if (mask & 0x80)
+		index |= AA_X_UNCONFINED;
+
+	if (old_index == 1) {
+		index |= AA_X_UNCONFINED;
+	} else if (old_index == 2) {
+		index |= AA_X_NAME;
+	} else if (old_index == 3) {
+		index |= AA_X_NAME | AA_X_CHILD;
+	} else {
+		index |= AA_X_TABLE;
+		index |= old_index - 4;
+	}
+
+	return index;
+}
+
+/*
+ * map old dfa inline permissions to new format
+ */
+#define dfa_user_allow(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f) | \
+				    ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000))
+#define dfa_user_audit(dfa, state) ((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state) \
+	(dfa_map_xindex(ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x3fff))
+
+#define dfa_other_allow(dfa, state) ((((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & \
+				      0x7f) |				\
+				     ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000))
+#define dfa_other_audit(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state) \
+	((((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f)
+#define dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state) \
+	dfa_map_xindex((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] >> 14) & 0x3fff)
+
+int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
+		  gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name,
+		  const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error);
+
+/**
+ * struct aa_file_rules - components used for file rule permissions
+ * @dfa: dfa to match path names and conditionals against
+ * @perms: permission table indexed by the matched state accept entry of @dfa
+ * @trans: transition table for indexed by named x transitions
+ *
+ * File permission are determined by matching a path against @dfa and then
+ * then using the value of the accept entry for the matching state as
+ * an index into @perms.  If a named exec transition is required it is
+ * looked up in the transition table.
+ */
+struct aa_file_rules {
+	unsigned int start;
+	struct aa_dfa *dfa;
+	/* struct perms perms; */
+	struct aa_domain trans;
+	/* TODO: add delegate table */
+};
+
+unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+			  const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
+			  struct file_perms *perms);
+
+int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+		 int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond);
+
+int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+		 struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
+
+int aa_file_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
+		 u32 request);
+
+static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules)
+{
+	aa_put_dfa(rules->dfa);
+	aa_free_domain_entries(&rules->trans);
+}
+
+#define ACC_FMODE(x) (("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE]) | (((x) << 1) & 0x40))
+
+/* from namei.c */
+#define MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(x) ((((x) + 1) & O_ACCMODE) ? (x) + 1 : (x))
+
+/**
+ * aa_map_file_perms - map file flags to AppArmor permissions
+ * @file: open file to map flags to AppArmor permissions
+ *
+ * Returns: apparmor permission set for the file
+ */
+static inline u32 aa_map_file_to_perms(struct file *file)
+{
+	int flags = MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(file->f_flags);
+	u32 perms = ACC_FMODE(file->f_mode);
+
+	if ((flags & O_APPEND) && (perms & MAY_WRITE))
+		perms = (perms & ~MAY_WRITE) | MAY_APPEND;
+	/* trunc implies write permission */
+	if (flags & O_TRUNC)
+		perms |= MAY_WRITE;
+	if (flags & O_CREAT)
+		perms |= AA_MAY_CREATE;
+
+	return perms;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_FILE_H */

security/apparmor/include/ipc.h

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_IPC_H
+#define __AA_IPC_H
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer,
+		  struct aa_profile *tracee, unsigned int mode);
+
+int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
+	      unsigned int mode);
+
+#endif /* __AA_IPC_H */

security/apparmor/include/match.h

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy dfa matching engine definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_MATCH_H
+#define __AA_MATCH_H
+
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+
+#define DFA_NOMATCH			0
+#define DFA_START			1
+
+#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK		0xffffffff
+#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK		0xffffffff
+
+/**
+ * The format used for transition tables is based on the GNU flex table
+ * file format (--tables-file option; see Table File Format in the flex
+ * info pages and the flex sources for documentation). The magic number
+ * used in the header is 0x1B5E783D insted of 0xF13C57B1 though, because
+ * the YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF (default) tables are used
+ * slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser package).
+ */
+
+#define YYTH_MAGIC	0x1B5E783D
+#define YYTH_DEF_RECURSE 0x1			/* DEF Table is recursive */
+
+struct table_set_header {
+	u32 th_magic;		/* YYTH_MAGIC */
+	u32 th_hsize;
+	u32 th_ssize;
+	u16 th_flags;
+	char th_version[];
+};
+
+/* The YYTD_ID are one less than flex table mappings.  The flex id
+ * has 1 subtracted at table load time, this allows us to directly use the
+ * ID's as indexes.
+ */
+#define	YYTD_ID_ACCEPT	0
+#define YYTD_ID_BASE	1
+#define YYTD_ID_CHK	2
+#define YYTD_ID_DEF	3
+#define YYTD_ID_EC	4
+#define YYTD_ID_META	5
+#define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 6
+#define YYTD_ID_NXT	7
+#define YYTD_ID_TSIZE	8
+
+#define YYTD_DATA8	1
+#define YYTD_DATA16	2
+#define YYTD_DATA32	4
+#define YYTD_DATA64	8
+
+/* Each ACCEPT2 table gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the
+ * first flags
+ */
+#define ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) ((X) & 0x3f)
+#define ACCEPT2_FLAGS(X) ACCEPT1_FLAGS((X) >> YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2)
+#define TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(X) ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X)
+#define TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(X) (ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) << YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2)
+#define DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES 0x1000
+
+struct table_header {
+	u16 td_id;
+	u16 td_flags;
+	u32 td_hilen;
+	u32 td_lolen;
+	char td_data[];
+};
+
+#define DEFAULT_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_data))
+#define BASE_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_data))
+#define NEXT_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_data))
+#define CHECK_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_data))
+#define EQUIV_TABLE(DFA) ((u8 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_data))
+#define ACCEPT_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_data))
+#define ACCEPT_TABLE2(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_data))
+
+struct aa_dfa {
+	struct kref count;
+	u16 flags;
+	struct table_header *tables[YYTD_ID_TSIZE];
+};
+
+#define byte_to_byte(X) (X)
+
+#define UNPACK_ARRAY(TABLE, BLOB, LEN, TYPE, NTOHX) \
+	do { \
+		typeof(LEN) __i; \
+		TYPE *__t = (TYPE *) TABLE; \
+		TYPE *__b = (TYPE *) BLOB; \
+		for (__i = 0; __i < LEN; __i++) { \
+			__t[__i] = NTOHX(__b[__i]); \
+		} \
+	} while (0)
+
+static inline size_t table_size(size_t len, size_t el_size)
+{
+	return ALIGN(sizeof(struct table_header) + len * el_size, 8);
+}
+
+struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+			      const char *str, int len);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+			  const char *str);
+void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
+
+/**
+ * aa_put_dfa - put a dfa refcount
+ * @dfa: dfa to put refcount   (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: if @dfa != NULL that a valid refcount be held
+ */
+static inline void aa_put_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
+{
+	if (dfa)
+		kref_put(&dfa->count, aa_dfa_free_kref);
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_MATCH_H */

security/apparmor/include/path.h

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor basic path manipulation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_PATH_H
+#define __AA_PATH_H
+
+
+enum path_flags {
+	PATH_IS_DIR = 0x1,		/* path is a directory */
+	PATH_CONNECT_PATH = 0x4,	/* connect disconnected paths to / */
+	PATH_CHROOT_REL = 0x8,		/* do path lookup relative to chroot */
+	PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT = 0x10,	/* connect paths that are at ns root */
+
+	PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED = 0x08000, /* delegate deleted files */
+	PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x10000,	/* mediate deleted paths */
+};
+
+int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name);
+
+#endif /* __AA_PATH_H */

security/apparmor/include/policy.h

@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_POLICY_H
+#define __AA_POLICY_H
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+
+#include "apparmor.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "capability.h"
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "file.h"
+#include "resource.h"
+
+extern const char *profile_mode_names[];
+#define APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 3
+
+#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile)	\
+	((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) || \
+	 ((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN))
+
+#define KILL_MODE(_profile) \
+	((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) || \
+	 ((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_KILL))
+
+#define PROFILE_IS_HAT(_profile) ((_profile)->flags & PFLAG_HAT)
+
+/*
+ * FIXME: currently need a clean way to replace and remove profiles as a
+ * set.  It should be done at the namespace level.
+ * Either, with a set of profiles loaded at the namespace level or via
+ * a mark and remove marked interface.
+ */
+enum profile_mode {
+	APPARMOR_ENFORCE,	/* enforce access rules */
+	APPARMOR_COMPLAIN,	/* allow and log access violations */
+	APPARMOR_KILL,		/* kill task on access violation */
+};
+
+enum profile_flags {
+	PFLAG_HAT = 1,			/* profile is a hat */
+	PFLAG_UNCONFINED = 2,		/* profile is an unconfined profile */
+	PFLAG_NULL = 4,			/* profile is null learning profile */
+	PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR = 8,	/* fallback to ix on name lookup fail */
+	PFLAG_IMMUTABLE = 0x10,		/* don't allow changes/replacement */
+	PFLAG_USER_DEFINED = 0x20,	/* user based profile - lower privs */
+	PFLAG_NO_LIST_REF = 0x40,	/* list doesn't keep profile ref */
+	PFLAG_OLD_NULL_TRANS = 0x100,	/* use // as the null transition */
+
+	/* These flags must correspond with PATH_flags */
+	PFLAG_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x10000, /* mediate instead delegate deleted */
+};
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+/* struct aa_policy - common part of both namespaces and profiles
+ * @name: name of the object
+ * @hname - The hierarchical name
+ * @count: reference count of the obj
+ * @list: list policy object is on
+ * @profiles: head of the profiles list contained in the object
+ */
+struct aa_policy {
+	char *name;
+	char *hname;
+	struct kref count;
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct list_head profiles;
+};
+
+/* struct aa_ns_acct - accounting of profiles in namespace
+ * @max_size: maximum space allowed for all profiles in namespace
+ * @max_count: maximum number of profiles that can be in this namespace
+ * @size: current size of profiles
+ * @count: current count of profiles (includes null profiles)
+ */
+struct aa_ns_acct {
+	int max_size;
+	int max_count;
+	int size;
+	int count;
+};
+
+/* struct aa_namespace - namespace for a set of profiles
+ * @base: common policy
+ * @parent: parent of namespace
+ * @lock: lock for modifying the object
+ * @acct: accounting for the namespace
+ * @unconfined: special unconfined profile for the namespace
+ * @sub_ns: list of namespaces under the current namespace.
+ *
+ * An aa_namespace defines the set profiles that are searched to determine
+ * which profile to attach to a task.  Profiles can not be shared between
+ * aa_namespaces and profile names within a namespace are guaranteed to be
+ * unique.  When profiles in separate namespaces have the same name they
+ * are NOT considered to be equivalent.
+ *
+ * Namespaces are hierarchical and only namespaces and profiles below the
+ * current namespace are visible.
+ *
+ * Namespace names must be unique and can not contain the characters :/\0
+ *
+ * FIXME TODO: add vserver support of namespaces (can it all be done in
+ *             userspace?)
+ */
+struct aa_namespace {
+	struct aa_policy base;
+	struct aa_namespace *parent;
+	rwlock_t lock;
+	struct aa_ns_acct acct;
+	struct aa_profile *unconfined;
+	struct list_head sub_ns;
+};
+
+/* struct aa_profile - basic confinement data
+ * @base - base components of the profile (name, refcount, lists, lock ...)
+ * @parent: parent of profile
+ * @ns: namespace the profile is in
+ * @replacedby: is set to the profile that replaced this profile
+ * @rename: optional profile name that this profile renamed
+ * @xmatch: optional extended matching for unconfined executables names
+ * @xmatch_len: xmatch prefix len, used to determine xmatch priority
+ * @sid: the unique security id number of this profile
+ * @audit: the auditing mode of the profile
+ * @mode: the enforcement mode of the profile
+ * @flags: flags controlling profile behavior
+ * @path_flags: flags controlling path generation behavior
+ * @size: the memory consumed by this profiles rules
+ * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
+ * @caps: capabilities for the profile
+ * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
+ *
+ * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data.  Each profile
+ * has a name, and exists in a namespace.  The @name and @exec_match are
+ * used to determine profile attachment against unconfined tasks.  All other
+ * attachments are determined by profile X transition rules.
+ *
+ * The @replacedby field is write protected by the profile lock.  Reads
+ * are assumed to be atomic, and are done without locking.
+ *
+ * Profiles have a hierarchy where hats and children profiles keep
+ * a reference to their parent.
+ *
+ * Profile names can not begin with a : and can not contain the \0
+ * character.  If a profile name begins with / it will be considered when
+ * determining profile attachment on "unconfined" tasks.
+ */
+struct aa_profile {
+	struct aa_policy base;
+	struct aa_profile *parent;
+
+	struct aa_namespace *ns;
+	struct aa_profile *replacedby;
+	const char *rename;
+
+	struct aa_dfa *xmatch;
+	int xmatch_len;
+	u32 sid;
+	enum audit_mode audit;
+	enum profile_mode mode;
+	u32 flags;
+	u32 path_flags;
+	int size;
+
+	struct aa_file_rules file;
+	struct aa_caps caps;
+	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
+};
+
+extern struct aa_namespace *root_ns;
+extern enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode;
+
+void aa_add_profile(struct aa_policy *common, struct aa_profile *profile);
+
+bool aa_ns_visible(struct aa_namespace *curr, struct aa_namespace *view);
+const char *aa_ns_name(struct aa_namespace *parent, struct aa_namespace *child);
+int aa_alloc_root_ns(void);
+void aa_free_root_ns(void);
+void aa_free_namespace_kref(struct kref *kref);
+
+struct aa_namespace *aa_find_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
+				       const char *name);
+
+static inline struct aa_policy *aa_get_common(struct aa_policy *c)
+{
+	if (c)
+		kref_get(&c->count);
+
+	return c;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_namespace - increment references count on @ns
+ * @ns: namespace to increment reference count of (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @ns, if @ns is NULL returns NULL
+ * Requires: @ns must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_namespace *aa_get_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+	if (ns)
+		kref_get(&(ns->base.count));
+
+	return ns;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_put_namespace - decrement refcount on @ns
+ * @ns: namespace to put reference of
+ *
+ * Decrement reference count of @ns and if no longer in use free it
+ */
+static inline void aa_put_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+	if (ns)
+		kref_put(&ns->base.count, aa_free_namespace_kref);
+}
+
+struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *name);
+struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat);
+void aa_free_profile_kref(struct kref *kref);
+struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name);
+struct aa_profile *aa_lookup_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *name);
+struct aa_profile *aa_match_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *name);
+
+ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace);
+ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(char *name, size_t size);
+
+#define PROF_ADD 1
+#define PROF_REPLACE 0
+
+#define unconfined(X) ((X)->flags & PFLAG_UNCONFINED)
+
+/**
+ * aa_newest_version - find the newest version of @profile
+ * @profile: the profile to check for newer versions of (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: newest version of @profile, if @profile is the newest version
+ *          return @profile.
+ *
+ * NOTE: the profile returned is not refcounted, The refcount on @profile
+ * must be held until the caller decides what to do with the returned newest
+ * version.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_newest_version(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	while (profile->replacedby)
+		profile = profile->replacedby;
+
+	return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p
+ * @p: profile  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to @p if @p is NULL will return NULL
+ * Requires: @p must be held with valid refcount when called
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+	if (p)
+		kref_get(&(p->base.count));
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_put_profile - decrement refcount on profile @p
+ * @p: profile  (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_put_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+	if (p)
+		kref_put(&p->base.count, aa_free_profile_kref);
+}
+
+static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	if (aa_g_audit != AUDIT_NORMAL)
+		return aa_g_audit;
+
+	return profile->audit;
+}
+
+bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op);
+
+#endif /* __AA_POLICY_H */

security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor policy loading interface function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __POLICY_INTERFACE_H
+#define __POLICY_INTERFACE_H
+
+struct aa_profile *aa_unpack(void *udata, size_t size, const char **ns);
+
+#endif /* __POLICY_INTERFACE_H */

security/apparmor/include/procattr.h

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor /proc/<pid>/attr/ interface function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
+#define __AA_PROCATTR_H
+
+#define AA_DO_TEST 1
+#define AA_ONEXEC  1
+
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *profile, char **string);
+int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int test);
+int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test);
+int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname);
+
+#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */

security/apparmor/include/resource.h

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor resource limits function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_RESOURCE_H
+#define __AA_RESOURCE_H
+
+#include <linux/resource.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+/* struct aa_rlimit - rlimit settings for the profile
+ * @mask: which hard limits to set
+ * @limits: rlimit values that override task limits
+ *
+ * AppArmor rlimits are used to set confined task rlimits.  Only the
+ * limits specified in @mask will be controlled by apparmor.
+ */
+struct aa_rlimit {
+	unsigned int mask;
+	struct rlimit limits[RLIM_NLIMITS];
+};
+
+int aa_map_resource(int resource);
+int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
+		      struct rlimit *new_rlim);
+
+void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new);
+
+static inline void aa_free_rlimit_rules(struct aa_rlimit *rlims)
+{
+	/* NOP */
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_RESOURCE_H */

security/apparmor/include/sid.h

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor security identifier (sid) definitions
+ *
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_SID_H
+#define __AA_SID_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct aa_profile;
+
+u32 aa_alloc_sid(void);
+void aa_free_sid(u32 sid);
+
+#endif /* __AA_SID_H */

security/apparmor/ipc.c

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	audit_log_format(ab, " target=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.target);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_audit_ptrace - do auditing for ptrace
+ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @target: profile being traced (NOT NULL)
+ * @error: error condition
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error code
+ */
+static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			   struct aa_profile *target, int error)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+	sa.aad.op = OP_PTRACE;
+	sa.aad.target = target;
+	sa.aad.error = error;
+
+	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa,
+			audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
+ * @tracer_task: task who will do the tracing  (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracer: profile of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracee: task to be traced
+ * @mode: whether PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
+ */
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer,
+		  struct aa_profile *tracee, unsigned int mode)
+{
+	/* TODO: currently only based on capability, not extended ptrace
+	 *       rules,
+	 *       Test mode for PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
+	 */
+
+	if (unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
+		return 0;
+	/* log this capability request */
+	return aa_capable(tracer_task, tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_ptrace - do ptrace permission check and auditing
+ * @tracer: task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracee: task being traced (NOT NULL)
+ * @mode: ptrace mode either PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
+ */
+int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
+	      unsigned int mode)
+{
+	/*
+	 * tracer can ptrace tracee when
+	 * - tracer is unconfined ||
+	 *   - tracer is in complain mode
+	 *   - tracer has rules allowing it to trace tracee currently this is:
+	 *       - confined by the same profile ||
+	 *       - tracer profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+	 */
+
+	struct aa_profile *tracer_p;
+	/* cred released below */
+	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
+	int error = 0;
+	tracer_p = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+
+	if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) {
+		/* lcred released below */
+		const struct cred *lcred = get_task_cred(tracee);
+		struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_cred_profile(lcred);
+
+		error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
+		error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error);
+
+		put_cred(lcred);
+	}
+	put_cred(cred);
+
+	return error;
+}

security/apparmor/lib.c

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains basic common functions used in AppArmor
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_split_fqname - split a fqname into a profile and namespace name
+ * @fqname: a full qualified name in namespace profile format (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns_name: pointer to portion of the string containing the ns name (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: profile name or NULL if one is not specified
+ *
+ * Split a namespace name from a profile name (see policy.c for naming
+ * description).  If a portion of the name is missing it returns NULL for
+ * that portion.
+ *
+ * NOTE: may modify the @fqname string.  The pointers returned point
+ *       into the @fqname string.
+ */
+char *aa_split_fqname(char *fqname, char **ns_name)
+{
+	char *name = strim(fqname);
+
+	*ns_name = NULL;
+	if (name[0] == ':') {
+		char *split = strchr(&name[1], ':');
+		if (split) {
+			/* overwrite ':' with \0 */
+			*split = 0;
+			name = skip_spaces(split + 1);
+		} else
+			/* a ns name without a following profile is allowed */
+			name = NULL;
+		*ns_name = &name[1];
+	}
+	if (name && *name == 0)
+		name = NULL;
+
+	return name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_info_message - log a none profile related status message
+ * @str: message to log
+ */
+void aa_info_message(const char *str)
+{
+	if (audit_enabled) {
+		struct common_audit_data sa;
+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+		sa.aad.info = str;
+		aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL);
+	}
+	printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str);
+}
+
+/**
+ * kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc
+ * @size: size of allocation
+ *
+ * Return: allocated buffer or NULL if failed
+ *
+ * It is possible that policy being loaded from the user is larger than
+ * what can be allocated by kmalloc, in those cases fall back to vmalloc.
+ */
+void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
+{
+	void *buffer = NULL;
+
+	if (size == 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* do not attempt kmalloc if we need more than 16 pages at once */
+	if (size <= (16*PAGE_SIZE))
+		buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN);
+	if (!buffer) {
+		/* see kvfree for why size must be at least work_struct size
+		 * when allocated via vmalloc
+		 */
+		if (size < sizeof(struct work_struct))
+			size = sizeof(struct work_struct);
+		buffer = vmalloc(size);
+	}
+	return buffer;
+}
+
+/**
+ * do_vfree - workqueue routine for freeing vmalloced memory
+ * @work: data to be freed
+ *
+ * The work_struct is overlaid to the data being freed, as at the point
+ * the work is scheduled the data is no longer valid, be its freeing
+ * needs to be delayed until safe.
+ */
+static void do_vfree(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	vfree(work);
+}
+
+/**
+ * kvfree - free an allocation do by kvmalloc
+ * @buffer: buffer to free (MAYBE_NULL)
+ *
+ * Free a buffer allocated by kvmalloc
+ */
+void kvfree(void *buffer)
+{
+	if (is_vmalloc_addr(buffer)) {
+		/* Data is no longer valid so just use the allocated space
+		 * as the work_struct
+		 */
+		struct work_struct *work = (struct work_struct *) buffer;
+		INIT_WORK(work, do_vfree);
+		schedule_work(work);
+	} else
+		kfree(buffer);
+}

