bpf: Add probe_read_{user, kernel} and probe_read_{user, kernel}_str helpers
The current bpf_probe_read() and bpf_probe_read_str() helpers are broken
in that they assume they can be used for probing memory access for kernel
space addresses /as well as/ user space addresses.
However, plain use of probe_kernel_read() for both cases will attempt to
always access kernel space address space given access is performed under
KERNEL_DS and some archs in-fact have overlapping address spaces where a
kernel pointer and user pointer would have the /same/ address value and
therefore accessing application memory via bpf_probe_read{,_str}() would
read garbage values.
Lets fix BPF side by making use of recently added 3d7081822f ("uaccess:
Add non-pagefault user-space read functions"). Unfortunately, the only way
to fix this status quo is to add dedicated bpf_probe_read_{user,kernel}()
and bpf_probe_read_{user,kernel}_str() helpers. The bpf_probe_read{,_str}()
helpers are kept as-is to retain their current behavior.
The two *_user() variants attempt the access always under USER_DS set, the
two *_kernel() variants will -EFAULT when accessing user memory if the
underlying architecture has non-overlapping address ranges, also avoiding
throwing the kernel warning via 00c42373d3 ("x86-64: add warning for
non-canonical user access address dereferences").
Fixes: a5e8c07059 ("bpf: add bpf_probe_read_str helper")
Fixes: 2541517c32 ("tracing, perf: Implement BPF programs attached to kprobes")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/796ee46e948bc808d54891a1108435f8652c6ca4.1572649915.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Alexei Starovoitov
parent
eb1b668874
commit
6ae08ae3de
+137
-48
@@ -138,24 +138,140 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_override_return_proto = {
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};
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#endif
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BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const void *, unsafe_ptr)
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BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_user, void *, dst, u32, size,
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const void __user *, unsafe_ptr)
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{
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int ret;
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int ret = probe_user_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
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ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto out;
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ret = probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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out:
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memset(dst, 0, size);
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return ret;
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}
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static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_proto = {
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.func = bpf_probe_read,
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static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_user_proto = {
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.func = bpf_probe_read_user,
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.gpl_only = true,
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.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
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.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
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.arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
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.arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
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};
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BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_user_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
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const void __user *, unsafe_ptr)
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{
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int ret = strncpy_from_unsafe_user(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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memset(dst, 0, size);
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return ret;
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}
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static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto = {
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.func = bpf_probe_read_user_str,
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.gpl_only = true,
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.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
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.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
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.arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
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.arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
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};
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static __always_inline int
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bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr,
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const bool compat)
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{
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int ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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goto out;
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ret = compat ? probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size) :
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probe_kernel_read_strict(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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out:
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memset(dst, 0, size);
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return ret;
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}
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BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_kernel, void *, dst, u32, size,
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const void *, unsafe_ptr)
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{
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return bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr, false);
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}
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static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto = {
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.func = bpf_probe_read_kernel,
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.gpl_only = true,
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.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
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.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
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.arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
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.arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
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};
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BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_compat, void *, dst, u32, size,
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const void *, unsafe_ptr)
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{
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return bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr, true);
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}
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static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_compat_proto = {
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.func = bpf_probe_read_compat,
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.gpl_only = true,
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.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
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.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
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.arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
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.arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
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};
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static __always_inline int
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bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_common(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr,
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const bool compat)
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{
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int ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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goto out;
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/*
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* The strncpy_from_unsafe_*() call will likely not fill the entire
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* buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing
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* arbitrary memory anyway similar to bpf_probe_read_*() and might
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* as well probe the stack. Thus, memory is explicitly cleared
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* only in error case, so that improper users ignoring return
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* code altogether don't copy garbage; otherwise length of string
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* is returned that can be used for bpf_perf_event_output() et al.
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*/
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ret = compat ? strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size) :
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strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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out:
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memset(dst, 0, size);
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return ret;
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}
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BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_kernel_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
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const void *, unsafe_ptr)
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{
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return bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr, false);
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}
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static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto = {
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.func = bpf_probe_read_kernel_str,
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.gpl_only = true,
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.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
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.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
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.arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
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.arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
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};
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BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_compat_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
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const void *, unsafe_ptr)
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{
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return bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr, true);
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}
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static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_compat_str_proto = {
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.func = bpf_probe_read_compat_str,
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.gpl_only = true,
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.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
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.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
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@@ -583,41 +699,6 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_current_task_under_cgroup_proto = {
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.arg2_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
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};
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BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
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const void *, unsafe_ptr)
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{
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int ret;
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ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto out;
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/*
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* The strncpy_from_unsafe() call will likely not fill the entire
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* buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing
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* arbitrary memory anyway similar to bpf_probe_read() and might
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* as well probe the stack. Thus, memory is explicitly cleared
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* only in error case, so that improper users ignoring return
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* code altogether don't copy garbage; otherwise length of string
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* is returned that can be used for bpf_perf_event_output() et al.
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*/
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ret = strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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out:
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memset(dst, 0, size);
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return ret;
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}
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static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_str_proto = {
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.func = bpf_probe_read_str,
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.gpl_only = true,
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.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
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.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
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.arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
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.arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
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};
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struct send_signal_irq_work {
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struct irq_work irq_work;
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struct task_struct *task;
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@@ -697,8 +778,6 @@ tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
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return &bpf_map_pop_elem_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem:
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return &bpf_map_peek_elem_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_probe_read:
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return &bpf_probe_read_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns:
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return &bpf_ktime_get_ns_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
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@@ -725,8 +804,18 @@ tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
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return &bpf_current_task_under_cgroup_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32:
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return &bpf_get_prandom_u32_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user:
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return &bpf_probe_read_user_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel:
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return &bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_probe_read:
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return &bpf_probe_read_compat_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str:
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return &bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str:
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return &bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto;
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case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str:
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return &bpf_probe_read_str_proto;
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return &bpf_probe_read_compat_str_proto;
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#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
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case BPF_FUNC_get_current_cgroup_id:
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return &bpf_get_current_cgroup_id_proto;
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