security/apparmor/lsm.c

@@ -0,0 +1,938 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/capability.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/procattr.h"
+
+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook functions
+ */
+
+/*
+ * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles
+ */
+static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+	aa_free_task_context(cred->security);
+	cred->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
+ */
+static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
+	if (!cxt)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cred->security = cxt;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block
+ */
+static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+				 gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	/* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
+	if (!cxt)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security);
+	new->security = cxt;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security;
+	struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security;
+
+	aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+					unsigned int mode)
+{
+	int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+	int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+}
+
+/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
+static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+			   kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	const struct cred *cred;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	cred = __task_cred(target);
+	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+
+	*effective = cred->cap_effective;
+	*inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
+	*permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
+
+	if (!unconfined(profile)) {
+		*effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
+		*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
+			    int cap, int audit)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
+	int error = cap_capable(task, cred, cap, audit);
+	if (!error) {
+		profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+		if (!unconfined(profile))
+			error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @path: path to check permission of  (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permissions mask
+ * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask,
+		       struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	profile = __aa_current_profile();
+	if (!unconfined(profile))
+		error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @dir: directory of the dentry  (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry to check  (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permissions mask
+ * @cond: conditional info for the permission request  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir,
+				  struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
+				  struct path_cond *cond)
+{
+	struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
+
+	return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry to check  (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permissions mask
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+				  struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
+{
+	struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
+	struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+				  dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+	};
+
+	return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @dir: directory that the dentry is in  (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry being rm'd  (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: requested permission mask
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir,
+			  struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct path_cond cond = { };
+
+	if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(inode))
+		return 0;
+
+	cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
+	cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
+
+	return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+/**
+ * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in  (NOT NULL)
+ * @dentry: dentry to create   (NOT NULL)
+ * @mask: request permission mask
+ * @mode: created file mode
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
+ */
+static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			      u32 mask, umode_t mode)
+{
+	struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
+
+	if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode))
+		return 0;
+
+	return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			       int mode)
+{
+	return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+				  S_IFDIR);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			       int mode, unsigned int dev)
+{
+	return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path)
+{
+	struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+				  path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+	};
+
+	if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
+		return 0;
+
+	return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE,
+			   &cond);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+				 const char *old_name)
+{
+	return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
+				  S_IFLNK);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+			      struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
+		return 0;
+
+	profile = aa_current_profile();
+	if (!unconfined(profile))
+		error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+				struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
+		return 0;
+
+	profile = aa_current_profile();
+	if (!unconfined(profile)) {
+		struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
+		struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
+		struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+					  old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+		};
+
+		error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0,
+				     MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE |
+				     AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE,
+				     &cond);
+		if (!error)
+			error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path,
+					     0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE |
+					     AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
+
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+			       mode_t mode)
+{
+	if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode))
+		return 0;
+
+	return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, mnt, dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+	struct path_cond cond =  { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+				   path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+	};
+
+	if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
+		return 0;
+
+	return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode))
+		return 0;
+
+	return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry,
+				      AA_MAY_META_READ);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
+	 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
+	 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
+	 * actually execute the image.
+	 */
+	if (current->in_execve) {
+		fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+	if (!unconfined(profile)) {
+		struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+		struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
+
+		error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0,
+				     aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
+		/* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
+		fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	/* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
+	file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!file->f_security)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+
+}
+
+static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
+
+	aa_free_file_context(cxt);
+}
+
+static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
+{
+	struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
+	struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred);
+	int error = 0;
+
+	BUG_ON(!fprofile);
+
+	if (!file->f_path.mnt ||
+	    !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
+		return 0;
+
+	profile = __aa_current_profile();
+
+	/* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred
+	 * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than
+	 * was granted.
+	 *
+	 * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file
+	 *       delegation from unconfined tasks
+	 */
+	if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) &&
+	    ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow)))
+		error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
+
+	if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
+		mask |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+	return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
+}
+
+static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+		       unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	int mask = 0;
+
+	if (!file || !file->f_security)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (prot & PROT_READ)
+		mask |= MAY_READ;
+	/*
+	 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
+	 * write back to the files
+	 */
+	if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
+		mask |= MAY_WRITE;
+	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+		mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
+
+	dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+	return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			      unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
+			      unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/* do DAC check */
+	rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	if (rc || addr_only)
+		return rc;
+
+	return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+				  unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
+{
+	return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
+			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+				char **value)
+{
+	int error = -ENOENT;
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	/* released below */
+	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
+	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
+		error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile),
+				       value);
+	else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0  && cxt->previous)
+		error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->previous),
+				       value);
+	else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
+		error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec),
+				       value);
+	else
+		error = -EINVAL;
+
+	put_cred(cred);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+				void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	char *command, *args = value;
+	size_t arg_size;
+	int error;
+
+	if (size == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
+	 * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
+	 * so that AppArmor can null terminate them
+	 */
+	if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
+		if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		args[size] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	/* task can only write its own attributes */
+	if (current != task)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	args = value;
+	args = strim(args);
+	command = strsep(&args, " ");
+	if (!args)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	args = skip_spaces(args);
+	if (!*args)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
+	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
+		if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
+			error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
+							 !AA_DO_TEST);
+		} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
+			error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
+							 AA_DO_TEST);
+		} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
+			error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
+							     !AA_DO_TEST);
+		} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
+			error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
+							     AA_DO_TEST);
+		} else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
+			error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
+		} else {
+			struct common_audit_data sa;
+			COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+			sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
+			sa.aad.info = name;
+			sa.aad.error = -EINVAL;
+			return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+					&sa, NULL);
+		}
+	} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
+		error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
+						     !AA_DO_TEST);
+	} else {
+		/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!error)
+		error = size;
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource,
+				   struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile();
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (!unconfined(profile))
+		error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
+	.name =				"apparmor",
+
+	.ptrace_access_check =		apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
+	.ptrace_traceme =		apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
+	.capget =			apparmor_capget,
+	.capable =			apparmor_capable,
+
+	.path_link =			apparmor_path_link,
+	.path_unlink =			apparmor_path_unlink,
+	.path_symlink =			apparmor_path_symlink,
+	.path_mkdir =			apparmor_path_mkdir,
+	.path_rmdir =			apparmor_path_rmdir,
+	.path_mknod =			apparmor_path_mknod,
+	.path_rename =			apparmor_path_rename,
+	.path_chmod =			apparmor_path_chmod,
+	.path_chown =			apparmor_path_chown,
+	.path_truncate =		apparmor_path_truncate,
+	.dentry_open =			apparmor_dentry_open,
+	.inode_getattr =                apparmor_inode_getattr,
+
+	.file_permission =		apparmor_file_permission,
+	.file_alloc_security =		apparmor_file_alloc_security,
+	.file_free_security =		apparmor_file_free_security,
+	.file_mmap =			apparmor_file_mmap,
+	.file_mprotect =		apparmor_file_mprotect,
+	.file_lock =			apparmor_file_lock,
+
+	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
+	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
+
+	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
+	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
+	.cred_prepare =			apparmor_cred_prepare,
+	.cred_transfer =		apparmor_cred_transfer,
+
+	.bprm_set_creds =		apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
+	.bprm_committing_creds =	apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
+	.bprm_committed_creds =		apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
+	.bprm_secureexec =		apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
+
+	.task_setrlimit =		apparmor_task_setrlimit,
+};
+
+/*
+ * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
+ */
+
+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+
+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aauint(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+
+static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_aalockpolicy(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+
+static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+
+static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
+#define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
+
+/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
+ * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
+ */
+
+/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
+enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
+module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
+		  &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Debug mode */
+int aa_g_debug;
+module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Audit mode */
+enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
+		  &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages.  This
+ * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
+ */
+int aa_g_audit_header = 1;
+module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
+		   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* lock out loading/removal of policy
+ * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
+ *       load policy, if lock_policy is set
+ */
+int aa_g_lock_policy;
+module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
+		   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Syscall logging mode */
+int aa_g_logsyscall;
+module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
+unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
+module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
+ * on the loaded policy is done.
+ */
+int aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
+module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool,
+		   S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+
+/* Boot time disable flag */
+static unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR);
+
+static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long enabled;
+	int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
+	if (!error)
+		apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
+
+/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
+static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	if (aa_g_lock_policy)
+		return -EACCES;
+	return param_set_bool(val, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return param_set_bool(val, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return param_set_uint(val, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
+}
+
+static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
+}
+
+static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	int i;
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!val)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
+			aa_g_audit = i;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return sprintf(buffer, "%s", profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
+}
+
+static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	int i;
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (!apparmor_enabled)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!val)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(val, profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
+			aa_g_profile_mode = i;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * AppArmor init functions
+ */
+
+/**
+ * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task.
+ *
+ * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
+ */
+static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
+{
+	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+
+	cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cxt)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
+	cred->security = cxt;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init apparmor_init(void)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
+		aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
+		apparmor_enabled = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
+	if (error) {
+		AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
+		goto alloc_out;
+	}
+
+	error = set_init_cxt();
+	if (error) {
+		AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
+		goto register_security_out;
+	}
+
+	error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
+	if (error) {
+		AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
+		goto register_security_out;
+	}
+
+	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
+	apparmor_initialized = 1;
+	if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
+		aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
+	else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
+		aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
+	else
+		aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
+
+	return error;
+
+register_security_out:
+	aa_free_root_ns();
+
+alloc_out:
+	aa_destroy_aafs();
+
+	apparmor_enabled = 0;
+	return error;
+
+}
+
+security_initcall(apparmor_init);

security/apparmor/match.c

@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor dfa based regular expression matching engine
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+
+/**
+ * unpack_table - unpack a dfa table (one of accept, default, base, next check)
+ * @blob: data to unpack (NOT NULL)
+ * @bsize: size of blob
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to table else NULL on failure
+ *
+ * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kmalloc)
+ */
+static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
+{
+	struct table_header *table = NULL;
+	struct table_header th;
+	size_t tsize;
+
+	if (bsize < sizeof(struct table_header))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* loaded td_id's start at 1, subtract 1 now to avoid doing
+	 * it every time we use td_id as an index
+	 */
+	th.td_id = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob)) - 1;
+	th.td_flags = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob + 2));
+	th.td_lolen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *) (blob + 8));
+	blob += sizeof(struct table_header);
+
+	if (!(th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA16 || th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA32 ||
+	      th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8))
+		goto out;
+
+	tsize = table_size(th.td_lolen, th.td_flags);
+	if (bsize < tsize)
+		goto out;
+
+	table = kvmalloc(tsize);
+	if (table) {
+		*table = th;
+		if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
+			UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
+				     u8, byte_to_byte);
+		else if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA16)
+			UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
+				     u16, be16_to_cpu);
+		else if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA32)
+			UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
+				     u32, be32_to_cpu);
+		else
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
+out:
+	/* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced
+	 * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus.
+	 */
+	if (is_vmalloc_addr(table))
+		vm_unmap_aliases();
+	return table;
+fail:
+	kvfree(table);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_dfa - verify that transitions and states in the tables are in bounds.
+ * @dfa: dfa to test  (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling what type of accept table are acceptable
+ *
+ * Assumes dfa has gone through the first pass verification done by unpacking
+ * NOTE: this does not valid accept table values
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code on failure to verify
+ */
+static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
+{
+	size_t i, state_count, trans_count;
+	int error = -EPROTO;
+
+	/* check that required tables exist */
+	if (!(dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF] &&
+	      dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE] &&
+	      dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT] && dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* accept.size == default.size == base.size */
+	state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+	if (ACCEPT1_FLAGS(flags)) {
+		if (!dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT])
+			goto out;
+		if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (ACCEPT2_FLAGS(flags)) {
+		if (!dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2])
+			goto out;
+		if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_lolen)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* next.size == chk.size */
+	trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen;
+	if (trans_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_lolen)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* if equivalence classes then its table size must be 256 */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC] &&
+	    dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_lolen != 256)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
+		for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
+			if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+				goto out;
+			/* TODO: do check that DEF state recursion terminates */
+			if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] + 255 >= trans_count) {
+				printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper "
+				       "bounds error\n");
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < trans_count; i++) {
+			if (NEXT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+				goto out;
+			if (CHECK_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
+				goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	error = 0;
+out:
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * dfa_free - free a dfa allocated by aa_dfa_unpack
+ * @dfa: the dfa to free  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * Requires: reference count to dfa == 0
+ */
+static void dfa_free(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
+{
+	if (dfa) {
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dfa->tables); i++) {
+			kvfree(dfa->tables[i]);
+			dfa->tables[i] = NULL;
+		}
+		kfree(dfa);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_free_kref - free aa_dfa by kref (called by aa_put_dfa)
+ * @kr: kref callback for freeing of a dfa  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct aa_dfa *dfa = container_of(kref, struct aa_dfa, count);
+	dfa_free(dfa);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_unpack - unpack the binary tables of a serialized dfa
+ * @blob: aligned serialized stream of data to unpack  (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: size of data to unpack
+ * @flags: flags controlling what type of accept tables are acceptable
+ *
+ * Unpack a dfa that has been serialized.  To find information on the dfa
+ * format look in Documentation/apparmor.txt
+ * Assumes the dfa @blob stream has been aligned on a 8 byte boundry
+ *
+ * Returns: an unpacked dfa ready for matching or ERR_PTR on failure
+ */
+struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	int hsize;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+	char *data = blob;
+	struct table_header *table = NULL;
+	struct aa_dfa *dfa = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_dfa), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!dfa)
+		goto fail;
+
+	kref_init(&dfa->count);
+
+	error = -EPROTO;
+
+	/* get dfa table set header */
+	if (size < sizeof(struct table_set_header))
+		goto fail;
+
+	if (ntohl(*(u32 *) data) != YYTH_MAGIC)
+		goto fail;
+
+	hsize = ntohl(*(u32 *) (data + 4));
+	if (size < hsize)
+		goto fail;
+
+	dfa->flags = ntohs(*(u16 *) (data + 12));
+	data += hsize;
+	size -= hsize;
+
+	while (size > 0) {
+		table = unpack_table(data, size);
+		if (!table)
+			goto fail;
+
+		switch (table->td_id) {
+		case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT:
+			if (!(table->td_flags & ACCEPT1_FLAGS(flags)))
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2:
+			if (!(table->td_flags & ACCEPT2_FLAGS(flags)))
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		case YYTD_ID_BASE:
+			if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA32)
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		case YYTD_ID_DEF:
+		case YYTD_ID_NXT:
+		case YYTD_ID_CHK:
+			if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA16)
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		case YYTD_ID_EC:
+			if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA8)
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		/* check for duplicate table entry */
+		if (dfa->tables[table->td_id])
+			goto fail;
+		dfa->tables[table->td_id] = table;
+		data += table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags);
+		size -= table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags);
+		table = NULL;
+	}
+
+	error = verify_dfa(dfa, flags);
+	if (error)
+		goto fail;
+
+	return dfa;
+
+fail:
+	kvfree(table);
+	dfa_free(dfa);
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_match_len - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the string of bytes to match against the dfa  (NOT NULL)
+ * @len: length of the string of bytes to match
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match_len will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * This function will happily match again the 0 byte and only finishes
+ * when @len input is consumed.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+			      const char *str, int len)
+{
+	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	unsigned int state = start, pos;
+
+	if (state == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		for (; len; len--) {
+			pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		for (; len; len--) {
+			pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++;
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+		}
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_next_state - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
+ * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_next_state will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
+ *
+ * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+			  const char *str)
+{
+	return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, start, str, strlen(str));
+}

security/apparmor/path.c

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor function for pathnames
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/mnt_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+
+/* modified from dcache.c */
+static int prepend(char **buffer, int buflen, const char *str, int namelen)
+{
+	buflen -= namelen;
+	if (buflen < 0)
+		return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	*buffer -= namelen;
+	memcpy(*buffer, str, namelen);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define CHROOT_NSCONNECT (PATH_CHROOT_REL | PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT)
+
+/**
+ * d_namespace_path - lookup a name associated with a given path
+ * @path: path to lookup  (NOT NULL)
+ * @buf:  buffer to store path to  (NOT NULL)
+ * @buflen: length of @buf
+ * @name: Returns - pointer for start of path name with in @buf (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling path lookup
+ *
+ * Handle path name lookup.
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if path lookup fails
+ *          When no error the path name is returned in @name which points to
+ *          to a position in @buf
+ */
+static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
+			    char **name, int flags)
+{
+	struct path root, tmp;
+	char *res;
+	int deleted, connected;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	/* Get the root we want to resolve too */
+	if (flags & PATH_CHROOT_REL) {
+		/* resolve paths relative to chroot */
+		read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
+		root = current->fs->root;
+		/* released below */
+		path_get(&root);
+		read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
+	} else {
+		/* resolve paths relative to namespace */
+		root.mnt = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->root;
+		root.dentry = root.mnt->mnt_root;
+		/* released below */
+		path_get(&root);
+	}
+
+	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
+	/* There is a race window between path lookup here and the
+	 * need to strip the " (deleted) string that __d_path applies
+	 * Detect the race and relookup the path
+	 *
+	 * The stripping of (deleted) is a hack that could be removed
+	 * with an updated __d_path
+	 */
+	do {
+		tmp = root;
+		deleted = d_unlinked(path->dentry);
+		res = __d_path(path, &tmp, buf, buflen);
+
+	} while (deleted != d_unlinked(path->dentry));
+	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
+
+	*name = res;
+	/* handle error conditions - and still allow a partial path to
+	 * be returned.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ERR(res)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(res);
+		*name = buf;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (deleted) {
+		/* On some filesystems, newly allocated dentries appear to the
+		 * security_path hooks as a deleted dentry except without an
+		 * inode allocated.
+		 *
+		 * Remove the appended deleted text and return as string for
+		 * normal mediation, or auditing.  The (deleted) string is
+		 * guaranteed to be added in this case, so just strip it.
+		 */
+		buf[buflen - 11] = 0;	/* - (len(" (deleted)") +\0) */
+
+		if (path->dentry->d_inode && !(flags & PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED)) {
+			error = -ENOENT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Determine if the path is connected to the expected root */
+	connected = tmp.dentry == root.dentry && tmp.mnt == root.mnt;
+
+	/* If the path is not connected,
+	 * check if it is a sysctl and handle specially else remove any
+	 * leading / that __d_path may have returned.
+	 * Unless
+	 *     specifically directed to connect the path,
+	 * OR
+	 *     if in a chroot and doing chroot relative paths and the path
+	 *     resolves to the namespace root (would be connected outside
+	 *     of chroot) and specifically directed to connect paths to
+	 *     namespace root.
+	 */
+	if (!connected) {
+		/* is the disconnect path a sysctl? */
+		if (tmp.dentry->d_sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC &&
+		    strncmp(*name, "/sys/", 5) == 0) {
+			/* TODO: convert over to using a per namespace
+			 * control instead of hard coded /proc
+			 */
+			error = prepend(name, *name - buf, "/proc", 5);
+		} else if (!(flags & PATH_CONNECT_PATH) &&
+			   !(((flags & CHROOT_NSCONNECT) == CHROOT_NSCONNECT) &&
+			     (tmp.mnt == current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->root &&
+			      tmp.dentry == tmp.mnt->mnt_root))) {
+			/* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting
+			 * with '/'
+			 */
+			error = -ESTALE;
+			if (*res == '/')
+				*name = res + 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	path_put(&root);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * get_name_to_buffer - get the pathname to a buffer ensure dir / is appended
+ * @path: path to get name for  (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling path lookup
+ * @buffer: buffer to put name in  (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: size of buffer
+ * @name: Returns - contains position of path name in @buffer (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error on failure
+ */
+static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
+			      int size, char **name)
+{
+	int adjust = (flags & PATH_IS_DIR) ? 1 : 0;
+	int error = d_namespace_path(path, buffer, size - adjust, name, flags);
+
+	if (!error && (flags & PATH_IS_DIR) && (*name)[1] != '\0')
+		/*
+		 * Append "/" to the pathname.  The root directory is a special
+		 * case; it already ends in slash.
+		 */
+		strcpy(&buffer[size - 2], "/");
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_name - compute the pathname of a file
+ * @path: path the file  (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags controlling path name generation
+ * @buffer: buffer that aa_get_name() allocated  (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: Returns - the generated path name if !error (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * @name is a pointer to the beginning of the pathname (which usually differs
+ * from the beginning of the buffer), or NULL.  If there is an error @name
+ * may contain a partial or invalid name that can be used for audit purposes,
+ * but it can not be used for mediation.
+ *
+ * We need PATH_IS_DIR to indicate whether the file is a directory or not
+ * because the file may not yet exist, and so we cannot check the inode's
+ * file type.
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if could retrieve name
+ */
+int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name)
+{
+	char *buf, *str = NULL;
+	int size = 256;
+	int error;
+
+	*name = NULL;
+	*buffer = NULL;
+	for (;;) {
+		/* freed by caller */
+		buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!buf)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		error = get_name_to_buffer(path, flags, buf, size, &str);
+		if (error != -ENAMETOOLONG)
+			break;
+
+		kfree(buf);
+		size <<= 1;
+		if (size > aa_g_path_max)
+			return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+	}
+	*buffer = buf;
+	*name = str;
+
+	return error;
+}

security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c

@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor functions for unpacking policy loaded from
+ * userspace.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * AppArmor uses a serialized binary format for loading policy.
+ * To find policy format documentation look in Documentation/apparmor.txt
+ * All policy is validated before it is used.
+ */
+
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
+#include "include/sid.h"
+
+/*
+ * The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the
+ * actual data.  The interface has the notion of a a named entry
+ * which has a name (AA_NAME typecode followed by name string) followed by
+ * the entries typecode and data.  Named types allow for optional
+ * elements and extensions to be added and tested for without breaking
+ * backwards compatibility.
+ */
+
+enum aa_code {
+	AA_U8,
+	AA_U16,
+	AA_U32,
+	AA_U64,
+	AA_NAME,		/* same as string except it is items name */
+	AA_STRING,
+	AA_BLOB,
+	AA_STRUCT,
+	AA_STRUCTEND,
+	AA_LIST,
+	AA_LISTEND,
+	AA_ARRAY,
+	AA_ARRAYEND,
+};
+
+/*
+ * aa_ext is the read of the buffer containing the serialized profile.  The
+ * data is copied into a kernel buffer in apparmorfs and then handed off to
+ * the unpack routines.
+ */
+struct aa_ext {
+	void *start;
+	void *end;
+	void *pos;		/* pointer to current position in the buffer */
+	u32 version;
+};
+
+/* audit callback for unpack fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+	if (sa->aad.iface.target) {
+		struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad.iface.target;
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name->base.hname);
+	}
+	if (sa->aad.iface.pos)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", sa->aad.iface.pos);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_iface - do audit message for policy unpacking/load/replace/remove
+ * @new: profile if it has been allocated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @name: name of the profile being manipulated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @info: any extra info about the failure (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @e: buffer position info (NOT NULL)
+ * @error: error code
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error
+ */
+static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name,
+		       const char *info, struct aa_ext *e, int error)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
+	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+	sa.aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
+	sa.aad.iface.target = new;
+	sa.aad.name = name;
+	sa.aad.info = info;
+	sa.aad.error = error;
+
+	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa,
+			audit_cb);
+}
+
+/* test if read will be in packed data bounds */
+static bool inbounds(struct aa_ext *e, size_t size)
+{
+	return (size <= e->end - e->pos);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_u16_chunck - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk
+ * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL)
+ * @chunk: start address for chunk of data (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: the size of chunk found with the read head at the end of the chunk.
+ */
+static size_t unpack_u16_chunk(struct aa_ext *e, char **chunk)
+{
+	size_t size = 0;
+
+	if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
+		return 0;
+	size = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
+	e->pos += sizeof(u16);
+	if (!inbounds(e, size))
+		return 0;
+	*chunk = e->pos;
+	e->pos += size;
+	return size;
+}
+
+/* unpack control byte */
+static bool unpack_X(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code)
+{
+	if (!inbounds(e, 1))
+		return 0;
+	if (*(u8 *) e->pos != code)
+		return 0;
+	e->pos++;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * unpack_nameX - check is the next element is of type X with a name of @name
+ * @e: serialized data extent information  (NOT NULL)
+ * @code: type code
+ * @name: name to match to the serialized element.  (MAYBE NULL)
+ *
+ * check that the next serialized data element is of type X and has a tag
+ * name @name.  If @name is specified then there must be a matching
+ * name element in the stream.  If @name is NULL any name element will be
+ * skipped and only the typecode will be tested.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success (both type code and name tests match) and the read
+ * head is advanced past the headers
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if either match fails, the read head does not move
+ */
+static bool unpack_nameX(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code, const char *name)
+{
+	/*
+	 * May need to reset pos if name or type doesn't match
+	 */
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+	/*
+	 * Check for presence of a tagname, and if present name size
+	 * AA_NAME tag value is a u16.
+	 */
+	if (unpack_X(e, AA_NAME)) {
+		char *tag = NULL;
+		size_t size = unpack_u16_chunk(e, &tag);
+		/* if a name is specified it must match. otherwise skip tag */
+		if (name && (!size || strcmp(name, tag)))
+			goto fail;
+	} else if (name) {
+		/* if a name is specified and there is no name tag fail */
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* now check if type code matches */
+	if (unpack_X(e, code))
+		return 1;
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
+{
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
+		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u32)))
+			return 0;
+		if (data)
+			*data = le32_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u32 *) e->pos));
+		e->pos += sizeof(u32);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool unpack_u64(struct aa_ext *e, u64 *data, const char *name)
+{
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U64, name)) {
+		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u64)))
+			return 0;
+		if (data)
+			*data = le64_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u64 *) e->pos));
+		e->pos += sizeof(u64);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static size_t unpack_array(struct aa_ext *e, const char *name)
+{
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAY, name)) {
+		int size;
+		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
+			return 0;
+		size = (int)le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
+		e->pos += sizeof(u16);
+		return size;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static size_t unpack_blob(struct aa_ext *e, char **blob, const char *name)
+{
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_BLOB, name)) {
+		u32 size;
+		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u32)))
+			return 0;
+		size = le32_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u32 *) e->pos));
+		e->pos += sizeof(u32);
+		if (inbounds(e, (size_t) size)) {
+			*blob = e->pos;
+			e->pos += size;
+			return size;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int unpack_str(struct aa_ext *e, const char **string, const char *name)
+{
+	char *src_str;
+	size_t size = 0;
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+	*string = NULL;
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRING, name)) {
+		size = unpack_u16_chunk(e, &src_str);
+		if (size) {
+			/* strings are null terminated, length is size - 1 */
+			if (src_str[size - 1] != 0)
+				goto fail;
+			*string = src_str;
+		}
+	}
+	return size;
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int unpack_strdup(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name)
+{
+	const char *tmp;
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+	int res = unpack_str(e, &tmp, name);
+	*string = NULL;
+
+	if (!res)
+		return 0;
+
+	*string = kmemdup(tmp, res, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!*string) {
+		e->pos = pos;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return res;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_accept - verify the accept tables of a dfa
+ * @dfa: dfa to verify accept tables of (NOT NULL)
+ * @flags: flags governing dfa
+ *
+ * Returns: 1 if valid accept tables else 0 if error
+ */
+static bool verify_accept(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	/* verify accept permissions */
+	for (i = 0; i < dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; i++) {
+		int mode = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[i];
+
+		if (mode & ~DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK)
+			return 0;
+
+		if (ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[i] & ~DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK)
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * unpack_dfa - unpack a file rule dfa
+ * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * returns dfa or ERR_PTR or NULL if no dfa
+ */
+static struct aa_dfa *unpack_dfa(struct aa_ext *e)
+{
+	char *blob = NULL;
+	size_t size;
+	struct aa_dfa *dfa = NULL;
+
+	size = unpack_blob(e, &blob, "aadfa");
+	if (size) {
+		/*
+		 * The dfa is aligned with in the blob to 8 bytes
+		 * from the beginning of the stream.
+		 */
+		size_t sz = blob - (char *)e->start;
+		size_t pad = ALIGN(sz, 8) - sz;
+		int flags = TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) |
+			TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32);
+
+
+		if (aa_g_paranoid_load)
+			flags |= DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES;
+
+		dfa = aa_dfa_unpack(blob + pad, size - pad, flags);
+
+		if (IS_ERR(dfa))
+			return dfa;
+
+		if (!verify_accept(dfa, flags))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
+	return dfa;
+
+fail:
+	aa_put_dfa(dfa);
+	return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO);
+}
+
+/**
+ * unpack_trans_table - unpack a profile transition table
+ * @e: serialized data extent information  (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: profile to add the accept table to (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: 1 if table succesfully unpacked
+ */
+static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	/* exec table is optional */
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xtable")) {
+		int i, size;
+
+		size = unpack_array(e, NULL);
+		/* currently 4 exec bits and entries 0-3 are reserved iupcx */
+		if (size > 16 - 4)
+			goto fail;
+		profile->file.trans.table = kzalloc(sizeof(char *) * size,
+						    GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!profile->file.trans.table)
+			goto fail;
+
+		profile->file.trans.size = size;
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+			char *str;
+			int c, j, size = unpack_strdup(e, &str, NULL);
+			/* unpack_strdup verifies that the last character is
+			 * null termination byte.
+			 */
+			if (!size)
+				goto fail;
+			profile->file.trans.table[i] = str;
+			/* verify that name doesn't start with space */
+			if (isspace(*str))
+				goto fail;
+
+			/* count internal #  of internal \0 */
+			for (c = j = 0; j < size - 2; j++) {
+				if (!str[j])
+					c++;
+			}
+			if (*str == ':') {
+				/* beginning with : requires an embedded \0,
+				 * verify that exactly 1 internal \0 exists
+				 * trailing \0 already verified by unpack_strdup
+				 */
+				if (c != 1)
+					goto fail;
+				/* first character after : must be valid */
+				if (!str[1])
+					goto fail;
+			} else if (c)
+				/* fail - all other cases with embedded \0 */
+				goto fail;
+		}
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	return 1;
+
+fail:
+	aa_free_domain_entries(&profile->file.trans);
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	void *pos = e->pos;
+
+	/* rlimits are optional */
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "rlimits")) {
+		int i, size;
+		u32 tmp = 0;
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		profile->rlimits.mask = tmp;
+
+		size = unpack_array(e, NULL);
+		if (size > RLIM_NLIMITS)
+			goto fail;
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+			u64 tmp = 0;
+			int a = aa_map_resource(i);
+			if (!unpack_u64(e, &tmp, NULL))
+				goto fail;
+			profile->rlimits.limits[a].rlim_max = tmp;
+		}
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	return 1;
+
+fail:
+	e->pos = pos;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * unpack_profile - unpack a serialized profile
+ * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * NOTE: unpack profile sets audit struct if there is a failure
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+	const char *name = NULL;
+	int error = -EPROTO;
+	kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
+	u32 tmp;
+
+	/* check that we have the right struct being passed */
+	if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "profile"))
+		goto fail;
+	if (!unpack_str(e, &name, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+
+	profile = aa_alloc_profile(name);
+	if (!profile)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	/* profile renaming is optional */
+	(void) unpack_str(e, &profile->rename, "rename");
+
+	/* xmatch is optional and may be NULL */
+	profile->xmatch = unpack_dfa(e);
+	if (IS_ERR(profile->xmatch)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(profile->xmatch);
+		profile->xmatch = NULL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	/* xmatch_len is not optional if xmatch is set */
+	if (profile->xmatch) {
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		profile->xmatch_len = tmp;
+	}
+
+	/* per profile debug flags (complain, audit) */
+	if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags"))
+		goto fail;
+	if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (tmp)
+		profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
+	if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (tmp)
+		profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
+	if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (tmp)
+		profile->audit = AUDIT_ALL;
+
+	if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+
+	/* path_flags is optional */
+	if (unpack_u32(e, &profile->path_flags, "path_flags"))
+		profile->path_flags |= profile->flags & PFLAG_MEDIATE_DELETED;
+	else
+		/* set a default value if path_flags field is not present */
+		profile->path_flags = PFLAG_MEDIATE_DELETED;
+
+	if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[0]), NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[0]), NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.quiet.cap[0]), NULL))
+		goto fail;
+	if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmpcap.cap[0], NULL))
+		goto fail;
+
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "caps64")) {
+		/* optional upper half of 64 bit caps */
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[1]), NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[1]), NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.quiet.cap[1]), NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(tmpcap.cap[1]), NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "capsx")) {
+		/* optional extended caps mediation mask */
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[0]), NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[1]), NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
+		goto fail;
+
+	/* get file rules */
+	profile->file.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
+	if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(profile->file.dfa);
+		profile->file.dfa = NULL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->file.start, "dfa_start"))
+		/* default start state */
+		profile->file.start = DFA_START;
+
+	if (!unpack_trans_table(e, profile))
+		goto fail;
+
+	if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+		goto fail;
+
+	return profile;
+
+fail:
+	if (profile)
+		name = NULL;
+	else if (!name)
+		name = "unknown";
+	audit_iface(profile, name, "failed to unpack profile", e, error);
+	aa_put_profile(profile);
+
+	return ERR_PTR(error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_head - unpack serialized stream header
+ * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: Returns - namespace if one is specified else NULL (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: error or 0 if header is good
+ */
+static int verify_header(struct aa_ext *e, const char **ns)
+{
+	int error = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
+	/* get the interface version */
+	if (!unpack_u32(e, &e->version, "version")) {
+		audit_iface(NULL, NULL, "invalid profile format", e, error);
+		return error;
+	}
+
+	/* check that the interface version is currently supported */
+	if (e->version != 5) {
+		audit_iface(NULL, NULL, "unsupported interface version", e,
+			    error);
+		return error;
+	}
+
+	/* read the namespace if present */
+	if (!unpack_str(e, ns, "namespace"))
+		*ns = NULL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool verify_xindex(int xindex, int table_size)
+{
+	int index, xtype;
+	xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
+	index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
+	if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE && index > table_size)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* verify dfa xindexes are in range of transition tables */
+static bool verify_dfa_xindex(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int table_size)
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; i++) {
+		if (!verify_xindex(dfa_user_xindex(dfa, i), table_size))
+			return 0;
+		if (!verify_xindex(dfa_other_xindex(dfa, i), table_size))
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * verify_profile - Do post unpack analysis to verify profile consistency
+ * @profile: profile to verify (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if passes verification else error
+ */
+static int verify_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	if (aa_g_paranoid_load) {
+		if (profile->file.dfa &&
+		    !verify_dfa_xindex(profile->file.dfa,
+				       profile->file.trans.size)) {
+			audit_iface(profile, NULL, "Invalid named transition",
+				    NULL, -EPROTO);
+			return -EPROTO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_unpack - unpack packed binary profile data loaded from user space
+ * @udata: user data copied to kmem  (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: the size of the user data
+ * @ns: Returns namespace profile is in if specified else NULL (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Unpack user data and return refcounted allocated profile or ERR_PTR
+ *
+ * Returns: profile else error pointer if fails to unpack
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_unpack(void *udata, size_t size, const char **ns)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+	int error;
+	struct aa_ext e = {
+		.start = udata,
+		.end = udata + size,
+		.pos = udata,
+	};
+
+	error = verify_header(&e, ns);
+	if (error)
+		return ERR_PTR(error);
+
+	profile = unpack_profile(&e);
+	if (IS_ERR(profile))
+		return profile;
+
+	error = verify_profile(profile);
+	if (error) {
+		aa_put_profile(profile);
+		profile = ERR_PTR(error);
+	}
+
+	/* return refcount */
+	return profile;
+}

security/apparmor/procattr.c

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor /proc/<pid>/attr/ interface functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/domain.h"
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile
+ * @profile: the profile to print profile info about  (NOT NULL)
+ * @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: length of @string on success else error on failure
+ *
+ * Requires: profile != NULL
+ *
+ * Creates a string containing the namespace_name://profile_name for
+ * @profile.
+ *
+ * Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
+ */
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *profile, char **string)
+{
+	char *str;
+	int len = 0, mode_len = 0, ns_len = 0, name_len;
+	const char *mode_str = profile_mode_names[profile->mode];
+	const char *ns_name = NULL;
+	struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+	struct aa_namespace *current_ns = __aa_current_profile()->ns;
+	char *s;
+
+	if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	ns_name = aa_ns_name(current_ns, ns);
+	ns_len = strlen(ns_name);
+
+	/* if the visible ns_name is > 0 increase size for : :// seperator */
+	if (ns_len)
+		ns_len += 4;
+
+	/* unconfined profiles don't have a mode string appended */
+	if (!unconfined(profile))
+		mode_len = strlen(mode_str) + 3;	/* + 3 for _() */
+
+	name_len = strlen(profile->base.hname);
+	len = mode_len + ns_len + name_len + 1;	    /* + 1 for \n */
+	s = str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);	    /* + 1 \0 */
+	if (!str)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (ns_len) {
+		/* skip over prefix current_ns->base.hname and separating // */
+		sprintf(s, ":%s://", ns_name);
+		s += ns_len;
+	}
+	if (unconfined(profile))
+		/* mode string not being appended */
+		sprintf(s, "%s\n", profile->base.hname);
+	else
+		sprintf(s, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname, mode_str);
+	*string = str;
+
+	/* NOTE: len does not include \0 of string, not saved as part of file */
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * split_token_from_name - separate a string of form  <token>^<name>
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @args: string to parse  (NOT NULL)
+ * @token: stores returned parsed token value  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: start position of name after token else NULL on failure
+ */
+static char *split_token_from_name(int op, char *args, u64 * token)
+{
+	char *name;
+
+	*token = simple_strtoull(args, &name, 16);
+	if ((name == args) || *name != '^') {
+		AA_ERROR("%s: Invalid input '%s'", op_table[op], args);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	name++;			/* skip ^ */
+	if (!*name)
+		name = NULL;
+	return name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_setprocattr_chagnehat - handle procattr interface to change_hat
+ * @args: args received from writing to /proc/<pid>/attr/current (NOT NULL)
+ * @size: size of the args
+ * @test: true if this is a test of change_hat permissions
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error code if change_hat fails
+ */
+int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int test)
+{
+	char *hat;
+	u64 token;
+	const char *hats[16];		/* current hard limit on # of names */
+	int count = 0;
+
+	hat = split_token_from_name(OP_CHANGE_HAT, args, &token);
+	if (IS_ERR(hat))
+		return PTR_ERR(hat);
+
+	if (!hat && !token) {
+		AA_ERROR("change_hat: Invalid input, NULL hat and NULL magic");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (hat) {
+		/* set up hat name vector, args guaranteed null terminated
+		 * at args[size] by setprocattr.
+		 *
+		 * If there are multiple hat names in the buffer each is
+		 * separated by a \0.  Ie. userspace writes them pre tokenized
+		 */
+		char *end = args + size;
+		for (count = 0; (hat < end) && count < 16; ++count) {
+			char *next = hat + strlen(hat) + 1;
+			hats[count] = hat;
+			hat = next;
+		}
+	}
+
+	AA_DEBUG("%s: Magic 0x%llx Hat '%s'\n",
+		 __func__, token, hat ? hat : NULL);
+
+	return aa_change_hat(hats, count, token, test);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_setprocattr_changeprofile - handle procattr interface to changeprofile
+ * @fqname: args received from writting to /proc/<pid>/attr/current (NOT NULL)
+ * @onexec: true if change_profile should be delayed until exec
+ * @test: true if this is a test of change_profile permissions
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error code if change_profile fails
+ */
+int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test)
+{
+	char *name, *ns_name;
+
+	name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name);
+	return aa_change_profile(ns_name, name, onexec, test);
+}
+
+int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname)
+{
+	/* TODO: add ipc permission querying */
+	return -ENOTSUPP;
+}

security/apparmor/resource.c

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor resource mediation and attachment
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/resource.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/*
+ * Table of rlimit names: we generate it from resource.h.
+ */
+#include "rlim_names.h"
+
+/* audit callback for resource specific fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu",
+			 rlim_names[sa->aad.rlim.rlim], sa->aad.rlim.max);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_resource - audit setting resource limit
+ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @resoure: rlimit being auditing
+ * @value: value being set
+ * @error: error value
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or sa->error else other error code on failure
+ */
+static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
+			  unsigned long value, int error)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data sa;
+
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+	sa.aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT,
+	sa.aad.rlim.rlim = resource;
+	sa.aad.rlim.max = value;
+	sa.aad.error = error;
+	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa,
+			audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_map_resouce - map compiled policy resource to internal #
+ * @resource: flattened policy resource number
+ *
+ * Returns: resource # for the current architecture.
+ *
+ * rlimit resource can vary based on architecture, map the compiled policy
+ * resource # to the internal representation for the architecture.
+ */
+int aa_map_resource(int resource)
+{
+	return rlim_map[resource];
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_task_setrlimit - test permission to set an rlimit
+ * @profile - profile confining the task  (NOT NULL)
+ * @resource - the resource being set
+ * @new_rlim - the new resource limit  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Control raising the processes hard limit.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 or error code if setting resource failed
+ */
+int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
+		      struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
+	    new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max)
+
+		error = audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max,
+			-EACCES);
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_transition_rlimits - apply new profile rlimits
+ * @old: old profile on task  (NOT NULL)
+ * @new: new profile with rlimits to apply  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new)
+{
+	unsigned int mask = 0;
+	struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
+	int i;
+
+	/* for any rlimits the profile controlled reset the soft limit
+	 * to the less of the tasks hard limit and the init tasks soft limit
+	 */
+	if (old->rlimits.mask) {
+		for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++, mask <<= 1) {
+			if (old->rlimits.mask & mask) {
+				rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
+				initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
+				rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,
+						     initrlim->rlim_cur);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* set any new hard limits as dictated by the new profile */
+	if (!new->rlimits.mask)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++, mask <<= 1) {
+		if (!(new->rlimits.mask & mask))
+			continue;
+
+		rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
+		rlim->rlim_max = min(rlim->rlim_max,
+				     new->rlimits.limits[i].rlim_max);
+		/* soft limit should not exceed hard limit */
+		rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_cur, rlim->rlim_max);
+	}
+}

security/apparmor/sid.c

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor security identifier (sid) manipulation fns
+ *
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ *
+ * AppArmor allocates a unique sid for every profile loaded.  If a profile
+ * is replaced it receives the sid of the profile it is replacing.
+ *
+ * The sid value of 0 is invalid.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+
+#include "include/sid.h"
+
+/* global counter from which sids are allocated */
+static u32 global_sid;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sid_lock);
+
+/* TODO FIXME: add sid to profile mapping, and sid recycling */
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_sid - allocate a new sid for a profile
+ */
+u32 aa_alloc_sid(void)
+{
+	u32 sid;
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO FIXME: sid recycling - part of profile mapping table
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&sid_lock);
+	sid = (++global_sid);
+	spin_unlock(&sid_lock);
+	return sid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_sid - free a sid
+ * @sid: sid to free
+ */
+void aa_free_sid(u32 sid)
+{
+	;			/* NOP ATM */
+}

security/capability.c

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static int cap_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+static int cap_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -268,8 +268,7 @@ static int cap_path_rename(struct path *old_path, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
-			     unsigned int time_attrs)
+static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path)
 {
 	return 0;
 }

security/inode.c

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 			 int mode, dev_t dev)
 {
 	struct inode *inode;
-	int error = -EPERM;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (dentry->d_inode)
 		return -EEXIST;
@@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ static int create_by_name(const char *name, mode_t mode,
 			error = mkdir(parent->d_inode, *dentry, mode);
 		else
 			error = create(parent->d_inode, *dentry, mode);
+		if (error)
+			dput(*dentry);
 	} else
 		error = PTR_ERR(*dentry);
 	mutex_unlock(&parent->d_inode->i_mutex);

security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c

@@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp,
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations ima_htable_violations_ops = {
-	.read = ima_show_htable_violations
+	.read = ima_show_htable_violations,
+	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp,
@@ -57,7 +58,8 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp,
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = {
-	.read = ima_show_measurements_count
+	.read = ima_show_measurements_count,
+	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 /* returns pointer to hlist_node */
@@ -319,7 +321,8 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
 	.open = ima_open_policy,
 	.write = ima_write_policy,
-	.release = ima_release_policy
+	.release = ima_release_policy,
+	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 int __init ima_fs_init(void)

security/keys/internal.h

@@ -114,6 +114,10 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 				    const void *description,
 				    key_match_func_t match);
 
+extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
+					    const void *description,
+					    key_match_func_t match,
+					    const struct cred *cred);
 extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 					 const void *description,
 					 key_match_func_t match,
@@ -134,6 +138,7 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 					struct key *dest_keyring,
 					unsigned long flags);
 
+extern int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target);
 extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
 				 key_perm_t perm);
 #define KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE	0x01

security/keys/keyctl.c

@@ -505,13 +505,11 @@ okay:
 
 	ret = snprintf(tmpbuf, PAGE_SIZE - 1,
 		       "%s;%d;%d;%08x;%s",
-		       key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->type->name,
-		       key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->uid,
-		       key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->gid,
-		       key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->perm,
-		       key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->description ?
-		       key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->description : ""
-		       );
+		       key->type->name,
+		       key->uid,
+		       key->gid,
+		       key->perm,
+		       key->description ?: "");
 
 	/* include a NUL char at the end of the data */
 	if (ret > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
@@ -1091,7 +1089,7 @@ error:
 long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
 {
 	struct timespec now;
-	struct key *key;
+	struct key *key, *instkey;
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
 	time_t expiry;
 	long ret;
@@ -1099,10 +1097,25 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
 	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
 				  KEY_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+		/* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
+		 * if we have the authorisation token handy */
+		if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) {
+			instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id);
+			if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
+				key_put(instkey);
+				key_ref = lookup_user_key(id,
+							  KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+							  0);
+				if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+					goto okay;
+			}
+		}
+
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
 	}
 
+okay:
 	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 
 	/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent races */

security/keys/proc.c

@@ -184,20 +184,36 @@ static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
 
 static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct rb_node *_p = v;
 	struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
 	struct timespec now;
 	unsigned long timo;
+	key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
 	char xbuf[12];
 	int rc;
 
+	key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
+
+	/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can
+	 * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it
+	 */
+	if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
+		skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
+						      lookup_user_key_possessed,
+						      cred);
+		if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
+			key_ref_put(skey_ref);
+			key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
+		}
+	}
+
 	/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key (assuming
 	 * non-possession)
 	 * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
 	 *   access to __current_cred() safe
 	 */
-	rc = key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, 0), current_cred(),
-				 KEY_VIEW);
+	rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, KEY_VIEW);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return 0;
 

security/keys/process_keys.c

@@ -309,22 +309,19 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
- * search the process keyrings for the first matching key
+ * search only my process keyrings for the first matching key
  * - we use the supplied match function to see if the description (or other
  *   feature of interest) matches
  * - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key
  * - we return -ENOKEY if we found only negative matching keys
  */
-key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
-				  const void *description,
-				  key_match_func_t match,
-				  const struct cred *cred)
+key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
+				     const void *description,
+				     key_match_func_t match,
+				     const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	struct request_key_auth *rka;
 	key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
 
-	might_sleep();
-
 	/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were
 	 * searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;
 	 * otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if
@@ -424,6 +421,36 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 		}
 	}
 
+	/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
+	key_ref = ret ? ret : err;
+
+found:
+	return key_ref;
+}
+
+/*****************************************************************************/
+/*
+ * search the process keyrings for the first matching key
+ * - we use the supplied match function to see if the description (or other
+ *   feature of interest) matches
+ * - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key
+ * - we return -ENOKEY if we found only negative matching keys
+ */
+key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
+				  const void *description,
+				  key_match_func_t match,
+				  const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
+	key_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err;
+
+	might_sleep();
+
+	key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match, cred);
+	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
+		goto found;
+	err = key_ref;
+
 	/* if this process has an instantiation authorisation key, then we also
 	 * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there
 	 * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
@@ -446,24 +473,19 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 			if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 				goto found;
 
-			switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
-			case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
-				if (ret)
-					break;
-			case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
-				ret = key_ref;
-				break;
-			default:
-				err = key_ref;
-				break;
-			}
+			ret = key_ref;
 		} else {
 			up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 		}
 	}
 
 	/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
-	key_ref = ret ? ret : err;
+	if (err == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) || ret == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY))
+		key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+	else if (err == ERR_PTR(-EACCES))
+		key_ref = ret;
+	else
+		key_ref = err;
 
 found:
 	return key_ref;
@@ -474,7 +496,7 @@ found:
 /*
  * see if the key we're looking at is the target key
  */
-static int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
+int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
 {
 	return key == target;
 

security/keys/request_key.c

@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons,
 	prkey = 0;
 	if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring)
 		prkey = cred->tgcred->process_keyring->serial;
+	sprintf(keyring_str[1], "%d", prkey);
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	session = rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring);

security/security.c

@@ -417,12 +417,11 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 					 new_dentry);
 }
 
-int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
-			   unsigned int time_attrs)
+int security_path_truncate(struct path *path)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_truncate(path, length, time_attrs);
+	return security_ops->path_truncate(path);
 }
 
 int security_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,

security/selinux/avc.c

@@ -288,7 +288,6 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
 	if (!node)
 		goto out;
 
-	INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rhead);
 	INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
 
@@ -489,9 +488,29 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
 	u32 denied, audited;
 	denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
-	if (denied)
+	if (denied) {
 		audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
-	else if (result)
+		/*
+		 * a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny is TRICKY!  Setting a bit in
+		 * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
+		 * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
+		 * permission.  Take notice that this is unrelated to the
+		 * actual permissions that were denied.  As an example lets
+		 * assume:
+		 *
+		 * denied == READ
+		 * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
+		 * selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
+		 *
+		 * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
+		 * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
+		 * ACCESS
+		 */
+		if (a &&
+		    a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny &&
+		    !(a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
+			audited = 0;
+	} else if (result)
 		audited = denied = requested;
 	else
 		audited = requested & avd->auditallow;

security/selinux/hooks.c

@@ -87,9 +87,6 @@
 #include "netlabel.h"
 #include "audit.h"
 
-#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
-#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
-
 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
 
 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
@@ -188,7 +185,7 @@ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
  */
 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
 {
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 
 	return tsec->sid;
 }
@@ -279,32 +276,6 @@ static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 	kfree(sbsec);
 }
 
-static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
-{
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
-	sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
-	if (!sksec)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-	sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-	sk->sk_security = sksec;
-
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
-{
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-
-	sk->sk_security = NULL;
-	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
-	kfree(sksec);
-}
-
 /* The security server must be initialized before
    any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
 extern int ss_initialized;
@@ -1584,8 +1555,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 		      struct dentry *dentry,
 		      u16 tclass)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	u32 sid, newsid;
@@ -1806,27 +1776,9 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
 {
 	u32 av = file_to_av(file);
 
-	if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
-		mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
-		/*
-		 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
-		 */
-		if (S_ISREG(mode))
-			av |= FILE__OPEN;
-		else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
-			av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
-		else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
-			av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
-		else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
-			av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
-		else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
-			av |= DIR__OPEN;
-		else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
-			av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
-		else
-			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
-				"unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
-	}
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
+		av |= FILE__OPEN;
+
 	return av;
 }
 
@@ -2183,8 +2135,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 	u32 sid, osid;
 	int atsecure = 0;
 
@@ -2559,8 +2510,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 				       char **name, void **value,
 				       size_t *len)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
 	struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 	u32 sid, newsid, clen;
@@ -2676,14 +2626,26 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	u32 perms;
+	bool from_access;
 
-	if (!mask) {
-		/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
+	from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
+	mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
+
+	/* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
+	if (!mask)
 		return 0;
-	}
 
-	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
-			      file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
+
+	if (from_access)
+		ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
+
+	perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
+
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
@@ -3671,71 +3633,54 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 }
 
 /* socket security operations */
-static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
-			   u32 perms)
+
+static u32 socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec)
 {
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	return tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
+}
+
+static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	u32 sid;
-	int err = 0;
+	u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
 
-	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-
-	if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
-		goto out;
-	sid = task_sid(task);
+	if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
+		return 0;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-	ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
-	err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+	ad.u.net.sk = sk;
 
-out:
-	return err;
+	return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
 				 int protocol, int kern)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
-	u32 sid, newsid;
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	u32 newsid;
 	u16 secclass;
-	int err = 0;
 
 	if (kern)
-		goto out;
-
-	sid = tsec->sid;
-	newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
+		return 0;
 
+	newsid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
 	secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
-	err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
-
-out:
-	return err;
+	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 				      int type, int protocol, int kern)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-	u32 sid, newsid;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	sid = tsec->sid;
-	newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
-
-	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-
 	if (kern)
 		isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
-	else if (newsid)
-		isec->sid = newsid;
 	else
-		isec->sid = sid;
+		isec->sid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
 
 	isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
 	isec->initialized = 1;
@@ -3756,10 +3701,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 
 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	u16 family;
 	int err;
 
-	err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
+	err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3768,19 +3714,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 	 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
 	 * check the first address now.
 	 */
-	family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+	family = sk->sk_family;
 	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
 		char *addrp;
-		struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 		struct common_audit_data ad;
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
 		unsigned short snum;
-		struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 		u32 sid, node_perm;
 
-		isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-
 		if (family == PF_INET) {
 			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
 			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
@@ -3804,15 +3747,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 				COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 				ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
 				ad.u.net.family = family;
-				err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
-						   isec->sclass,
+				err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+						   sksec->sclass,
 						   SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
 				if (err)
 					goto out;
 			}
 		}
 
-		switch (isec->sclass) {
+		switch (sksec->sclass) {
 		case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
 			node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
 			break;
@@ -3843,8 +3786,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		else
 			ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
 
-		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
-				   isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
+		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+				   sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -3855,19 +3798,18 @@ out:
 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	int err;
 
-	err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
+	err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
 	/*
 	 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
 	 */
-	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
-	    isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
+	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
 		struct common_audit_data ad;
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
@@ -3890,13 +3832,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 
-		perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
+		perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
 		       TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
 
 		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 		ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
-		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
+		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -3909,7 +3851,7 @@ out:
 
 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 {
-	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
@@ -3918,7 +3860,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
 
-	err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
+	err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -3935,30 +3877,30 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 				  int size)
 {
-	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 				  int size, int flags)
 {
-	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
 {
-	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
 {
-	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
 {
 	int err;
 
-	err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
+	err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -3968,68 +3910,58 @@ static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname
 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
 				     int optname)
 {
-	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
 {
-	return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
+	return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
 					      struct socket *other,
 					      struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-	struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	int err;
 
-	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-	other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
-
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
 
-	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
-			   isec->sclass,
+	err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
+			   sksec_other->sclass,
 			   UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	/* connecting socket */
-	sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	sksec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
-
 	/* server child socket */
-	sksec = newsk->sk_security;
-	sksec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
-	err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, sksec->peer_sid, &sksec->sid);
+	sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
+	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
+				    &sksec_new->sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
-	return err;
+	/* connecting socket */
+	sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 					struct socket *other)
 {
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-	struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	int err;
-
-	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-	other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
 
-	err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
-			   isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	return 0;
+	return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
+			    &ad);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
@@ -4168,26 +4100,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
 	int err = 0;
 	char *scontext;
 	u32 scontext_len;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
 
-	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-
-	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
-	    isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
-		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
 		peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
-	}
-	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
-		err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
-		goto out;
-	}
+	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 
 	err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
-
 	if (err)
-		goto out;
+		return err;
 
 	if (scontext_len > len) {
 		err = -ERANGE;
@@ -4200,9 +4124,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
 out_len:
 	if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
 		err = -EFAULT;
-
 	kfree(scontext);
-out:
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -4234,12 +4156,27 @@ out:
 
 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
-	return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+	sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
+	if (!sksec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
+	sk->sk_security = sksec;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	sk_free_security(sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	sk->sk_security = NULL;
+	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
+	kfree(sksec);
 }
 
 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
@@ -4399,8 +4336,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	int err = 0;
 	u32 perm;
 	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
-	struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
-	struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
 	if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
@@ -4408,13 +4344,13 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	}
 	nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
 
-	err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+	err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -EINVAL) {
 			audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 				  "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
 				  " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
-				  nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
+				  nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
 			if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
 				err = 0;
 		}
@@ -4425,7 +4361,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
+	err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
 out:
 	return err;
 }

security/selinux/include/classmap.h

@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
     "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append"
 
 #define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \
-    "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton"
+    "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \
+    "open", "execmod"
 
 #define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \
     "listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom",  \
@@ -43,22 +44,21 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	    "quotaget", NULL } },
 	{ "file",
 	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS,
-	    "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execmod", "open", NULL } },
+	    "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } },
 	{ "dir",
 	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name",
-	    "reparent", "search", "rmdir", "open", NULL } },
+	    "reparent", "search", "rmdir", NULL } },
 	{ "fd", { "use", NULL } },
 	{ "lnk_file",
 	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "chr_file",
-	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS,
-	    "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execmod", "open", NULL } },
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "blk_file",
-	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } },
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "sock_file",
-	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } },
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "fifo_file",
-	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } },
+	  { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "tcp_socket",

security/selinux/netnode.c

@@ -183,8 +183,6 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
 		BUG();
 	}
 
-	INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rcu);
-
 	/* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
 	 * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */
 	list_add_rcu(&node->list, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list);

security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ out:
 static const struct file_operations sel_enforce_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_enforce,
 	.write		= sel_write_enforce,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
@@ -201,6 +202,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_handle_unknown,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
@@ -251,6 +253,7 @@ out:
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_disable_ops = {
 	.write		= sel_write_disable,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
@@ -265,6 +268,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_policyvers,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 /* declaration for sel_write_load */
@@ -289,6 +293,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_mls_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_mls,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
@@ -356,6 +361,7 @@ out:
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_load_ops = {
 	.write		= sel_write_load,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
@@ -437,6 +443,7 @@ out:
 static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_checkreqprot,
 	.write		= sel_write_checkreqprot,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 /*
@@ -482,6 +489,7 @@ static const struct file_operations transaction_ops = {
 	.write		= selinux_transaction_write,
 	.read		= simple_transaction_read,
 	.release	= simple_transaction_release,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 /*
@@ -883,6 +891,7 @@ out:
 static const struct file_operations sel_bool_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_bool,
 	.write		= sel_write_bool,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
@@ -935,6 +944,7 @@ out:
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = {
 	.write		= sel_commit_bools_write,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
@@ -1127,10 +1137,12 @@ out:
 static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_avc_cache_threshold,
 	.write		= sel_write_avc_cache_threshold,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_avc_hash_stats_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_avc_hash_stats,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
@@ -1255,6 +1267,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_initcon_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_initcon,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
@@ -1330,6 +1343,7 @@ out:
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_class,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
@@ -1354,6 +1368,7 @@ out:
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_perm,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
@@ -1372,6 +1387,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_policycap,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
 static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,

security/selinux/ss/avtab.c

@@ -342,20 +342,20 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 
 	if (vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
 		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
-		if (rc < 0) {
+		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
-			return -1;
+			return rc;
 		}
 		items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
 		if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
-			return -1;
+			return -EINVAL;
 
 		}
 		rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
-		if (rc < 0) {
+		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
-			return -1;
+			return rc;
 		}
 		items = 0;
 
@@ -363,19 +363,19 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 		key.source_type = (u16)val;
 		if (key.source_type != val) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n");
-			return -1;
+			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
 		key.target_type = (u16)val;
 		if (key.target_type != val) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n");
-			return -1;
+			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
 		key.target_class = (u16)val;
 		if (key.target_class != val) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n");
-			return -1;
+			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
@@ -383,12 +383,12 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 
 		if (!(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
-			return -1;
+			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		if ((val & AVTAB_AV) &&
 		    (val & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
-			return -1;
+			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
@@ -403,15 +403,15 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 
 		if (items != items2) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n", items2, items);
-			return -1;
+			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		return 0;
 	}
 
 	rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4);
-	if (rc < 0) {
+	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
-		return -1;
+		return rc;
 	}
 
 	items = 0;
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 	    !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
 	    !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
-		return -1;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	set = 0;
@@ -434,19 +434,19 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
 	}
 	if (!set || set > 1) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  avtab:  more than one specifier\n");
-		return -1;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
-	if (rc < 0) {
+	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
-		return -1;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
 	if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
 	    !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data)) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
-		return -1;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
 }
@@ -487,8 +487,7 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
 				printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n");
 			else if (rc == -EEXIST)
 				printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
-			else
-				rc = -EINVAL;
+
 			goto bad;
 		}
 	}

security/selinux/ss/conditional.c

@@ -117,10 +117,14 @@ int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
 
 int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
 {
+	int rc;
+
 	p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL;
 	p->cond_list = NULL;
-	if (avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab))
-		return -1;
+
+	rc = avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -219,34 +223,37 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
 
 	booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!booldatum)
-		return -1;
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
-	if (rc < 0)
+	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
 	booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 
+	rc = -EINVAL;
 	if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
 		goto err;
 
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
 
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
 	key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!key)
 		goto err;
 	rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
-	if (rc < 0)
+	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 	key[len] = '\0';
-	if (hashtab_insert(h, key, booldatum))
+	rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, booldatum);
+	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
 	return 0;
 err:
 	cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
-	return -1;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 struct cond_insertf_data {
@@ -263,7 +270,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
 	struct cond_av_list *other = data->other, *list, *cur;
 	struct avtab_node *node_ptr;
 	u8 found;
-
+	int rc = -EINVAL;
 
 	/*
 	 * For type rules we have to make certain there aren't any
@@ -313,12 +320,15 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
 	node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
 	if (!node_ptr) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: could not insert rule.\n");
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err;
 	}
 
 	list = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_av_list), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!list)
+	if (!list) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err;
+	}
 
 	list->node = node_ptr;
 	if (!data->head)
@@ -331,7 +341,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
 err:
 	cond_av_list_destroy(data->head);
 	data->head = NULL;
-	return -1;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list **ret_list, struct cond_av_list *other)
@@ -345,8 +355,8 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list *
 
 	len = 0;
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-	if (rc < 0)
-		return -1;
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 	if (len == 0)
@@ -361,7 +371,6 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list *
 				     &data);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
-
 	}
 
 	*ret_list = data.head;
@@ -390,24 +399,25 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
 	struct cond_expr *expr = NULL, *last = NULL;
 
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-	if (rc < 0)
-		return -1;
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
 	node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 
 	len = 0;
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-	if (rc < 0)
-		return -1;
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
 	/* expr */
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
 		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
-		if (rc < 0)
+		if (rc)
 			goto err;
 
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		expr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_expr), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!expr)
 			goto err;
@@ -416,6 +426,7 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
 		expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 
 		if (!expr_isvalid(p, expr)) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
 			kfree(expr);
 			goto err;
 		}
@@ -427,14 +438,16 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
 		last = expr;
 	}
 
-	if (cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL) != 0)
+	rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL);
+	if (rc)
 		goto err;
-	if (cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, node->true_list) != 0)
+	rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, node->true_list);
+	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 	return 0;
 err:
 	cond_node_destroy(node);
-	return -1;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
@@ -445,8 +458,8 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
-	if (rc < 0)
-		return -1;
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
 	len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 
@@ -455,11 +468,13 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		goto err;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		node = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_node), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!node)
 			goto err;
 
-		if (cond_read_node(p, node, fp) != 0)
+		rc = cond_read_node(p, node, fp);
+		if (rc)
 			goto err;
 
 		if (i == 0)
@@ -472,7 +487,7 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 err:
 	cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
 	p->cond_list = NULL;
-	return -1;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional

security/selinux/ss/policydb.c

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
 #include "security.h"
 
 #include "policydb.h"
@@ -655,6 +656,9 @@ static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
 
 static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i)
 {
+	if (!c)
+		return;
+
 	context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
 	context_destroy(&c->context[1]);
 	if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS ||
@@ -736,11 +740,17 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 	hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_tr_destroy, NULL);
 	hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
 
-	if (p->type_attr_map) {
-		for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++)
-			ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map[i]);
+	if (p->type_attr_map_array) {
+		for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+			struct ebitmap *e;
+
+			e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i);
+			if (!e)
+				continue;
+			ebitmap_destroy(e);
+		}
+		flex_array_free(p->type_attr_map_array);
 	}
-	kfree(p->type_attr_map);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
 
@@ -1701,6 +1711,333 @@ u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name)
 	return 1U << (perdatum->value-1);
 }
 
+static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	struct range_trans *rt = NULL;
+	struct mls_range *r = NULL;
+	int i, rc;
+	__le32 buf[2];
+	u32 nel;
+
+	if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		rt = kzalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!rt)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		} else
+			rt->target_class = p->process_class;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) ||
+		    !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) ||
+		    !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class))
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!r)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = mls_read_range_helper(r, fp);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  rangetrans:  invalid range\n");
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		rc = hashtab_insert(p->range_tr, rt, r);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		rt = NULL;
+		r = NULL;
+	}
+	rangetr_hash_eval(p->range_tr);
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	kfree(rt);
+	kfree(r);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	int i, j, rc;
+	u32 nel, nel2, len, len2;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	struct ocontext *l, *c;
+	struct ocontext *newc = NULL;
+	struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs;
+	struct genfs *newgenfs = NULL;
+
+	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		newgenfs = kzalloc(sizeof(*newgenfs), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!newgenfs)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		newgenfs->fstype = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!newgenfs->fstype)
+			goto out;
+
+		rc = next_entry(newgenfs->fstype, fp, len);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		newgenfs->fstype[len] = 0;
+
+		for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
+		     genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
+				printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  dup genfs fstype %s\n",
+				       newgenfs->fstype);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+		newgenfs->next = genfs;
+		if (genfs_p)
+			genfs_p->next = newgenfs;
+		else
+			p->genfs = newgenfs;
+		genfs = newgenfs;
+		newgenfs = NULL;
+
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) {
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			newc = kzalloc(sizeof(*newc), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!newc)
+				goto out;
+
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			newc->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!newc->u.name)
+				goto out;
+
+			rc = next_entry(newc->u.name, fp, len);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+			newc->u.name[len] = 0;
+
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+
+			newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+			rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out;
+
+			for (l = NULL, c = genfs->head; c;
+			     l = c, c = c->next) {
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
+				    (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
+				     newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
+					printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  dup genfs entry (%s,%s)\n",
+					       genfs->fstype, c->u.name);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				len = strlen(newc->u.name);
+				len2 = strlen(c->u.name);
+				if (len > len2)
+					break;
+			}
+
+			newc->next = c;
+			if (l)
+				l->next = newc;
+			else
+				genfs->head = newc;
+			newc = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	if (newgenfs)
+		kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
+	kfree(newgenfs);
+	ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
+			 void *fp)
+{
+	int i, j, rc;
+	u32 nel, len;
+	__le32 buf[3];
+	struct ocontext *l, *c;
+	u32 nodebuf[8];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+		nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+		l = NULL;
+		for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!c)
+				goto out;
+			if (l)
+				l->next = c;
+			else
+				p->ocontexts[i] = c;
+			l = c;
+
+			switch (i) {
+			case OCON_ISID:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FS:
+			case OCON_NETIF:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+				if (!c->u.name)
+					goto out;
+
+				rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				c->u.name[len] = 0;
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_PORT:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+				c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE:
+				rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */
+				c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_FSUSE:
+				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+				c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+				if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE)
+					goto out;
+
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+				c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+				if (!c->u.name)
+					goto out;
+
+				rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				c->u.name[len] = 0;
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			case OCON_NODE6: {
+				int k;
+
+				rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+					c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k];
+				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+					c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4];
+				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+				if (rc)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	rc = 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /*
  * Read the configuration data from a policy database binary
  * representation file into a policy database structure.
@@ -1709,16 +2046,12 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
 	struct role_allow *ra, *lra;
 	struct role_trans *tr, *ltr;
-	struct ocontext *l, *c, *newc;
-	struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs, *newgenfs;
 	int i, j, rc;
 	__le32 buf[4];
-	u32 nodebuf[8];
-	u32 len, len2, nprim, nel, nel2;
+	u32 len, nprim, nel;
+
 	char *policydb_str;
 	struct policydb_compat_info *info;
-	struct range_trans *rt;
-	struct mls_range *r;
 
 	rc = policydb_init(p);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1919,294 +2252,45 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	if (!p->process_trans_perms)
 		goto bad;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
-		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-		if (rc < 0)
-			goto bad;
-		nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-		l = NULL;
-		for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
-			c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!c) {
-				rc = -ENOMEM;
-				goto bad;
-			}
-			if (l)
-				l->next = c;
-			else
-				p->ocontexts[i] = c;
-			l = c;
-			rc = -EINVAL;
-			switch (i) {
-			case OCON_ISID:
-				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-				if (rc < 0)
-					goto bad;
-				c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
-				if (rc)
-					goto bad;
-				break;
-			case OCON_FS:
-			case OCON_NETIF:
-				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-				if (rc < 0)
-					goto bad;
-				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-				c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-				if (!c->u.name) {
-					rc = -ENOMEM;
-					goto bad;
-				}
-				rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
-				if (rc < 0)
-					goto bad;
-				c->u.name[len] = 0;
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
-				if (rc)
-					goto bad;
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp);
-				if (rc)
-					goto bad;
-				break;
-			case OCON_PORT:
-				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
-				if (rc < 0)
-					goto bad;
-				c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-				c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
-				c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
-				if (rc)
-					goto bad;
-				break;
-			case OCON_NODE:
-				rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
-				if (rc < 0)
-					goto bad;
-				c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */
-				c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
-				if (rc)
-					goto bad;
-				break;
-			case OCON_FSUSE:
-				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
-				if (rc < 0)
-					goto bad;
-				c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-				if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE)
-					goto bad;
-				len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
-				c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-				if (!c->u.name) {
-					rc = -ENOMEM;
-					goto bad;
-				}
-				rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len);
-				if (rc < 0)
-					goto bad;
-				c->u.name[len] = 0;
-				rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
-				if (rc)
-					goto bad;
-				break;
-			case OCON_NODE6: {
-				int k;
-
-				rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
-				if (rc < 0)
-					goto bad;
-				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
-					c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k];
-				for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
-					c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4];
-				if (context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp))
-					goto bad;
-				break;
-			}
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-	if (rc < 0)
+	rc = ocontext_read(p, info, fp);
+	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
-	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-	genfs_p = NULL;
-	rc = -EINVAL;
-	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
-		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-		if (rc < 0)
-			goto bad;
-		len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-		newgenfs = kzalloc(sizeof(*newgenfs), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!newgenfs) {
-			rc = -ENOMEM;
-			goto bad;
-		}
 
-		newgenfs->fstype = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!newgenfs->fstype) {
-			rc = -ENOMEM;
-			kfree(newgenfs);
-			goto bad;
-		}
-		rc = next_entry(newgenfs->fstype, fp, len);
-		if (rc < 0) {
-			kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
-			kfree(newgenfs);
-			goto bad;
-		}
-		newgenfs->fstype[len] = 0;
-		for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
-		     genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
-			if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
-				printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  dup genfs "
-				       "fstype %s\n", newgenfs->fstype);
-				kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
-				kfree(newgenfs);
-				goto bad;
-			}
-			if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0)
-				break;
-		}
-		newgenfs->next = genfs;
-		if (genfs_p)
-			genfs_p->next = newgenfs;
-		else
-			p->genfs = newgenfs;
-		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-		if (rc < 0)
-			goto bad;
-		nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-		for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) {
-			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-			if (rc < 0)
-				goto bad;
-			len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+	rc = genfs_read(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
 
-			newc = kzalloc(sizeof(*newc), GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!newc) {
-				rc = -ENOMEM;
-				goto bad;
-			}
+	rc = range_read(p, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
 
-			newc->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!newc->u.name) {
-				rc = -ENOMEM;
-				goto bad_newc;
-			}
-			rc = next_entry(newc->u.name, fp, len);
-			if (rc < 0)
-				goto bad_newc;
-			newc->u.name[len] = 0;
-			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-			if (rc < 0)
-				goto bad_newc;
-			newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-			if (context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp))
-				goto bad_newc;
-			for (l = NULL, c = newgenfs->head; c;
-			     l = c, c = c->next) {
-				if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
-				    (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
-				     newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
-					printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  dup genfs "
-					       "entry (%s,%s)\n",
-					       newgenfs->fstype, c->u.name);
-					goto bad_newc;
-				}
-				len = strlen(newc->u.name);
-				len2 = strlen(c->u.name);
-				if (len > len2)
-					break;
-			}
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	p->type_attr_map_array = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct ebitmap),
+						  p->p_types.nprim,
+						  GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!p->type_attr_map_array)
+		goto bad;
 
-			newc->next = c;
-			if (l)
-				l->next = newc;
-			else
-				newgenfs->head = newc;
-		}
-	}
-
-	if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
-		int new_rangetr = p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS;
-		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-		if (rc < 0)
-			goto bad;
-		nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-		for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
-			rt = kzalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!rt) {
-				rc = -ENOMEM;
-				goto bad;
-			}
-			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
-			if (rc < 0) {
-				kfree(rt);
-				goto bad;
-			}
-			rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-			rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
-			if (new_rangetr) {
-				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-				if (rc < 0) {
-					kfree(rt);
-					goto bad;
-				}
-				rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-			} else
-				rt->target_class = p->process_class;
-			if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) ||
-			    !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) ||
-			    !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class)) {
-				kfree(rt);
-				rc = -EINVAL;
-				goto bad;
-			}
-			r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!r) {
-				kfree(rt);
-				rc = -ENOMEM;
-				goto bad;
-			}
-			rc = mls_read_range_helper(r, fp);
-			if (rc) {
-				kfree(rt);
-				kfree(r);
-				goto bad;
-			}
-			if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) {
-				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  rangetrans:  invalid range\n");
-				kfree(rt);
-				kfree(r);
-				goto bad;
-			}
-			rc = hashtab_insert(p->range_tr, rt, r);
-			if (rc) {
-				kfree(rt);
-				kfree(r);
-				goto bad;
-			}
-		}
-		rangetr_hash_eval(p->range_tr);
-	}
-
-	p->type_attr_map = kmalloc(p->p_types.nprim * sizeof(struct ebitmap), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!p->type_attr_map)
+	/* preallocate so we don't have to worry about the put ever failing */
+	rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_attr_map_array, 0, p->p_types.nprim - 1,
+				 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
-		ebitmap_init(&p->type_attr_map[i]);
+		struct ebitmap *e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i);
+
+		BUG_ON(!e);
+		ebitmap_init(e);
 		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
-			if (ebitmap_read(&p->type_attr_map[i], fp))
+			rc = ebitmap_read(e, fp);
+			if (rc)
 				goto bad;
 		}
 		/* add the type itself as the degenerate case */
-		if (ebitmap_set_bit(&p->type_attr_map[i], i, 1))
-				goto bad;
+		rc = ebitmap_set_bit(e, i, 1);
+		if (rc)
+			goto bad;
 	}
 
 	rc = policydb_bounds_sanity_check(p);
@@ -2216,8 +2300,6 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	rc = 0;
 out:
 	return rc;
-bad_newc:
-	ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
 bad:
 	if (!rc)
 		rc = -EINVAL;

security/selinux/ss/policydb.h

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
 #ifndef _SS_POLICYDB_H_
 #define _SS_POLICYDB_H_
 
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
+
 #include "symtab.h"
 #include "avtab.h"
 #include "sidtab.h"
@@ -246,7 +248,7 @@ struct policydb {
 	struct hashtab *range_tr;
 
 	/* type -> attribute reverse mapping */
-	struct ebitmap *type_attr_map;
+	struct flex_array *type_attr_map_array;
 
 	struct ebitmap policycaps;
 

security/selinux/ss/services.c

@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 
 #include "flask.h"
@@ -626,8 +627,10 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	 */
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
-	sattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[scontext->type - 1];
-	tattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[tcontext->type - 1];
+	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!sattr);
+	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
+	BUG_ON(!tattr);
 	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
 		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
 			avkey.source_type = i + 1;

security/selinux/ss/symtab.c

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size)
 {
 	s->table = hashtab_create(symhash, symcmp, size);
 	if (!s->table)
-		return -1;
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	s->nprim = 0;
 	return 0;
 }

security/smack/smack.h

@@ -123,16 +123,6 @@ struct smack_known {
 #define SMK_FSHAT	"smackfshat="
 #define SMK_FSROOT	"smackfsroot="
 
-/*
- * xattr names
- */
-#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX	"SMACK64"
-#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN	"SMACK64IPIN"
-#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT	"SMACK64IPOUT"
-#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX
-#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN
-#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
-
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION 	"-CIPSO"
 
 /*

security/smack/smack_lsm.c

@@ -598,6 +598,8 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
 	/*
 	 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
 	 */
@@ -2191,7 +2193,7 @@ static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
 
 /**
  * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
- * @opt_dentry: unused
+ * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
  * @inode: the object
  *
  * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
@@ -2310,20 +2312,10 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		/*
 		 * Get the dentry for xattr.
 		 */
-		if (opt_dentry == NULL) {
-			dp = d_find_alias(inode);
-			if (dp == NULL)
-				break;
-		} else {
-			dp = dget(opt_dentry);
-			if (dp == NULL)
-				break;
-		}
-
+		dp = dget(opt_dentry);
 		fetched = smk_fetch(inode, dp);
 		if (fetched != NULL)
 			final = fetched;
-
 		dput(dp);
 		break;
 	}

security/tomoyo/Makefile

@@ -1 +1 @@
-obj-y = common.o realpath.o tomoyo.o domain.o file.o gc.o path_group.o
+obj-y = common.o domain.o file.o gc.o group.o load_policy.o memory.o mount.o realpath.o securityfs_if.o tomoyo.o util.o

security/tomoyo/gc.c

@@ -11,83 +11,75 @@
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 
-enum tomoyo_gc_id {
-	TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP,
-	TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP_MEMBER,
-	TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_INITIALIZER,
-	TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_KEEPER,
-	TOMOYO_ID_ALIAS,
-	TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE,
-	TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN,
-	TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE,
-	TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER,
-	TOMOYO_ID_NAME,
-	TOMOYO_ID_ACL,
-	TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN
-};
-
-struct tomoyo_gc_entry {
+struct tomoyo_gc {
 	struct list_head list;
 	int type;
-	void *element;
+	struct list_head *element;
 };
 static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_gc_queue);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(tomoyo_gc_mutex);
 
 /* Caller holds tomoyo_policy_lock mutex. */
-static bool tomoyo_add_to_gc(const int type, void *element)
+static bool tomoyo_add_to_gc(const int type, struct list_head *element)
 {
-	struct tomoyo_gc_entry *entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	struct tomoyo_gc *entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!entry)
 		return false;
 	entry->type = type;
 	entry->element = element;
 	list_add(&entry->list, &tomoyo_gc_queue);
+	list_del_rcu(element);
 	return true;
 }
 
-static void tomoyo_del_allow_read
-(struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr)
+static void tomoyo_del_allow_read(struct list_head *element)
 {
+	struct tomoyo_readable_file *ptr =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list);
 	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->filename);
 }
 
-static void tomoyo_del_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr)
+static void tomoyo_del_file_pattern(struct list_head *element)
 {
+	struct tomoyo_no_pattern *ptr =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list);
 	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->pattern);
 }
 
-static void tomoyo_del_no_rewrite(struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr)
+static void tomoyo_del_no_rewrite(struct list_head *element)
 {
+	struct tomoyo_no_rewrite *ptr =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list);
 	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->pattern);
 }
 
-static void tomoyo_del_domain_initializer
-(struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr)
+static void tomoyo_del_transition_control(struct list_head *element)
 {
+	struct tomoyo_transition_control *ptr =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list);
 	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->domainname);
 	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->program);
 }
 
-static void tomoyo_del_domain_keeper(struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr)
-{
-	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->domainname);
-	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->program);
-}
-
-static void tomoyo_del_alias(struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr)
+static void tomoyo_del_aggregator(struct list_head *element)
 {
+	struct tomoyo_aggregator *ptr =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list);
 	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->original_name);
-	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->aliased_name);
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->aggregated_name);
 }
 
-static void tomoyo_del_manager(struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr)
+static void tomoyo_del_manager(struct list_head *element)
 {
+	struct tomoyo_manager *ptr =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list);
 	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->manager);
 }
 
-static void tomoyo_del_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl)
+static void tomoyo_del_acl(struct list_head *element)
 {
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*acl), list);
 	switch (acl->type) {
 	case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL:
 		{
@@ -104,14 +96,41 @@ static void tomoyo_del_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl)
 			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name2);
 		}
 		break;
-	default:
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "Unknown type\n");
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_path_number_acl *entry
+				= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name);
+			tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->number);
+		}
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl *entry
+				= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name);
+			tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->mode);
+			tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->major);
+			tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->minor);
+		}
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_mount_acl *entry
+				= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->dev_name);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->dir_name);
+			tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->fs_type);
+			tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->flags);
+		}
 		break;
 	}
 }
 
-static bool tomoyo_del_domain(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain)
+static bool tomoyo_del_domain(struct list_head *element)
 {
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*domain), list);
 	struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl;
 	struct tomoyo_acl_info *tmp;
 	/*
@@ -139,7 +158,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_del_domain(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain)
 	if (atomic_read(&domain->users))
 		return false;
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(acl, tmp, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
-		tomoyo_del_acl(acl);
+		tomoyo_del_acl(&acl->list);
 		tomoyo_memory_free(acl);
 	}
 	tomoyo_put_name(domain->domainname);
@@ -147,135 +166,70 @@ static bool tomoyo_del_domain(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain)
 }
 
 
-static void tomoyo_del_name(const struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr)
+static void tomoyo_del_name(struct list_head *element)
 {
+	const struct tomoyo_name *ptr =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), list);
 }
 
-static void tomoyo_del_path_group_member(struct tomoyo_path_group_member
-					 *member)
+static void tomoyo_del_path_group(struct list_head *element)
 {
+	struct tomoyo_path_group *member =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*member), head.list);
 	tomoyo_put_name(member->member_name);
 }
 
-static void tomoyo_del_path_group(struct tomoyo_path_group *group)
+static void tomoyo_del_group(struct list_head *element)
 {
+	struct tomoyo_group *group =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*group), list);
 	tomoyo_put_name(group->group_name);
 }
 
+static void tomoyo_del_number_group(struct list_head *element)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_number_group *member =
+		container_of(element, typeof(*member), head.list);
+}
+
+static bool tomoyo_collect_member(struct list_head *member_list, int id)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_acl_head *member;
+	list_for_each_entry(member, member_list, list) {
+		if (!member->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_add_to_gc(id, &member->list))
+			return false;
+	}
+        return true;
+}
+
+static bool tomoyo_collect_acl(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl;
+	list_for_each_entry(acl, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		if (!acl->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_ACL, &acl->list))
+			return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
 static void tomoyo_collect_entry(void)
 {
+	int i;
 	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
 		return;
-	{
-		struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
-		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list,
-					list) {
-			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
-				continue;
-			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE, ptr))
-				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
-			else
-				break;
-		}
-	}
-	{
-		struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr;
-		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) {
-			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
-				continue;
-			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN, ptr))
-				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
-			else
-				break;
-		}
-	}
-	{
-		struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr;
-		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) {
-			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
-				continue;
-			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE, ptr))
-				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
-			else
-				break;
-		}
-	}
-	{
-		struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
-		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list,
-					list) {
-			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
-				continue;
-			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_INITIALIZER, ptr))
-				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
-			else
-				break;
-		}
-	}
-	{
-		struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
-		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) {
-			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
-				continue;
-			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_KEEPER, ptr))
-				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
-			else
-				break;
-		}
-	}
-	{
-		struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr;
-		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) {
-			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
-				continue;
-			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_ALIAS, ptr))
-				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
-			else
-				break;
-		}
-	}
-	{
-		struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr;
-		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list,
-					list) {
-			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
-				continue;
-			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER, ptr))
-				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
-			else
-				break;
-		}
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY; i++) {
+		if (!tomoyo_collect_member(&tomoyo_policy_list[i], i))
+			goto unlock;
 	}
 	{
 		struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
 		list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
-			struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl;
-			list_for_each_entry_rcu(acl, &domain->acl_info_list,
-						list) {
-				switch (acl->type) {
-				case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL:
-					if (container_of(acl,
-					 struct tomoyo_path_acl,
-							 head)->perm ||
-					    container_of(acl,
-					 struct tomoyo_path_acl,
-							 head)->perm_high)
-						continue;
-					break;
-				case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL:
-					if (container_of(acl,
-					 struct tomoyo_path2_acl,
-							 head)->perm)
-						continue;
-					break;
-				default:
-					continue;
-				}
-				if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_ACL, acl))
-					list_del_rcu(&acl->list);
-				else
-					break;
-			}
+			if (!tomoyo_collect_acl(domain))
+				goto unlock;
 			if (!domain->is_deleted || atomic_read(&domain->users))
 				continue;
 			/*
@@ -283,104 +237,92 @@ static void tomoyo_collect_entry(void)
 			 * refer this domain after successful execve().
 			 * We recheck domain->users after SRCU synchronization.
 			 */
-			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN, domain))
-				list_del_rcu(&domain->list);
-			else
-				break;
+			if (!tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN, &domain->list))
+				goto unlock;
 		}
 	}
-	{
-		int i;
-		for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++) {
-			struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr;
-			list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_name_list[i],
-						list) {
-				if (atomic_read(&ptr->users))
-					continue;
-				if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_NAME, ptr))
-					list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
-				else {
-					i = TOMOYO_MAX_HASH;
-					break;
-				}
-			}
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++) {
+		struct tomoyo_name *ptr;
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_name_list[i], list) {
+			if (atomic_read(&ptr->users))
+				continue;
+			if (!tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_NAME, &ptr->list))
+				goto unlock;
 		}
 	}
-	{
-		struct tomoyo_path_group *group;
-		list_for_each_entry_rcu(group, &tomoyo_path_group_list, list) {
-			struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member;
-			list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list,
-						list) {
-				if (!member->is_deleted)
-					continue;
-				if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP_MEMBER,
-						     member))
-					list_del_rcu(&member->list);
-				else
-					break;
-			}
+	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP; i++) {
+		struct list_head *list = &tomoyo_group_list[i];
+		int id;
+		struct tomoyo_group *group;
+		switch (i) {
+		case 0:
+			id = TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP;
+			break;
+		default:
+			id = TOMOYO_ID_NUMBER_GROUP;
+			break;
+		}
+		list_for_each_entry(group, list, list) {
+			if (!tomoyo_collect_member(&group->member_list, id))
+				goto unlock;
 			if (!list_empty(&group->member_list) ||
 			    atomic_read(&group->users))
 				continue;
-			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP, group))
-				list_del_rcu(&group->list);
-			else
-				break;
+			if (!tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_GROUP, &group->list))
+				goto unlock;
 		}
 	}
+ unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
 }
 
 static void tomoyo_kfree_entry(void)
 {
-	struct tomoyo_gc_entry *p;
-	struct tomoyo_gc_entry *tmp;
+	struct tomoyo_gc *p;
+	struct tomoyo_gc *tmp;
 
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &tomoyo_gc_queue, list) {
+		struct list_head *element = p->element;
 		switch (p->type) {
-		case TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_INITIALIZER:
-			tomoyo_del_domain_initializer(p->element);
+		case TOMOYO_ID_TRANSITION_CONTROL:
+			tomoyo_del_transition_control(element);
 			break;
-		case TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_KEEPER:
-			tomoyo_del_domain_keeper(p->element);
-			break;
-		case TOMOYO_ID_ALIAS:
-			tomoyo_del_alias(p->element);
+		case TOMOYO_ID_AGGREGATOR:
+			tomoyo_del_aggregator(element);
 			break;
 		case TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE:
-			tomoyo_del_allow_read(p->element);
+			tomoyo_del_allow_read(element);
 			break;
 		case TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN:
-			tomoyo_del_file_pattern(p->element);
+			tomoyo_del_file_pattern(element);
 			break;
 		case TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE:
-			tomoyo_del_no_rewrite(p->element);
+			tomoyo_del_no_rewrite(element);
 			break;
 		case TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER:
-			tomoyo_del_manager(p->element);
+			tomoyo_del_manager(element);
 			break;
 		case TOMOYO_ID_NAME:
-			tomoyo_del_name(p->element);
+			tomoyo_del_name(element);
 			break;
 		case TOMOYO_ID_ACL:
-			tomoyo_del_acl(p->element);
+			tomoyo_del_acl(element);
 			break;
 		case TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN:
-			if (!tomoyo_del_domain(p->element))
+			if (!tomoyo_del_domain(element))
 				continue;
 			break;
-		case TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP_MEMBER:
-			tomoyo_del_path_group_member(p->element);
-			break;
 		case TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP:
-			tomoyo_del_path_group(p->element);
+			tomoyo_del_path_group(element);
 			break;
-		default:
-			printk(KERN_WARNING "Unknown type\n");
+		case TOMOYO_ID_GROUP:
+			tomoyo_del_group(element);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_NUMBER_GROUP:
+			tomoyo_del_number_group(element);
 			break;
 		}
-		tomoyo_memory_free(p->element);
+		tomoyo_memory_free(element);
 		list_del(&p->list);
 		kfree(p);
 	}

security/tomoyo/group.c

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/group.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "common.h"
+
+static bool tomoyo_same_path_group(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a,
+				const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b)
+{
+	return container_of(a, struct tomoyo_path_group, head)->member_name ==
+		container_of(b, struct tomoyo_path_group, head)->member_name;
+}
+
+static bool tomoyo_same_number_group(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a,
+				  const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b)
+{
+	return !memcmp(&container_of(a, struct tomoyo_number_group, head)
+		       ->number,
+		       &container_of(b, struct tomoyo_number_group, head)
+		       ->number,
+		       sizeof(container_of(a, struct tomoyo_number_group, head)
+			      ->number));
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_group - Write "struct tomoyo_path_group"/"struct tomoyo_number_group" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ * @type:      Type of this group.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_group(char *data, const bool is_delete, const u8 type)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_group *group;
+	struct list_head *member;
+	char *w[2];
+	int error = -EINVAL;
+	if (!tomoyo_tokenize(data, w, sizeof(w)) || !w[1][0])
+		return -EINVAL;
+	group = tomoyo_get_group(w[0], type);
+	if (!group)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	member = &group->member_list;
+	if (type == TOMOYO_PATH_GROUP) {
+		struct tomoyo_path_group e = { };
+		e.member_name = tomoyo_get_name(w[1]);
+		if (!e.member_name) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete,
+					     member, tomoyo_same_path_group);
+		tomoyo_put_name(e.member_name);
+	} else if (type == TOMOYO_NUMBER_GROUP) {
+		struct tomoyo_number_group e = { };
+		if (w[1][0] == '@'
+		    || !tomoyo_parse_number_union(w[1], &e.number)
+		    || e.number.values[0] > e.number.values[1])
+			goto out;
+		error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete,
+					     member, tomoyo_same_number_group);
+		/*
+		 * tomoyo_put_number_union() is not needed because
+		 * w[1][0] != '@'.
+		 */
+	}
+ out:
+	tomoyo_put_group(group);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_matches_group - Check whether the given pathname matches members of the given pathname group.
+ *
+ * @pathname:        The name of pathname.
+ * @group:           Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_group".
+ *
+ * Returns matched member's pathname if @pathname matches pathnames in @group,
+ * NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+tomoyo_path_matches_group(const struct tomoyo_path_info *pathname,
+			  const struct tomoyo_group *group)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_path_group *member;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, head.list) {
+		if (member->head.is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(pathname, member->member_name))
+			continue;
+		return member->member_name;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_number_matches_group - Check whether the given number matches members of the given number group.
+ *
+ * @min:   Min number.
+ * @max:   Max number.
+ * @group: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_group".
+ *
+ * Returns true if @min and @max partially overlaps @group, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+bool tomoyo_number_matches_group(const unsigned long min,
+				 const unsigned long max,
+				 const struct tomoyo_group *group)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_number_group *member;
+	bool matched = false;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, head.list) {
+		if (member->head.is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		if (min > member->number.values[1] ||
+		    max < member->number.values[0])
+			continue;
+		matched = true;
+		break;
+	}
+	return matched;
+}

security/tomoyo/load_policy.c

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
+ *
+ * Policy loader launcher for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+/* path to policy loader */
+static const char *tomoyo_loader = "/sbin/tomoyo-init";
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_policy_loader_exists - Check whether /sbin/tomoyo-init exists.
+ *
+ * Returns true if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_policy_loader_exists(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Don't activate MAC if the policy loader doesn't exist.
+	 * If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not
+	 * mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since
+	 * policies are not loaded yet.
+	 * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime.
+	 */
+	struct path path;
+
+	if (kern_path(tomoyo_loader, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path)) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "Not activating Mandatory Access Control now "
+		       "since %s doesn't exist.\n", tomoyo_loader);
+		return false;
+	}
+	path_put(&path);
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_load_policy - Run external policy loader to load policy.
+ *
+ * @filename: The program about to start.
+ *
+ * This function checks whether @filename is /sbin/init , and if so
+ * invoke /sbin/tomoyo-init and wait for the termination of /sbin/tomoyo-init
+ * and then continues invocation of /sbin/init.
+ * /sbin/tomoyo-init reads policy files in /etc/tomoyo/ directory and
+ * writes to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interfaces.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename)
+{
+	char *argv[2];
+	char *envp[3];
+
+	if (tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * Check filename is /sbin/init or /sbin/tomoyo-start.
+	 * /sbin/tomoyo-start is a dummy filename in case where /sbin/init can't
+	 * be passed.
+	 * You can create /sbin/tomoyo-start by
+	 * "ln -s /bin/true /sbin/tomoyo-start".
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(filename, "/sbin/init") &&
+	    strcmp(filename, "/sbin/tomoyo-start"))
+		return;
+	if (!tomoyo_policy_loader_exists())
+		return;
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Calling %s to load policy. Please wait.\n",
+	       tomoyo_loader);
+	argv[0] = (char *) tomoyo_loader;
+	argv[1] = NULL;
+	envp[0] = "HOME=/";
+	envp[1] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin";
+	envp[2] = NULL;
+	call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, 1);
+	tomoyo_check_profile();
+}

security/tomoyo/memory.c

@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/memory.c
+ *
+ * Memory management functions for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/hash.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "common.h"
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_warn_oom - Print out of memory warning message.
+ *
+ * @function: Function's name.
+ */
+void tomoyo_warn_oom(const char *function)
+{
+	/* Reduce error messages. */
+	static pid_t tomoyo_last_pid;
+	const pid_t pid = current->pid;
+	if (tomoyo_last_pid != pid) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory at %s.\n",
+		       function);
+		tomoyo_last_pid = pid;
+	}
+	if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+		panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n");
+}
+
+/* Memory allocated for policy. */
+static atomic_t tomoyo_policy_memory_size;
+/* Quota for holding policy. */
+static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_policy;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_memory_ok - Check memory quota.
+ *
+ * @ptr: Pointer to allocated memory.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @ptr is not NULL and quota not exceeded, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_memory_ok(void *ptr)
+{
+	size_t s = ptr ? ksize(ptr) : 0;
+	atomic_add(s, &tomoyo_policy_memory_size);
+	if (ptr && (!tomoyo_quota_for_policy ||
+		    atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size)
+		    <= tomoyo_quota_for_policy)) {
+		memset(ptr, 0, s);
+		return true;
+	}
+	atomic_sub(s, &tomoyo_policy_memory_size);
+	tomoyo_warn_oom(__func__);
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_commit_ok - Check memory quota.
+ *
+ * @data:   Data to copy from.
+ * @size:   Size in byte.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise.
+ * @data is zero-cleared on success.
+ */
+void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size)
+{
+	void *ptr = kzalloc(size, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (tomoyo_memory_ok(ptr)) {
+		memmove(ptr, data, size);
+		memset(data, 0, size);
+		return ptr;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_memory_free - Free memory for elements.
+ *
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to allocated memory.
+ */
+void tomoyo_memory_free(void *ptr)
+{
+	atomic_sub(ksize(ptr), &tomoyo_policy_memory_size);
+	kfree(ptr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_group - Allocate memory for "struct tomoyo_path_group"/"struct tomoyo_number_group".
+ *
+ * @group_name: The name of address group.
+ * @idx:        Index number.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_group" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_group *tomoyo_get_group(const char *group_name, const u8 idx)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_group e = { };
+	struct tomoyo_group *group = NULL;
+	bool found = false;
+	if (!tomoyo_correct_word(group_name) || idx >= TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP)
+		return NULL;
+	e.group_name = tomoyo_get_name(group_name);
+	if (!e.group_name)
+		return NULL;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		goto out;
+	list_for_each_entry(group, &tomoyo_group_list[idx], list) {
+		if (e.group_name != group->group_name)
+			continue;
+		atomic_inc(&group->users);
+		found = true;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (!found) {
+		struct tomoyo_group *entry = tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+		if (entry) {
+			INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->member_list);
+			atomic_set(&entry->users, 1);
+			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
+					  &tomoyo_group_list[idx]);
+			group = entry;
+			found = true;
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_put_name(e.group_name);
+	return found ? group : NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * tomoyo_name_list is used for holding string data used by TOMOYO.
+ * Since same string data is likely used for multiple times (e.g.
+ * "/lib/libc-2.5.so"), TOMOYO shares string data in the form of
+ * "const struct tomoyo_path_info *".
+ */
+struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH];
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_name - Allocate permanent memory for string data.
+ *
+ * @name: The string to store into the permernent memory.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_name(const char *name)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_name *ptr;
+	unsigned int hash;
+	int len;
+	int allocated_len;
+	struct list_head *head;
+
+	if (!name)
+		return NULL;
+	len = strlen(name) + 1;
+	hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1);
+	head = &tomoyo_name_list[hash_long(hash, TOMOYO_HASH_BITS)];
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+		return NULL;
+	list_for_each_entry(ptr, head, list) {
+		if (hash != ptr->entry.hash || strcmp(name, ptr->entry.name))
+			continue;
+		atomic_inc(&ptr->users);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(*ptr) + len, GFP_NOFS);
+	allocated_len = ptr ? ksize(ptr) : 0;
+	if (!ptr || (tomoyo_quota_for_policy &&
+		     atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size) + allocated_len
+		     > tomoyo_quota_for_policy)) {
+		kfree(ptr);
+		ptr = NULL;
+		tomoyo_warn_oom(__func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	atomic_add(allocated_len, &tomoyo_policy_memory_size);
+	ptr->entry.name = ((char *) ptr) + sizeof(*ptr);
+	memmove((char *) ptr->entry.name, name, len);
+	atomic_set(&ptr->users, 1);
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&ptr->entry);
+	list_add_tail(&ptr->list, head);
+ out:
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_mm_init - Initialize mm related code.
+ */
+void __init tomoyo_mm_init(void)
+{
+	int idx;
+
+	for (idx = 0; idx < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY; idx++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_policy_list[idx]);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP; idx++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_group_list[idx]);
+	for (idx = 0; idx < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; idx++)
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_name_list[idx]);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.acl_info_list);
+	tomoyo_kernel_domain.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME);
+	list_add_tail_rcu(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.list, &tomoyo_domain_list);
+	idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+	if (tomoyo_find_domain(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME) != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+		panic("Can't register tomoyo_kernel_domain");
+	{
+		/* Load built-in policy. */
+		tomoyo_write_transition_control("/sbin/hotplug", false,
+					TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_INITIALIZE);
+		tomoyo_write_transition_control("/sbin/modprobe", false,
+					TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_INITIALIZE);
+	}
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+}
+
+
+/* Memory allocated for query lists. */
+unsigned int tomoyo_query_memory_size;
+/* Quota for holding query lists. */
+unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_query;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_memory_counter - Check for memory usage in bytes.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns memory usage.
+ */
+void tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	if (!head->r.eof) {
+		const unsigned int policy
+			= atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size);
+		const unsigned int query = tomoyo_query_memory_size;
+		char buffer[64];
+
+		memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
+		if (tomoyo_quota_for_policy)
+			snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1,
+				 "   (Quota: %10u)",
+				 tomoyo_quota_for_policy);
+		else
+			buffer[0] = '\0';
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Policy:       %10u%s\n", policy,
+				 buffer);
+		if (tomoyo_quota_for_query)
+			snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1,
+				 "   (Quota: %10u)",
+				 tomoyo_quota_for_query);
+		else
+			buffer[0] = '\0';
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Query lists:  %10u%s\n", query,
+				 buffer);
+		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Total:        %10u\n", policy + query);
+		head->r.eof = true;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_memory_quota - Set memory quota.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_memory_quota(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+	char *data = head->write_buf;
+	unsigned int size;
+
+	if (sscanf(data, "Policy: %u", &size) == 1)
+		tomoyo_quota_for_policy = size;
+	else if (sscanf(data, "Query lists: %u", &size) == 1)
+		tomoyo_quota_for_query = size;
+	return 0;
+}

security/tomoyo/mount.c

@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/mount.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "common.h"
+
+/* Keywords for mount restrictions. */
+
+/* Allow to call 'mount --bind /source_dir /dest_dir' */
+#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND_KEYWORD                        "--bind"
+/* Allow to call 'mount --move /old_dir    /new_dir ' */
+#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE_KEYWORD                        "--move"
+/* Allow to call 'mount -o remount /dir             ' */
+#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT_KEYWORD                     "--remount"
+/* Allow to call 'mount --make-unbindable /dir'       */
+#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE_KEYWORD             "--make-unbindable"
+/* Allow to call 'mount --make-private /dir'          */
+#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE_KEYWORD                "--make-private"
+/* Allow to call 'mount --make-slave /dir'            */
+#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE_KEYWORD                  "--make-slave"
+/* Allow to call 'mount --make-shared /dir'           */
+#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED_KEYWORD                 "--make-shared"
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_audit_mount_log - Audit mount log.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_audit_mount_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
+{
+	const char *dev = r->param.mount.dev->name;
+	const char *dir = r->param.mount.dir->name;
+	const char *type = r->param.mount.type->name;
+	const unsigned long flags = r->param.mount.flags;
+	if (r->granted)
+		return 0;
+	if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT_KEYWORD))
+		tomoyo_warn_log(r, "mount -o remount %s 0x%lX", dir, flags);
+	else if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND_KEYWORD)
+		 || !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE_KEYWORD))
+		tomoyo_warn_log(r, "mount %s %s %s 0x%lX", type, dev, dir,
+				flags);
+	else if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE_KEYWORD) ||
+		 !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE_KEYWORD) ||
+		 !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE_KEYWORD) ||
+		 !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED_KEYWORD))
+		tomoyo_warn_log(r, "mount %s %s 0x%lX", type, dir, flags);
+	else
+		tomoyo_warn_log(r, "mount -t %s %s %s 0x%lX", type, dev, dir,
+				flags);
+	return tomoyo_supervisor(r,
+				 TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_MOUNT "%s %s %s 0x%lX\n",
+				 tomoyo_pattern(r->param.mount.dev),
+				 tomoyo_pattern(r->param.mount.dir), type,
+				 flags);
+}
+
+static bool tomoyo_check_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+				   const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_mount_acl *acl =
+		container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), head);
+	return tomoyo_compare_number_union(r->param.mount.flags, &acl->flags) &&
+		tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.mount.type, &acl->fs_type) &&
+		tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.mount.dir, &acl->dir_name) &&
+		(!r->param.mount.need_dev ||
+		 tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.mount.dev, &acl->dev_name));
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_mount_acl - Check permission for mount() operation.
+ *
+ * @r:        Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @dev_name: Name of device file.
+ * @dir:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @type:     Name of filesystem type.
+ * @flags:    Mount options.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name,
+			    struct path *dir, char *type, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct path path;
+	struct file_system_type *fstype = NULL;
+	const char *requested_type = NULL;
+	const char *requested_dir_name = NULL;
+	const char *requested_dev_name = NULL;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info rtype;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info rdev;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info rdir;
+	int need_dev = 0;
+	int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* Get fstype. */
+	requested_type = tomoyo_encode(type);
+	if (!requested_type)
+		goto out;
+	rtype.name = requested_type;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rtype);
+
+	/* Get mount point. */
+	requested_dir_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(dir);
+	if (!requested_dir_name) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rdir.name = requested_dir_name;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rdir);
+
+	/* Compare fs name. */
+	if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT_KEYWORD)) {
+		/* dev_name is ignored. */
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE_KEYWORD) ||
+		   !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE_KEYWORD) ||
+		   !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE_KEYWORD) ||
+		   !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED_KEYWORD)) {
+		/* dev_name is ignored. */
+	} else if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND_KEYWORD) ||
+		   !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE_KEYWORD)) {
+		need_dev = -1; /* dev_name is a directory */
+	} else {
+		fstype = get_fs_type(type);
+		if (!fstype) {
+			error = -ENODEV;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV)
+			/* dev_name is a block device file. */
+			need_dev = 1;
+	}
+	if (need_dev) {
+		/* Get mount point or device file. */
+		if (kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path)) {
+			error = -ENOENT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		requested_dev_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path);
+		if (!requested_dev_name) {
+			error = -ENOENT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Map dev_name to "<NULL>" if no dev_name given. */
+		if (!dev_name)
+			dev_name = "<NULL>";
+		requested_dev_name = tomoyo_encode(dev_name);
+		if (!requested_dev_name) {
+			error = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	rdev.name = requested_dev_name;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rdev);
+	r->param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL;
+	r->param.mount.need_dev = need_dev;
+	r->param.mount.dev = &rdev;
+	r->param.mount.dir = &rdir;
+	r->param.mount.type = &rtype;
+	r->param.mount.flags = flags;
+	do {
+		tomoyo_check_acl(r, tomoyo_check_mount_acl);
+		error = tomoyo_audit_mount_log(r);
+	} while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+ out:
+	kfree(requested_dev_name);
+	kfree(requested_dir_name);
+	if (fstype)
+		put_filesystem(fstype);
+	kfree(requested_type);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_mount_permission - Check permission for mount() operation.
+ *
+ * @dev_name:  Name of device file.
+ * @path:      Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @type:      Name of filesystem type. May be NULL.
+ * @flags:     Mount options.
+ * @data_page: Optional data. May be NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_mount_permission(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type,
+			    unsigned long flags, void *data_page)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_request_info r;
+	int error;
+	int idx;
+
+	if (tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MOUNT)
+	    == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED)
+		return 0;
+	if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
+		flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
+	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) {
+		type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT_KEYWORD;
+		flags &= ~MS_REMOUNT;
+	}
+	if (flags & MS_MOVE) {
+		type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE_KEYWORD;
+		flags &= ~MS_MOVE;
+	}
+	if (flags & MS_BIND) {
+		type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND_KEYWORD;
+		flags &= ~MS_BIND;
+	}
+	if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) {
+		type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE_KEYWORD;
+		flags &= ~MS_UNBINDABLE;
+	}
+	if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) {
+		type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE_KEYWORD;
+		flags &= ~MS_PRIVATE;
+	}
+	if (flags & MS_SLAVE) {
+		type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE_KEYWORD;
+		flags &= ~MS_SLAVE;
+	}
+	if (flags & MS_SHARED) {
+		type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED_KEYWORD;
+		flags &= ~MS_SHARED;
+	}
+	if (!type)
+		type = "<NULL>";
+	idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+	error = tomoyo_mount_acl(&r, dev_name, path, type, flags);
+	tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+	return error;
+}
+
+static bool tomoyo_same_mount_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a,
+				  const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b)
+{
+	const struct tomoyo_mount_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head);
+	const struct tomoyo_mount_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head);
+	return tomoyo_same_acl_head(&p1->head, &p2->head) &&
+		tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->dev_name, &p2->dev_name) &&
+		tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->dir_name, &p2->dir_name) &&
+		tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->fs_type, &p2->fs_type) &&
+		tomoyo_same_number_union(&p1->flags, &p2->flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_mount - Write "struct tomoyo_mount_acl" list.
+ *
+ * @data:      String to parse.
+ * @domain:    Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_mount(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+		       const bool is_delete)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_mount_acl e = { .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL };
+	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
+	char *w[4];
+	if (!tomoyo_tokenize(data, w, sizeof(w)) || !w[3][0])
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(w[0], &e.dev_name) ||
+	    !tomoyo_parse_name_union(w[1], &e.dir_name) ||
+	    !tomoyo_parse_name_union(w[2], &e.fs_type) ||
+	    !tomoyo_parse_number_union(w[3], &e.flags))
+		goto out;
+	error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, domain,
+				     tomoyo_same_mount_acl, NULL);
+ out:
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.dev_name);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.dir_name);
+	tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.fs_type);
+	tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.flags);
+	return error;
+}

security/tomoyo/path_group.c

@@ -1,172 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * security/tomoyo/path_group.c
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
- */
-
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include "common.h"
-/* The list for "struct ccs_path_group". */
-LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_path_group_list);
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_get_path_group - Allocate memory for "struct tomoyo_path_group".
- *
- * @group_name: The name of pathname group.
- *
- * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_group" on success, NULL otherwise.
- */
-struct tomoyo_path_group *tomoyo_get_path_group(const char *group_name)
-{
-	struct tomoyo_path_group *entry = NULL;
-	struct tomoyo_path_group *group = NULL;
-	const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_group_name;
-	int error = -ENOMEM;
-	if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(group_name, 0, 0, 0) ||
-	    !group_name[0])
-		return NULL;
-	saved_group_name = tomoyo_get_name(group_name);
-	if (!saved_group_name)
-		return NULL;
-	entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS);
-	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
-		goto out;
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(group, &tomoyo_path_group_list, list) {
-		if (saved_group_name != group->group_name)
-			continue;
-		atomic_inc(&group->users);
-		error = 0;
-		break;
-	}
-	if (error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
-		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->member_list);
-		entry->group_name = saved_group_name;
-		saved_group_name = NULL;
-		atomic_set(&entry->users, 1);
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_path_group_list);
-		group = entry;
-		entry = NULL;
-		error = 0;
-	}
-	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
- out:
-	tomoyo_put_name(saved_group_name);
-	kfree(entry);
-	return !error ? group : NULL;
-}
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_write_path_group_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_path_group" list.
- *
- * @data:      String to parse.
- * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success, nagative value otherwise.
- */
-int tomoyo_write_path_group_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
-{
-	struct tomoyo_path_group *group;
-	struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member;
-	struct tomoyo_path_group_member e = { };
-	int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
-	char *w[2];
-	if (!tomoyo_tokenize(data, w, sizeof(w)) || !w[1][0])
-		return -EINVAL;
-	group = tomoyo_get_path_group(w[0]);
-	if (!group)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	e.member_name = tomoyo_get_name(w[1]);
-	if (!e.member_name)
-		goto out;
-	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
-		goto out;
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, list) {
-		if (member->member_name != e.member_name)
-			continue;
-		member->is_deleted = is_delete;
-		error = 0;
-		break;
-	}
-	if (!is_delete && error) {
-		struct tomoyo_path_group_member *entry =
-			tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
-		if (entry) {
-			list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &group->member_list);
-			error = 0;
-		}
-	}
-	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
- out:
-	tomoyo_put_name(e.member_name);
-	tomoyo_put_path_group(group);
-	return error;
-}
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_read_path_group_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_path_group" list.
- *
- * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
- *
- * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
- *
- * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
- */
-bool tomoyo_read_path_group_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
-{
-	struct list_head *gpos;
-	struct list_head *mpos;
-	list_for_each_cookie(gpos, head->read_var1, &tomoyo_path_group_list) {
-		struct tomoyo_path_group *group;
-		group = list_entry(gpos, struct tomoyo_path_group, list);
-		list_for_each_cookie(mpos, head->read_var2,
-				     &group->member_list) {
-			struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member;
-			member = list_entry(mpos,
-					    struct tomoyo_path_group_member,
-					    list);
-			if (member->is_deleted)
-				continue;
-			if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_PATH_GROUP
-					      "%s %s\n",
-					      group->group_name->name,
-					      member->member_name->name))
-				return false;
-		}
-	}
-	return true;
-}
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_path_matches_group - Check whether the given pathname matches members of the given pathname group.
- *
- * @pathname:        The name of pathname.
- * @group:           Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_group".
- * @may_use_pattern: True if wild card is permitted.
- *
- * Returns true if @pathname matches pathnames in @group, false otherwise.
- *
- * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
- */
-bool tomoyo_path_matches_group(const struct tomoyo_path_info *pathname,
-			       const struct tomoyo_path_group *group,
-			       const bool may_use_pattern)
-{
-	struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member;
-	bool matched = false;
-	list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, list) {
-		if (member->is_deleted)
-			continue;
-		if (!member->member_name->is_patterned) {
-			if (tomoyo_pathcmp(pathname, member->member_name))
-				continue;
-		} else if (may_use_pattern) {
-			if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(pathname,
-							 member->member_name))
-				continue;
-		} else
-			continue;
-		matched = true;
-		break;
-	}
-	return matched;
-}

security/tomoyo/realpath.c

@@ -1,130 +1,71 @@
 /*
  * security/tomoyo/realpath.c
  *
- * Get the canonicalized absolute pathnames. The basis for TOMOYO.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
- *
- * Version: 2.2.0   2009/04/01
+ * Pathname calculation functions for TOMOYO.
  *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010  NTT DATA CORPORATION
  */
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/mnt_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
-#include <linux/hash.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
 #include "common.h"
 
 /**
  * tomoyo_encode: Convert binary string to ascii string.
  *
- * @buffer:  Buffer for ASCII string.
- * @buflen:  Size of @buffer.
- * @str:     Binary string.
+ * @str: String in binary format.
  *
- * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise.
+ * Returns pointer to @str in ascii format on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This function uses kzalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function
+ * didn't return NULL.
  */
-int tomoyo_encode(char *buffer, int buflen, const char *str)
+char *tomoyo_encode(const char *str)
 {
-	while (1) {
-		const unsigned char c = *(unsigned char *) str++;
+	int len = 0;
+	const char *p = str;
+	char *cp;
+	char *cp0;
 
-		if (tomoyo_is_valid(c)) {
-			if (--buflen <= 0)
-				break;
-			*buffer++ = (char) c;
-			if (c != '\\')
-				continue;
-			if (--buflen <= 0)
-				break;
-			*buffer++ = (char) c;
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (!c) {
-			if (--buflen <= 0)
-				break;
-			*buffer = '\0';
-			return 0;
-		}
-		buflen -= 4;
-		if (buflen <= 0)
-			break;
-		*buffer++ = '\\';
-		*buffer++ = (c >> 6) + '0';
-		*buffer++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
-		*buffer++ = (c & 7) + '0';
+	if (!p)
+		return NULL;
+	while (*p) {
+		const unsigned char c = *p++;
+		if (c == '\\')
+			len += 2;
+		else if (c > ' ' && c < 127)
+			len++;
+		else
+			len += 4;
 	}
-	return -ENOMEM;
-}
+	len++;
+	/* Reserve space for appending "/". */
+	cp = kzalloc(len + 10, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!cp)
+		return NULL;
+	cp0 = cp;
+	p = str;
+	while (*p) {
+		const unsigned char c = *p++;
 
-/**
- * tomoyo_realpath_from_path2 - Returns realpath(3) of the given dentry but ignores chroot'ed root.
- *
- * @path:        Pointer to "struct path".
- * @newname:     Pointer to buffer to return value in.
- * @newname_len: Size of @newname.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
- *
- * If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
- * Characters out of 0x20 < c < 0x7F range are converted to
- * \ooo style octal string.
- * Character \ is converted to \\ string.
- */
-int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname,
-			       int newname_len)
-{
-	int error = -ENOMEM;
-	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
-	char *sp;
-
-	if (!dentry || !path->mnt || !newname || newname_len <= 2048)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_dname) {
-		/* For "socket:[\$]" and "pipe:[\$]". */
-		static const int offset = 1536;
-		sp = dentry->d_op->d_dname(dentry, newname + offset,
-					   newname_len - offset);
-	} else {
-		struct path ns_root = {.mnt = NULL, .dentry = NULL};
-
-		spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
-		/* go to whatever namespace root we are under */
-		sp = __d_path(path, &ns_root, newname, newname_len);
-		spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
-		/* Prepend "/proc" prefix if using internal proc vfs mount. */
-		if (!IS_ERR(sp) && (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) &&
-		    (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
-			sp -= 5;
-			if (sp >= newname)
-				memcpy(sp, "/proc", 5);
-			else
-				sp = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		if (c == '\\') {
+			*cp++ = '\\';
+			*cp++ = '\\';
+		} else if (c > ' ' && c < 127) {
+			*cp++ = c;
+		} else {
+			*cp++ = '\\';
+			*cp++ = (c >> 6) + '0';
+			*cp++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
+			*cp++ = (c & 7) + '0';
 		}
 	}
-	if (IS_ERR(sp))
-		error = PTR_ERR(sp);
-	else
-		error = tomoyo_encode(newname, sp - newname, sp);
-	/* Append trailing '/' if dentry is a directory. */
-	if (!error && dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)
-	    && *newname) {
-		sp = newname + strlen(newname);
-		if (*(sp - 1) != '/') {
-			if (sp < newname + newname_len - 4) {
-				*sp++ = '/';
-				*sp = '\0';
-			} else {
-				error = -ENOMEM;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if (error)
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "tomoyo_realpath: Pathname too long.\n");
-	return error;
+	return cp0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -134,41 +75,90 @@ int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname,
  *
  * Returns the realpath of the given @path on success, NULL otherwise.
  *
+ * If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
+ * Characters out of 0x20 < c < 0x7F range are converted to
+ * \ooo style octal string.
+ * Character \ is converted to \\ string.
+ *
  * These functions use kzalloc(), so the caller must call kfree()
  * if these functions didn't return NULL.
  */
 char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path)
 {
-	char *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer), GFP_NOFS);
-
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer)
-		     <= TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1);
-	if (!buf)
+	char *buf = NULL;
+	char *name = NULL;
+	unsigned int buf_len = PAGE_SIZE / 2;
+	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
+	bool is_dir;
+	if (!dentry)
 		return NULL;
-	if (tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(path, buf,
-				       TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1) == 0)
-		return buf;
-	kfree(buf);
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_realpath - Get realpath of a pathname.
- *
- * @pathname: The pathname to solve.
- *
- * Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise.
- */
-char *tomoyo_realpath(const char *pathname)
-{
-	struct path path;
-
-	if (pathname && kern_path(pathname, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path) == 0) {
-		char *buf = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path);
-		path_put(&path);
-		return buf;
+	is_dir = dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
+	while (1) {
+		struct path ns_root = { .mnt = NULL, .dentry = NULL };
+		char *pos;
+		buf_len <<= 1;
+		kfree(buf);
+		buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!buf)
+			break;
+		/* Get better name for socket. */
+		if (dentry->d_sb && dentry->d_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
+			struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+			struct socket *sock = inode ? SOCKET_I(inode) : NULL;
+			struct sock *sk = sock ? sock->sk : NULL;
+			if (sk) {
+				snprintf(buf, buf_len - 1, "socket:[family=%u:"
+					 "type=%u:protocol=%u]", sk->sk_family,
+					 sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol);
+			} else {
+				snprintf(buf, buf_len - 1, "socket:[unknown]");
+			}
+			name = tomoyo_encode(buf);
+			break;
+		}
+		/* For "socket:[\$]" and "pipe:[\$]". */
+		if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_dname) {
+			pos = dentry->d_op->d_dname(dentry, buf, buf_len - 1);
+			if (IS_ERR(pos))
+				continue;
+			name = tomoyo_encode(pos);
+			break;
+		}
+		/* If we don't have a vfsmount, we can't calculate. */
+		if (!path->mnt)
+			break;
+		spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
+		/* go to whatever namespace root we are under */
+		pos = __d_path(path, &ns_root, buf, buf_len);
+		spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
+		/* Prepend "/proc" prefix if using internal proc vfs mount. */
+		if (!IS_ERR(pos) && (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) &&
+		    (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC)) {
+			pos -= 5;
+			if (pos >= buf)
+				memcpy(pos, "/proc", 5);
+			else
+				pos = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		}
+		if (IS_ERR(pos))
+			continue;
+		name = tomoyo_encode(pos);
+		break;
 	}
-	return NULL;
+	kfree(buf);
+	if (!name)
+		tomoyo_warn_oom(__func__);
+	else if (is_dir && *name) {
+		/* Append trailing '/' if dentry is a directory. */
+		char *pos = name + strlen(name) - 1;
+		if (*pos != '/')
+			/*
+			 * This is OK because tomoyo_encode() reserves space
+			 * for appending "/".
+			 */
+			*++pos = '/';
+	}
+	return name;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -189,191 +179,3 @@ char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname)
 	}
 	return NULL;
 }
-
-/* Memory allocated for non-string data. */
-static atomic_t tomoyo_policy_memory_size;
-/* Quota for holding policy. */
-static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_policy;
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_memory_ok - Check memory quota.
- *
- * @ptr: Pointer to allocated memory.
- *
- * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
- *
- * Caller holds tomoyo_policy_lock.
- * Memory pointed by @ptr will be zeroed on success.
- */
-bool tomoyo_memory_ok(void *ptr)
-{
-	int allocated_len = ptr ? ksize(ptr) : 0;
-	atomic_add(allocated_len, &tomoyo_policy_memory_size);
-	if (ptr && (!tomoyo_quota_for_policy ||
-		    atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size)
-		    <= tomoyo_quota_for_policy)) {
-		memset(ptr, 0, allocated_len);
-		return true;
-	}
-	printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory "
-	       "for tomoyo_alloc_element().\n");
-	if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
-		panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n");
-	return false;
-}
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_commit_ok - Check memory quota.
- *
- * @data:   Data to copy from.
- * @size:   Size in byte.
- *
- * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise.
- */
-void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size)
-{
-	void *ptr = kzalloc(size, GFP_NOFS);
-	if (tomoyo_memory_ok(ptr)) {
-		memmove(ptr, data, size);
-		memset(data, 0, size);
-		return ptr;
-	}
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_memory_free - Free memory for elements.
- *
- * @ptr:  Pointer to allocated memory.
- */
-void tomoyo_memory_free(void *ptr)
-{
-	atomic_sub(ksize(ptr), &tomoyo_policy_memory_size);
-	kfree(ptr);
-}
-
-/*
- * tomoyo_name_list is used for holding string data used by TOMOYO.
- * Since same string data is likely used for multiple times (e.g.
- * "/lib/libc-2.5.so"), TOMOYO shares string data in the form of
- * "const struct tomoyo_path_info *".
- */
-struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH];
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_get_name - Allocate permanent memory for string data.
- *
- * @name: The string to store into the permernent memory.
- *
- * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
- */
-const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_name(const char *name)
-{
-	struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr;
-	unsigned int hash;
-	int len;
-	int allocated_len;
-	struct list_head *head;
-
-	if (!name)
-		return NULL;
-	len = strlen(name) + 1;
-	hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1);
-	head = &tomoyo_name_list[hash_long(hash, TOMOYO_HASH_BITS)];
-	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
-		return NULL;
-	list_for_each_entry(ptr, head, list) {
-		if (hash != ptr->entry.hash || strcmp(name, ptr->entry.name))
-			continue;
-		atomic_inc(&ptr->users);
-		goto out;
-	}
-	ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(*ptr) + len, GFP_NOFS);
-	allocated_len = ptr ? ksize(ptr) : 0;
-	if (!ptr || (tomoyo_quota_for_policy &&
-		     atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size) + allocated_len
-		     > tomoyo_quota_for_policy)) {
-		kfree(ptr);
-		printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory "
-		       "for tomoyo_get_name().\n");
-		if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
-			panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n");
-		ptr = NULL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	atomic_add(allocated_len, &tomoyo_policy_memory_size);
-	ptr->entry.name = ((char *) ptr) + sizeof(*ptr);
-	memmove((char *) ptr->entry.name, name, len);
-	atomic_set(&ptr->users, 1);
-	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&ptr->entry);
-	list_add_tail(&ptr->list, head);
- out:
-	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
-	return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL;
-}
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_realpath_init - Initialize realpath related code.
- */
-void __init tomoyo_realpath_init(void)
-{
-	int i;
-
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN > PATH_MAX);
-	for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++)
-		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_name_list[i]);
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.acl_info_list);
-	tomoyo_kernel_domain.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME);
-	/*
-	 * tomoyo_read_lock() is not needed because this function is
-	 * called before the first "delete" request.
-	 */
-	list_add_tail_rcu(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.list, &tomoyo_domain_list);
-	if (tomoyo_find_domain(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME) != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
-		panic("Can't register tomoyo_kernel_domain");
-}
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_read_memory_counter - Check for memory usage in bytes.
- *
- * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
- *
- * Returns memory usage.
- */
-int tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
-{
-	if (!head->read_eof) {
-		const unsigned int policy
-			= atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size);
-		char buffer[64];
-
-		memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
-		if (tomoyo_quota_for_policy)
-			snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1,
-				 "   (Quota: %10u)",
-				 tomoyo_quota_for_policy);
-		else
-			buffer[0] = '\0';
-		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Policy:  %10u%s\n", policy, buffer);
-		tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Total:   %10u\n", policy);
-		head->read_eof = true;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_write_memory_quota - Set memory quota.
- *
- * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
- *
- * Returns 0.
- */
-int tomoyo_write_memory_quota(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
-{
-	char *data = head->write_buf;
-	unsigned int size;
-
-	if (sscanf(data, "Policy: %u", &size) == 1)
-		tomoyo_quota_for_policy = size;
-	return 0;
-}

security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/common.c
+ *
+ * Securityfs interface for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "common.h"
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_open - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	const int key = ((u8 *) file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_private)
+		- ((u8 *) NULL);
+	return tomoyo_open_control(key, file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_release - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return tomoyo_close_control(file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_poll - poll() for /proc/ccs/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static unsigned int tomoyo_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+{
+	return tomoyo_poll_control(file, wait);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf:   Pointer to buffer.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos:  Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tomoyo_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+			   loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return tomoyo_read_control(file, buf, count);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file:  Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf:   Pointer to buffer.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos:  Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns @count on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tomoyo_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return tomoyo_write_control(file, buf, count);
+}
+
+/*
+ * tomoyo_operations is a "struct file_operations" which is used for handling
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * Some files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory accept open(O_RDWR).
+ * See tomoyo_io_buffer for internals.
+ */
+static const struct file_operations tomoyo_operations = {
+	.open    = tomoyo_open,
+	.release = tomoyo_release,
+	.poll    = tomoyo_poll,
+	.read    = tomoyo_read,
+	.write   = tomoyo_write,
+	.llseek  = noop_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_create_entry - Create interface files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory.
+ *
+ * @name:   The name of the interface file.
+ * @mode:   The permission of the interface file.
+ * @parent: The parent directory.
+ * @key:    Type of interface.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void __init tomoyo_create_entry(const char *name, const mode_t mode,
+				       struct dentry *parent, const u8 key)
+{
+	securityfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, ((u8 *) NULL) + key,
+			       &tomoyo_operations);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_initerface_init - Initialize /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int __init tomoyo_initerface_init(void)
+{
+	struct dentry *tomoyo_dir;
+
+	/* Don't create securityfs entries unless registered. */
+	if (current_cred()->security != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+		return 0;
+
+	tomoyo_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("query",            0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_QUERY);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("domain_policy",    0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("exception_policy", 0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("self_domain",      0400, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN);
+	tomoyo_create_entry(".domain_status",   0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS);
+	tomoyo_create_entry(".process_status",  0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("meminfo",          0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_MEMINFO);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("profile",          0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_PROFILE);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("manager",          0600, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_MANAGER);
+	tomoyo_create_entry("version",          0400, tomoyo_dir,
+			    TOMOYO_VERSION);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+fs_initcall(tomoyo_initerface_init);

security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c

@@ -3,10 +3,7 @@
  *
  * LSM hooks for TOMOYO Linux.
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
- *
- * Version: 2.2.0   2009/04/01
- *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010  NTT DATA CORPORATION
  */
 
 #include <linux/security.h>
@@ -96,8 +93,7 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, O_RDONLY);
 }
 
-static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
-				unsigned int time_attrs)
+static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path)
 {
 	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE, path);
 }
@@ -112,7 +108,8 @@ static int tomoyo_path_mkdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
 			     int mode)
 {
 	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
-	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR, &path);
+	return tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR, &path,
+				       mode & S_IALLUGO);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_rmdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
@@ -133,6 +130,7 @@ static int tomoyo_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
 	int type = TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE;
+	const unsigned int perm = mode & S_IALLUGO;
 
 	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
 	case S_IFCHR:
@@ -141,6 +139,12 @@ static int tomoyo_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
 	case S_IFBLK:
 		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK;
 		break;
+	default:
+		goto no_dev;
+	}
+	return tomoyo_mkdev_perm(type, &path, perm, dev);
+ no_dev:
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
 	case S_IFIFO:
 		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO;
 		break;
@@ -148,7 +152,7 @@ static int tomoyo_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
 		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK;
 		break;
 	}
-	return tomoyo_path_perm(type, &path);
+	return tomoyo_path_number_perm(type, &path, perm);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
@@ -173,7 +177,7 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			     unsigned long arg)
 {
 	if (cmd == F_SETFL && ((arg ^ file->f_flags) & O_APPEND))
-		return tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(file);
+		return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE, &file->f_path);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -189,23 +193,24 @@ static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
 static int tomoyo_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			     unsigned long arg)
 {
-	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL, &file->f_path);
+	return tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL, &file->f_path, cmd);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
 			     mode_t mode)
 {
 	struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
-	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD, &path);
+	return tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD, &path,
+				       mode & S_IALLUGO);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
 {
 	int error = 0;
 	if (uid != (uid_t) -1)
-		error = tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, path);
+		error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, path, uid);
 	if (!error && gid != (gid_t) -1)
-		error = tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, path);
+		error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, path, gid);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -217,7 +222,7 @@ static int tomoyo_path_chroot(struct path *path)
 static int tomoyo_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 			   char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
 {
-	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT, path);
+	return tomoyo_mount_permission(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
@@ -277,7 +282,7 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
 		panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux");
 	printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
 	cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
-	tomoyo_realpath_init();
+	tomoyo_mm_init();
 	return 0;
 }
 

security/tomoyo/util.c

@@ -0,0 +1,963 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/util.c
+ *
+ * Utility functions for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "common.h"
+
+/* Lock for protecting policy. */
+DEFINE_MUTEX(tomoyo_policy_lock);
+
+/* Has /sbin/init started? */
+bool tomoyo_policy_loaded;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_parse_ulong - Parse an "unsigned long" value.
+ *
+ * @result: Pointer to "unsigned long".
+ * @str:    Pointer to string to parse.
+ *
+ * Returns value type on success, 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * The @src is updated to point the first character after the value
+ * on success.
+ */
+static u8 tomoyo_parse_ulong(unsigned long *result, char **str)
+{
+	const char *cp = *str;
+	char *ep;
+	int base = 10;
+	if (*cp == '0') {
+		char c = *(cp + 1);
+		if (c == 'x' || c == 'X') {
+			base = 16;
+			cp += 2;
+		} else if (c >= '0' && c <= '7') {
+			base = 8;
+			cp++;
+		}
+	}
+	*result = simple_strtoul(cp, &ep, base);
+	if (cp == ep)
+		return 0;
+	*str = ep;
+	switch (base) {
+	case 16:
+		return TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_HEXADECIMAL;
+	case 8:
+		return TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_OCTAL;
+	default:
+		return TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_DECIMAL;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_ulong - Print an "unsigned long" value.
+ *
+ * @buffer:     Pointer to buffer.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ * @value:      An "unsigned long" value.
+ * @type:       Type of @value.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_print_ulong(char *buffer, const int buffer_len,
+			const unsigned long value, const u8 type)
+{
+	if (type == TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_DECIMAL)
+		snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "%lu", value);
+	else if (type == TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_OCTAL)
+		snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "0%lo", value);
+	else if (type == TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_HEXADECIMAL)
+		snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "0x%lX", value);
+	else
+		snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "type(%u)", type);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_parse_name_union - Parse a tomoyo_name_union.
+ *
+ * @filename: Name or name group.
+ * @ptr:      Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_parse_name_union(const char *filename,
+			     struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+	if (!tomoyo_correct_word(filename))
+		return false;
+	if (filename[0] == '@') {
+		ptr->group = tomoyo_get_group(filename + 1, TOMOYO_PATH_GROUP);
+		ptr->is_group = true;
+		return ptr->group != NULL;
+	}
+	ptr->filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename);
+	ptr->is_group = false;
+	return ptr->filename != NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_parse_number_union - Parse a tomoyo_number_union.
+ *
+ * @data: Number or number range or number group.
+ * @ptr:  Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_parse_number_union(char *data, struct tomoyo_number_union *num)
+{
+	u8 type;
+	unsigned long v;
+	memset(num, 0, sizeof(*num));
+	if (data[0] == '@') {
+		if (!tomoyo_correct_word(data))
+			return false;
+		num->group = tomoyo_get_group(data + 1, TOMOYO_NUMBER_GROUP);
+		num->is_group = true;
+		return num->group != NULL;
+	}
+	type = tomoyo_parse_ulong(&v, &data);
+	if (!type)
+		return false;
+	num->values[0] = v;
+	num->min_type = type;
+	if (!*data) {
+		num->values[1] = v;
+		num->max_type = type;
+		return true;
+	}
+	if (*data++ != '-')
+		return false;
+	type = tomoyo_parse_ulong(&v, &data);
+	if (!type || *data)
+		return false;
+	num->values[1] = v;
+	num->max_type = type;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_byte_range - Check whether the string is a \ooo style octal value.
+ *
+ * @str: Pointer to the string.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @str is a \ooo style octal value, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * TOMOYO uses \ooo style representation for 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x7F - 0xFF.
+ * This function verifies that \ooo is in valid range.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_byte_range(const char *str)
+{
+	return *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '3' &&
+		*str >= '0' && *str++ <= '7' &&
+		*str >= '0' && *str <= '7';
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_alphabet_char - Check whether the character is an alphabet.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is an alphabet character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_alphabet_char(const char c)
+{
+	return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z');
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_make_byte - Make byte value from three octal characters.
+ *
+ * @c1: The first character.
+ * @c2: The second character.
+ * @c3: The third character.
+ *
+ * Returns byte value.
+ */
+static inline u8 tomoyo_make_byte(const u8 c1, const u8 c2, const u8 c3)
+{
+	return ((c1 - '0') << 6) + ((c2 - '0') << 3) + (c3 - '0');
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_str_starts - Check whether the given string starts with the given keyword.
+ *
+ * @src:  Pointer to pointer to the string.
+ * @find: Pointer to the keyword.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @src starts with @find, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The @src is updated to point the first character after the @find
+ * if @src starts with @find.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_str_starts(char **src, const char *find)
+{
+	const int len = strlen(find);
+	char *tmp = *src;
+
+	if (strncmp(tmp, find, len))
+		return false;
+	tmp += len;
+	*src = tmp;
+	return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_normalize_line - Format string.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The line to normalize.
+ *
+ * Leading and trailing whitespaces are removed.
+ * Multiple whitespaces are packed into single space.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+	unsigned char *sp = buffer;
+	unsigned char *dp = buffer;
+	bool first = true;
+
+	while (tomoyo_invalid(*sp))
+		sp++;
+	while (*sp) {
+		if (!first)
+			*dp++ = ' ';
+		first = false;
+		while (tomoyo_valid(*sp))
+			*dp++ = *sp++;
+		while (tomoyo_invalid(*sp))
+			sp++;
+	}
+	*dp = '\0';
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_tokenize - Tokenize string.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The line to tokenize.
+ * @w:      Pointer to "char *".
+ * @size:   Sizeof @w .
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_tokenize(char *buffer, char *w[], size_t size)
+{
+	int count = size / sizeof(char *);
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		w[i] = "";
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		char *cp = strchr(buffer, ' ');
+		if (cp)
+			*cp = '\0';
+		w[i] = buffer;
+		if (!cp)
+			break;
+		buffer = cp + 1;
+	}
+	return i < count || !*buffer;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_correct_word2 - Validate a string.
+ *
+ * @string: The string to check. May be non-'\0'-terminated.
+ * @len:    Length of @string.
+ *
+ * Check whether the given string follows the naming rules.
+ * Returns true if @string follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_correct_word2(const char *string, size_t len)
+{
+	const char *const start = string;
+	bool in_repetition = false;
+	unsigned char c;
+	unsigned char d;
+	unsigned char e;
+	if (!len)
+		goto out;
+	while (len--) {
+		c = *string++;
+		if (c == '\\') {
+			if (!len--)
+				goto out;
+			c = *string++;
+			switch (c) {
+			case '\\':  /* "\\" */
+				continue;
+			case '$':   /* "\$" */
+			case '+':   /* "\+" */
+			case '?':   /* "\?" */
+			case '*':   /* "\*" */
+			case '@':   /* "\@" */
+			case 'x':   /* "\x" */
+			case 'X':   /* "\X" */
+			case 'a':   /* "\a" */
+			case 'A':   /* "\A" */
+			case '-':   /* "\-" */
+				continue;
+			case '{':   /* "/\{" */
+				if (string - 3 < start || *(string - 3) != '/')
+					break;
+				in_repetition = true;
+				continue;
+			case '}':   /* "\}/" */
+				if (*string != '/')
+					break;
+				if (!in_repetition)
+					break;
+				in_repetition = false;
+				continue;
+			case '0':   /* "\ooo" */
+			case '1':
+			case '2':
+			case '3':
+				if (!len-- || !len--)
+					break;
+				d = *string++;
+				e = *string++;
+				if (d < '0' || d > '7' || e < '0' || e > '7')
+					break;
+				c = tomoyo_make_byte(c, d, e);
+				if (tomoyo_invalid(c))
+					continue; /* pattern is not \000 */
+			}
+			goto out;
+		} else if (in_repetition && c == '/') {
+			goto out;
+		} else if (tomoyo_invalid(c)) {
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if (in_repetition)
+		goto out;
+	return true;
+ out:
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_correct_word - Validate a string.
+ *
+ * @string: The string to check.
+ *
+ * Check whether the given string follows the naming rules.
+ * Returns true if @string follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_correct_word(const char *string)
+{
+	return tomoyo_correct_word2(string, strlen(string));
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_correct_path - Validate a pathname.
+ *
+ * @filename: The pathname to check.
+ *
+ * Check whether the given pathname follows the naming rules.
+ * Returns true if @filename follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_correct_path(const char *filename)
+{
+	return *filename == '/' && tomoyo_correct_word(filename);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_correct_domain - Check whether the given domainname follows the naming rules.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The domainname to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @domainname follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname)
+{
+	if (!domainname || strncmp(domainname, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME,
+				   TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN))
+		goto out;
+	domainname += TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN;
+	if (!*domainname)
+		return true;
+	if (*domainname++ != ' ')
+		goto out;
+	while (1) {
+		const unsigned char *cp = strchr(domainname, ' ');
+		if (!cp)
+			break;
+		if (*domainname != '/' ||
+		    !tomoyo_correct_word2(domainname, cp - domainname - 1))
+			goto out;
+		domainname = cp + 1;
+	}
+	return tomoyo_correct_path(domainname);
+ out:
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_domain_def - Check whether the given token can be a domainname.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The token to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @buffer possibly be a domainname, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+	return !strncmp(buffer, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_domain - Find a domain by the given name.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The domainname to find.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" if found, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+	struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+	name.name = domainname;
+	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+		if (!domain->is_deleted &&
+		    !tomoyo_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname))
+			return domain;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_const_part_length - Evaluate the initial length without a pattern in a token.
+ *
+ * @filename: The string to evaluate.
+ *
+ * Returns the initial length without a pattern in @filename.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_const_part_length(const char *filename)
+{
+	char c;
+	int len = 0;
+
+	if (!filename)
+		return 0;
+	while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') {
+		if (c != '\\') {
+			len++;
+			continue;
+		}
+		c = *filename++;
+		switch (c) {
+		case '\\':  /* "\\" */
+			len += 2;
+			continue;
+		case '0':   /* "\ooo" */
+		case '1':
+		case '2':
+		case '3':
+			c = *filename++;
+			if (c < '0' || c > '7')
+				break;
+			c = *filename++;
+			if (c < '0' || c > '7')
+				break;
+			len += 4;
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_fill_path_info - Fill in "struct tomoyo_path_info" members.
+ *
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" to fill in.
+ *
+ * The caller sets "struct tomoyo_path_info"->name.
+ */
+void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr)
+{
+	const char *name = ptr->name;
+	const int len = strlen(name);
+
+	ptr->const_len = tomoyo_const_part_length(name);
+	ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/');
+	ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len);
+	ptr->hash = full_name_hash(name, len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2 - Pattern matching without '/' character and "\-" pattern.
+ *
+ * @filename:     The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern:      The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end:  The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(const char *filename,
+					 const char *filename_end,
+					 const char *pattern,
+					 const char *pattern_end)
+{
+	while (filename < filename_end && pattern < pattern_end) {
+		char c;
+		if (*pattern != '\\') {
+			if (*filename++ != *pattern++)
+				return false;
+			continue;
+		}
+		c = *filename;
+		pattern++;
+		switch (*pattern) {
+			int i;
+			int j;
+		case '?':
+			if (c == '/') {
+				return false;
+			} else if (c == '\\') {
+				if (filename[1] == '\\')
+					filename++;
+				else if (tomoyo_byte_range(filename + 1))
+					filename += 3;
+				else
+					return false;
+			}
+			break;
+		case '\\':
+			if (c != '\\')
+				return false;
+			if (*++filename != '\\')
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case '+':
+			if (!isdigit(c))
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case 'x':
+			if (!isxdigit(c))
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			if (!tomoyo_alphabet_char(c))
+				return false;
+			break;
+		case '0':
+		case '1':
+		case '2':
+		case '3':
+			if (c == '\\' && tomoyo_byte_range(filename + 1)
+			    && strncmp(filename + 1, pattern, 3) == 0) {
+				filename += 3;
+				pattern += 2;
+				break;
+			}
+			return false; /* Not matched. */
+		case '*':
+		case '@':
+			for (i = 0; i <= filename_end - filename; i++) {
+				if (tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(
+						    filename + i, filename_end,
+						    pattern + 1, pattern_end))
+					return true;
+				c = filename[i];
+				if (c == '.' && *pattern == '@')
+					break;
+				if (c != '\\')
+					continue;
+				if (filename[i + 1] == '\\')
+					i++;
+				else if (tomoyo_byte_range(filename + i + 1))
+					i += 3;
+				else
+					break; /* Bad pattern. */
+			}
+			return false; /* Not matched. */
+		default:
+			j = 0;
+			c = *pattern;
+			if (c == '$') {
+				while (isdigit(filename[j]))
+					j++;
+			} else if (c == 'X') {
+				while (isxdigit(filename[j]))
+					j++;
+			} else if (c == 'A') {
+				while (tomoyo_alphabet_char(filename[j]))
+					j++;
+			}
+			for (i = 1; i <= j; i++) {
+				if (tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(
+						    filename + i, filename_end,
+						    pattern + 1, pattern_end))
+					return true;
+			}
+			return false; /* Not matched or bad pattern. */
+		}
+		filename++;
+		pattern++;
+	}
+	while (*pattern == '\\' &&
+	       (*(pattern + 1) == '*' || *(pattern + 1) == '@'))
+		pattern += 2;
+	return filename == filename_end && pattern == pattern_end;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_matches_pattern - Pattern matching without '/' character.
+ *
+ * @filename:     The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern:      The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end:  The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(const char *filename,
+					const char *filename_end,
+					const char *pattern,
+					const char *pattern_end)
+{
+	const char *pattern_start = pattern;
+	bool first = true;
+	bool result;
+
+	while (pattern < pattern_end - 1) {
+		/* Split at "\-" pattern. */
+		if (*pattern++ != '\\' || *pattern++ != '-')
+			continue;
+		result = tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(filename,
+						      filename_end,
+						      pattern_start,
+						      pattern - 2);
+		if (first)
+			result = !result;
+		if (result)
+			return false;
+		first = false;
+		pattern_start = pattern;
+	}
+	result = tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(filename, filename_end,
+					      pattern_start, pattern_end);
+	return first ? result : !result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2 - Do pathname pattern matching.
+ *
+ * @f: The start of string to check.
+ * @p: The start of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @f matches @p, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(const char *f, const char *p)
+{
+	const char *f_delimiter;
+	const char *p_delimiter;
+
+	while (*f && *p) {
+		f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/');
+		if (!f_delimiter)
+			f_delimiter = f + strlen(f);
+		p_delimiter = strchr(p, '/');
+		if (!p_delimiter)
+			p_delimiter = p + strlen(p);
+		if (*p == '\\' && *(p + 1) == '{')
+			goto recursive;
+		if (!tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p,
+						 p_delimiter))
+			return false;
+		f = f_delimiter;
+		if (*f)
+			f++;
+		p = p_delimiter;
+		if (*p)
+			p++;
+	}
+	/* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */
+	while (*p == '\\' &&
+	       (*(p + 1) == '*' || *(p + 1) == '@'))
+		p += 2;
+	return !*f && !*p;
+ recursive:
+	/*
+	 * The "\{" pattern is permitted only after '/' character.
+	 * This guarantees that below "*(p - 1)" is safe.
+	 * Also, the "\}" pattern is permitted only before '/' character
+	 * so that "\{" + "\}" pair will not break the "\-" operator.
+	 */
+	if (*(p - 1) != '/' || p_delimiter <= p + 3 || *p_delimiter != '/' ||
+	    *(p_delimiter - 1) != '}' || *(p_delimiter - 2) != '\\')
+		return false; /* Bad pattern. */
+	do {
+		/* Compare current component with pattern. */
+		if (!tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p + 2,
+						 p_delimiter - 2))
+			break;
+		/* Proceed to next component. */
+		f = f_delimiter;
+		if (!*f)
+			break;
+		f++;
+		/* Continue comparison. */
+		if (tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(f, p_delimiter + 1))
+			return true;
+		f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/');
+	} while (f_delimiter);
+	return false; /* Not matched. */
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern - Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern.
+ *
+ * @filename: The filename to check.
+ * @pattern:  The pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if matches, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The following patterns are available.
+ *   \\     \ itself.
+ *   \ooo   Octal representation of a byte.
+ *   \*     Zero or more repetitions of characters other than '/'.
+ *   \@     Zero or more repetitions of characters other than '/' or '.'.
+ *   \?     1 byte character other than '/'.
+ *   \$     One or more repetitions of decimal digits.
+ *   \+     1 decimal digit.
+ *   \X     One or more repetitions of hexadecimal digits.
+ *   \x     1 hexadecimal digit.
+ *   \A     One or more repetitions of alphabet characters.
+ *   \a     1 alphabet character.
+ *
+ *   \-     Subtraction operator.
+ *
+ *   /\{dir\}/   '/' + 'One or more repetitions of dir/' (e.g. /dir/ /dir/dir/
+ *               /dir/dir/dir/ ).
+ */
+bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+				 const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern)
+{
+	const char *f = filename->name;
+	const char *p = pattern->name;
+	const int len = pattern->const_len;
+
+	/* If @pattern doesn't contain pattern, I can use strcmp(). */
+	if (!pattern->is_patterned)
+		return !tomoyo_pathcmp(filename, pattern);
+	/* Don't compare directory and non-directory. */
+	if (filename->is_dir != pattern->is_dir)
+		return false;
+	/* Compare the initial length without patterns. */
+	if (strncmp(f, p, len))
+		return false;
+	f += len;
+	p += len;
+	return tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(f, p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_exe - Get tomoyo_realpath() of current process.
+ *
+ * Returns the tomoyo_realpath() of current process on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This function uses kzalloc(), so the caller must call kfree()
+ * if this function didn't return NULL.
+ */
+const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	const char *cp = NULL;
+
+	if (!mm)
+		return NULL;
+	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+		if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) {
+			cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	return cp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_mode - Get MAC mode.
+ *
+ * @profile: Profile number.
+ * @index:   Index number of functionality.
+ *
+ * Returns mode.
+ */
+int tomoyo_get_mode(const u8 profile, const u8 index)
+{
+	u8 mode;
+	const u8 category = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE;
+	if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+		return TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED;
+	mode = tomoyo_profile(profile)->config[index];
+	if (mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT)
+		mode = tomoyo_profile(profile)->config[category];
+	if (mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT)
+		mode = tomoyo_profile(profile)->default_config;
+	return mode & 3;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_init_request_info - Initialize "struct tomoyo_request_info" members.
+ *
+ * @r:      Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info" to initialize.
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". NULL for tomoyo_domain().
+ * @index:  Index number of functionality.
+ *
+ * Returns mode.
+ */
+int tomoyo_init_request_info(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
+			     struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, const u8 index)
+{
+	u8 profile;
+	memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r));
+	if (!domain)
+		domain = tomoyo_domain();
+	r->domain = domain;
+	profile = domain->profile;
+	r->profile = profile;
+	r->type = index;
+	r->mode = tomoyo_get_mode(profile, index);
+	return r->mode;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_last_word - Get last component of a line.
+ *
+ * @line: A line.
+ *
+ * Returns the last word of a line.
+ */
+const char *tomoyo_last_word(const char *name)
+{
+	const char *cp = strrchr(name, ' ');
+	if (cp)
+		return cp + 1;
+	return name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_warn_log - Print warning or error message on console.
+ *
+ * @r:   Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ * @fmt: The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters.
+ */
+void tomoyo_warn_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	char *buffer;
+	const struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain = r->domain;
+	const struct tomoyo_profile *profile = tomoyo_profile(domain->profile);
+	switch (r->mode) {
+	case TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING:
+		if (!profile->enforcing->enforcing_verbose)
+			return;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_CONFIG_PERMISSIVE:
+		if (!profile->permissive->permissive_verbose)
+			return;
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_CONFIG_LEARNING:
+		if (!profile->learning->learning_verbose)
+			return;
+		break;
+	}
+	buffer = kmalloc(4096, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return;
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(buffer, 4095, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	buffer[4095] = '\0';
+	printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Access %s denied for %s\n",
+	       r->mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING ? "ERROR" : "WARNING", buffer,
+	       tomoyo_last_word(domain->domainname->name));
+	kfree(buffer);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok - Check for domain's quota.
+ *
+ * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if the domain is not exceeded quota, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_request_info *r)
+{
+	unsigned int count = 0;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = r->domain;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+
+	if (r->mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_LEARNING)
+		return false;
+	if (!domain)
+		return true;
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		if (ptr->is_deleted)
+			continue;
+		switch (ptr->type) {
+			u16 perm;
+			u8 i;
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL:
+			perm = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head)
+				->perm;
+			for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION; i++)
+				if (perm & (1 << i))
+					count++;
+			if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE))
+				count -= 2;
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL:
+			perm = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head)
+				->perm;
+			for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION; i++)
+				if (perm & (1 << i))
+					count++;
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL:
+			perm = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path_number_acl,
+					    head)->perm;
+			for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION; i++)
+				if (perm & (1 << i))
+					count++;
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL:
+			perm = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl,
+					    head)->perm;
+			for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION; i++)
+				if (perm & (1 << i))
+					count++;
+			break;
+		default:
+			count++;
+		}
+	}
+	if (count < tomoyo_profile(domain->profile)->learning->
+	    learning_max_entry)
+		return true;
+	if (!domain->quota_warned) {
+		domain->quota_warned = true;
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-WARNING: "
+		       "Domain '%s' has so many ACLs to hold. "
+		       "Stopped learning mode.\n", domain->domainname->name);
+	}
+	return false;
+}